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I. INTRODUCTION
The international intellectual property regime is at a crossroads
today.1 Since the establishment of the Agreement on Trade-Related
1. For discussions of international regimes, see generally ANDREAS
HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1997);
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); Stephan Haggard &
Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491
(1987). Commentators disagreed on the definition of international regimes.
For example, Professor Stephen Krasner defined international regimes as:
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area
of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and
rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights
and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for
making and implementing collective choice.
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra, at 1, 2. By
contrast, Professor Robert Keohane defined international regimes as
"institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to
particular sets of issues in international relations." Robert 0. Keohane,
Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics, in
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 1, 4 (Robert 0. Keohane ed., 1989).
Many commentators have pointed out the problematic nature of the
term "intellectual property." According to these commentators, the term
glosses over the differences in legal systems that originated differently, protect
different subject matter, and raise different policy questions. See, e.g., Richard
Stallman, Some Confusing or Loaded Words and Phrases That Are Worth
Avoiding, at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html (last visited
Aug. 30, 2004). For example, the Berne and Paris Conventions were two
separate treaties covering two different sets of intellectual property rights-
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 2 ("TRIPS Agreement") in the
early 1990s, many less developed countries have become dissatisfied
with the regime.3 As they claimed, the regime has failed to take into
consideration their needs, interests, and local conditions, and the
increased expansion of intellectual property protection has
jeopardized their access to information, knowledge, and essential
medicines. As a result, less developed countries are reluctant to
develop new international intellectual property norms despite
repeated demands by developed countries.
Unable to secure stronger protection for their nationals, many
literary and artistic property for the Berne Convention and industrial property
for the Paris Convention. Notwithstanding these differences, these two sets of
rights are now linked together, as the Berne and Paris conventions were
incorporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement. These two conventions
are also administered by a single intergovernmental organization known as the
World Intellectual Property Organization. Moreover, intellectual property
consists of more than just copyrights, patents, and trademarks; it also includes
trade secrets, geographical indications, industrial designs, layout designs of
integrated circuits, plant variety protection, utility models, and many forms of
unfair competition. As the international intellectual property regime continues
to develop, new sui generis protection will be created. Thus, this Article
brings together the different sets of rights under the rubric of the international
intellectual property regime.
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. Activist Roberto Verzola captured well the sentiment of many less
developed countries:
If it is a sin for the poor to steal from the rich, it must be a much
bigger sin for the rich to steal from the poor. Don't rich countries
pirate poor countries' best scientists, engineers, doctors, nurses and
programmers? When global corporations come to operate in the
Philippines, don't they pirate the best people from local firms? ... If
it is bad for poor countries like ours to pirate the intellectual property
of rich countries, isn't it a lot worse for rich countries like the US to
pirate our intellectuals?
In fact, we are benign enough to take only a copy, leaving the
original behind; rich countries are so greedy that they take away the
originals, leaving nothing behind.
Roberto Verzola, Pegging the World's Biggest, 12 EARTH ISLAND J. 41, 41
(1997), available at http://www.earthisland.org/eijournal/new-articles.cfn
?articlelD=31l&journalID=50, quoted in Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the
Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUs. L.
REV. 763, 764 (2003).
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developed countries, in particular the United States and the members
of the European Union, have turned to bilateral free trade
agreements, which enable countries to use economic strengths to
induce their less powerful trading partners to ratchet up intellectual
property protection offered to their nationals.4 Meanwhile, rights
holders in developed countries have also introduced mass market
licenses and technological protection measures to protect themselves
from piracy and counterfeiting abroad. Thus, many commentators
are concerned that this "one-way ratchet" 5 ultimately will roll back
the substantive and strategic gains made by less developed countries
during TRIPS negotiations. 6 These commentators also fear that the
international intellectual property regime will enter into a new era of
heightened protection as protection continues to expand.7
Interestingly, intellectual property rights holders feel equally
threatened by the new developments in the international intellectual
property regime. To many of them, the recent developments were
troubling and unprecedented. For example, the Doha Declaration
included strong language that recognizes the needs of less developed
countries to have access to affordable drugs in light of the public
health crises within their borders. 8  The two key documents
emanating from the World Summit on the Information Society in
4. For excellent discussions of the recent bilateral free trade agreements,
see generally DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
(FTAA) (2003), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pd/FTAA(A4).pdf;
Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U.
OTrAWA L. & TECH. J. 127 (2004).
5. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round H: Should Users Strike
Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 22 (2004). As one commentator described:
"Trends are moving towards widening the scope of protectable subject matter,
the creation of new intellectual property rights (IPRs), progressive
harmonisation, stronger enforcement measures, weakening of special and
differential treatment for developing countries and weakening or removal of
existing flexibilities." VIVAs-EUGUI, supra note 4, at 3.
6. See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 4, at 129.
7. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
8. See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration].
CURRENTS AND CROSSCURRENTS
Geneva included strong language declaring the need for universal
access to information and knowledge throughout the world.9 In
February 2003, the United Nations Development Programme
released a report highly critical of the TRIPS Agreement.10 The
report urged the WTO member states "to begin dialogues to replace
TRIPS-and equivalent top-down schemes of substantive IPR
harmonization-with alternate intellectual property paradigms
....,11 Most recently, the General Assembly of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) adopted the Proposal for
the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, which was
put forward by Argentina and Brazil. 12 Civil society organizations
were also able to put together the Geneva Declaration on the Future
of the World Intellectual Property Organization ("Geneva
Declaration"), highlighting the needs and demands of less developed
countries. 13 As a result of these developments, many intellectual
property rights holders have become concerned that the international
intellectual property regime is entering into a new era of significantly
reduced protection.
This Article challenges the incomplete views held by those on
both sides of the international intellectual property debate and argues
that recent developments are neither new nor surprising. Indeed,
there are many similarities between the current and past
developments. For example, before the creation of the Berne and
Paris Conventions, countries used bilateral treaties to coordinate
9. See World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, Declaration of Principles,
WSIS Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter WSIS
Declaration of Principles], available at http://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-
s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004! !PDF-E.pdf.
10. UNITED NATIONS DEv. PROGRAMME, MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK
FOR PEOPLE (2003), available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/
globaltrade.pdf.
11. Id. at 221.
12. The proposal "call[ed] for WIPO to 'fully incorporate' and 'to take
immediate action in providing for the incorporation of a 'Development
Agenda' in the Organization's work program."' See Press Release, WIPO,
Member States Agree to Further Examine Proposal on Development (Oct. 4,
2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2004/wipopr2 004_
396.html.
13. Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (Oct. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf [hereinafter
Geneva Declaration].
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national intellectual property policies.' 4 These bilateral treaties were
very similar to the bilateral and regional free trade agreements the
European Union and United States have recently signed with less
developed countries. 15 Likewise, the new WIPO Development
Agenda bears a strong resemblance to the agenda put forward by less
developed countries in the 1967 Stockholm revision conference,
which led to the creation of the World Intellectual Property
Organization and the inclusion of the Protocol Regarding Developing
Countries in the Berne Convention. 16  Indeed, the Geneva
Declaration specifically mentioned the 1967 Stockholm revision
conference. 1
7
To help us understand the recent developments, this Article
traces the historical development of the international intellectual
property regime and demonstrates that this regime is the product of
repeated interactions between an evolving set of currents and
crosscurrents. While the currents of multilateralism push for
uniformity and increased harmonization, the crosscurrents of
resistance-a term I use to denote the resistance to the "currents"-
protect national autonomy and international diversity. By bringing
together these currents and crosscurrents, this Article demonstrates
that the international intellectual property regime is an ongoing
project that provides opportunities and crises for both developed and
less developed countries, as well as for rights holders and individual
end users.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 49-57 & 120-22.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing recent bilateral agreements).
Indeed, as Professor Ruth Okediji argued:
[T]he so-called new bilateralism is actually more consistent with
historical uses of the foreign relations/treaty power of the United
States, as well as the general framework of international law, in its
dealings with developing countries since the independence era.
Consequently, it is probably the TRIPS Agreement that is the
aberration in international intellectual property law, and not the recent
spates of bilateral and regional agreements.
Okediji, supra note 4, at 130.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 90-100.
17. See Geneva Declaration, supra note 13.
18. See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual
Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global
Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 334-41 (2003)
(suggesting that the "third multilateralism," which began in 1994, is an era of
consolidation that "is still in its infancy"); Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property
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Part II of this Article traces the origins of the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 19 and the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 20  It also
discusses the emergence of the modem notions of intellectual
property in Venice, how countries became dissatisfied with the use
of bilateral agreements to protect authors and inventors in foreign
countries, and how they pushed for the establishment of multilateral
treaties. Part III traces the origins of the TRIPS Agreement and the
1996 WIPO Internet Treaties. 2 1  It describes how intellectual
property lawmaking shifted from the WTO back to WIPO in the
mid-1990s, despite the successful negotiation of the TRIPS
Agreement. Part IV explores the five crosscurrents that have
emerged in the international intellectual property regime in recent
years: reciprocization, diversification, bilateralism, non-
nationalization, and abandonment. It explains how these
crosscurrents may undercut international harmonization efforts and
create new challenges for this regime. Part V concludes by
providing observations on the international intellectual property
regime in five different areas: bargaining frameworks, regime
development, global lawmaking, harmonization efforts, and judicial
trends.
and Public Policy in Historical Perspective: Contestation and Settlement, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 267 (2004) (arguing that intellectual property rights were
historically developed through repeated rounds of contestation and settlement,
in which losers challenged winners over the status quo).
19. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
21. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/94 (Dec. 23, 1996) [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (Dec.
23, 1996) [hereinafter WPPT]. For comprehensive discussions of the 1996
WIPO Internet Treaties, see generally MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR
INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002); JORG REINBOTHE & SILKE
VON LEWINSKI, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY
AND THE WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY (2002).
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II. FROM BILATERALISM TO MULTILATERALISM
The modem notions of intellectual property are generally traced
back to the Venetian Republic in the fifteenth century. Although
intellectual property "existed in some form in Venetian law as a
customary practice,"22 the Republic did not formalize such protection
until it adopted the first patent law on March 19, 1474.23 This law
was designed primarily to encourage and reward inventors for their
ingenuity, rather than to prevent monopolies. The law, as translated
by Professor Luigi Sordelli, read as follows:
There are in this city, and also there come temporarily by
reason of its greatness and goodness, men from different
places and most clever minds, capable of devising and
inventing all manner of ingenious contrivances. And
should it be provided, that the works and contrivances
invented by them, others having seen them could not make
them and take their honour, men of such kind would exert
their minds, invent and make things which would be of no
small utility and benefit to our State. Therefore, decision
will be passed that, by authority of this Council, each
person who will make in this city any new ingenious
contrivance, not made heretofore in our dominion, as soon
as it is reduced to perfection, so that it can be used and
exercised, shall give notice of the same to the office of our
Provisioners of Common. It being forbidden to any other in
any territory and place of ours to make any other
contrivance in the form and resemblance thereof, without
the consent and license of the author up to ten years. And,
however, should anybody make it, the aforesaid author and
inventor will have the liberty to cite him before any office
of this city, by which office the aforesaid who shall infringe
be forced to pay him the sum of one hundred ducates and
22. Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New Technologies, Legal
Innovation and the Institutional Origins of Intellectual Property, 20
PROMETHEUS 159, 160 (2002); see also Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents
(1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 166 (1948).
23. STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 6 (1975). "[T]he Venetian
Council adopted this law by the vote of 116 members, with 10 negative votes
cast and 3 abstaining as uncertain." Id. at 6 n.24.
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the contrivance be immediately destroyed. Being then in
liberty of our Government at his will to take and use in his
need any of said contrivances and instruments, with this
condition, however, that no others than the authors shall
exercise them.
24
Although this Venetian statute was in primitive form, it outlined
a modem patent system, including such key components as "a
balance of knowledge available through a state sanctioned public
realm; the rights of the 'innovator' to benefit from his intellectual
endeavour; and the notion of reward for effort." 25 The Republic's
effort to formalize intellectual property notions also demonstrated the
strategic importance of promoting innovation and competitive
industrial practices.26
Since the enactment of the Venetian statute, the central
components and rationale of the patent system have remained largely
intact.27 As Professor Christopher May pointed out, the Venetian
statute was more modem than subsequent English patent law, as "it
provided for patents as a matter of right and general principle, not
merely of royal favor." 28  This statute is therefore of great
jurisprudential significance. "For the first time, patents were subject
to a generalised law rather than a process of individual petition and
grant[;] ... grants were based not on the relationship between the
petitioner and the authorities, but rather on the applicant's ability to
fulfil certain fixed criteria."
29
In addition to patents, the Venetian Republic was also credited
with the development of copyright law. In the late fifteenth century,
24. Id. at 6-7. For other translated versions of the statute, see May, supra
note 22, at 178-79.
25. May, supra note 22, at 163.
26. Id. at 169.
27. Id. at 166; see also BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT
AND COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (1967) (claiming that "the international patent
experience of nearly 500 years has merely brought amendments or
improvements upon the solid core established in Renaissance Venice"); Frank
D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 711, 720 (1944) ("In most places, the patent system was adopted
almost exactly as developed in Venice.... All of the basic patent rules
developed in Venice were preserved in the subsequent systems, down to and
including our present American system.").
28. Prager, supra note 27, at 715-16.
29. May, supra note 22, at 162.
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Venice was considered "the capital of printing." 30 Between 1480 and
1482, at least 156 different editions were published in Venice,
leaving Milan with only 82 known editions.3' Commentators
generally trace the origin of copyright law back to the patent the
Venetian Republic granted to Johann Speyer for his printing press in
321469. More than two decades later, in 1493, "the Venetian Cabinet
set a precedent giving Daniele Barbaro a ten-year exclusive grant to
publish a book by his late brother, Ermolao. ' 33 Due to an oversupply
of books, the Senate soon restricted the privilege to "new and
previously unprinted works." 34  In 1549, a new Council decree
organized all of Venice's printers and booksellers into a guild while
giving the Church some assistance in suppressing heretical works. 35
By the sixteenth century, the modem notions of intellectual
property had been formally institutionalized in Venice, even though
this development did not save the city-state from decline. 36 These
notions soon spread to other parts of Europe, including France and
the Holy Roman Empire. 37 Thanks to the increased competition in
trade and the ultimate rise of London, the momentum for the
development of intellectual property law eventually shifted to
England. 38 By the eighteenth century, the Statute of Monopolies39
and the Statute of Anne4° had attracted attention from many
countries, including the United States. These two famous English
30. Id. at 169.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN
HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 10-11 (1994). As Professor
John Feather wrote: "Speyer was the first printer in the city, and it was in
everyone's interest to protect his position. His privilege gave him an exclusive
right to print books in all Venetian territories for the next five years." Id. It
remains "contested whether [Speyer] was recognized as first importer of the
whole art of typography, or as inventor of improvements." Prager, supra note
27, at 718 (footnotes omitted).
33. May, supra note 22, at 172.
34. Id. at 173.
35. Id.
36. See Prager, supra note 27, at 719-20.
37. See id.
38. See generally CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 11-14 (1988) (describing the rise of patent protection in England
as a response to growing importation and improvement in technology).
39. 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (1623) (Eng.).
40. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
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statutes, together with the Intellectual Property Clause of the United
States Constitution41 and early French intellectual property laws,42
eventually became the models for intellectual property laws around
the world, including many less developed countries and former
colonies.
43
By the eighteenth century, most countries, in particular the
colonial powers, had offered formal intellectual property protection
to their nationals and resident aliens satisfying specified conditions. 4
Although authors and inventors would not be able to obtain
protection unless they were willing to travel abroad to seek
protection as residents in foreign countries, transportation and
communication barriers limited the ability of countries to trade
intellectual goods. 45  International intellectual property protection
therefore did not become a major issue until a century later.
By then, transportation and communication had substantially
improved, and the industrial revolution had greatly accelerated the
production of intellectual goods.46  As cross-border markets
developed and expanded, countries became concerned about the
limited national protection and the virtually nonexistent international
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42. For an insightful discussion of early French copyright law, see
generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990).
43. See Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright:
Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994) (discussing
the legal transplant of copyright law); Okediji, supra note 18, at 315-16
(noting that "[firom the moment a select group of European countries
concluded a multilateral agreement for the protection of industrial property in
1883, non-Western societies, principally in Africa and Asia, were swept under
the aegis of the international intellectual property system through the agency of
colonial rule." (footnote omitted)).
44. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 30-44 (1938) (discussing the protection
national laws offered to literary and artistic property owned by foreigners);
LADAS, supra note 23, at 19-42 (discussing the protection national laws
offered to industrial property owned by foreigners).
45. For an interesting account of the transportation barriers in the
eighteenth century and how these barriers affected the mobility of music
composers, see F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES: THE
ECONOMICS OF MUSIC COMPOSITION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH
CENTURIES 142-54 (2003).
46. See LADAS, supra note 23, at 12.
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protection for foreign authors and inventors.47  Although foreign
creators and inventors could obtain protection as resident aliens, this
protection was woefully inadequate, due largely to antiquated law,
technical objections, and the lack of an adequate private international
law theory.48 Justice was often unreasonably denied, and the need for
stronger international intellectual property protection therefore arose.
In the copyright area, early international protection existed in the
form of bilateral treaties, protecting authors and creative efforts
through reciprocity provisions. 49  For example, in 1828 Denmark
issued a decree to extend the protection of authors' rights to foreign
works on the condition of reciprocity.50 Prussia entered into thirty-
two bilateral agreements with other German states from 1827 to
1829, and Austria and Sardinia became the first autonomous states to
enter into a bilateral copyright agreement in 1840.51 Predominant
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Stephen Ladas described the changing conditions in nineteenth-century
Europe:
The nineteenth century brought profound changes in the conditions
upon which the rights of authors were based. In the political field, the
liberty of the press, the destruction of the division of social classes, the
dissemination of education, the reinforcement of national unity by the
use of national languages instead of separate dialects; in the social and
economic field, new processes of reproduction of literary and artistic
works, the expansion of the press, the creation of new universities,
libraries, museums and expositions, the development of bookselling
and the wider circulation of books, the learning of foreign languages
and the more general traveling of people from one country to
another-all these facts created new conditions for the works of
authors and artists. Writing and the cultivation of the arts came to be a
real profession and those engaged in it expected to be supported by it
and no longer by Maecenas and Royal Courts. As a result, authors
began to demand a fuller protection of their rights, and to raise much
outcry against the injustice done them by the pirating of their works in
foreign countries.
LADAS, supra note 44, at 23-24.
50. Id. at 22. "This [decree] is admitted to be the first provision for
international protection of authors' rights, and it is the first enactment in which
the principle of reciprocity is introduced in this field." Id.
51. See id. at 44. "These early German agreements... were of a special
character, as their purpose was to fill the gap left by the failure of the
legislature of the Germanic Confederation to enact a federal copyright law."
Sam Ricketson, The Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 9,
14-15 (1986).
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powers like France and Great Britain soon followed.52 By the late
nineteenth century, a network of bilateral copyri 3 ht conventions had
been established among major European powers.
Notwithstanding this treaty network, authors could expect very
little uniformity in protection outside of their home countries.54 This
lack of uniformity was complicated by the fact that the duration of a
copyright treaty was sometimes tied to a broader commercial treaty
and copyright protection would be deeply affected if the commercial
treaty were revoked or renegotiated."5 Even worse, some copyright
treaties contained "most favored nation" clauses, which allowed a
state to enjoy the more favorable benefits the other contracting party
granted to a third party in a different treaty.56 Although these clauses
did not result in any loss of protection for authors, they made it
difficult to ascertain the level of protection authors would receive in
a particular country.
57
In the mid-nineteenth century, France issued the Decree of
March 28, 1852, which unilaterally extended copyright protection to
all works regardless of their country of origin. 5 The promulgation
of this decree can be attributed to three factors:
First, the French believed that authors' rights were rooted in
natural rights and "should ... not be subject to artificial
52. France concluded a copyright convention with Sardinia in 1843, and
conventions for the protection of literary and artistic property with Great
Britain, Portugal, and Hanover in 1851. LADAS, supra note 44, at 45. Great
Britain passed the International Copyright Act in 1837, and entered into a
copyright convention with Prussia on the basis of this statute in 1846. This
Convention was further extended to ten German States in 1847, and two more
in 1853. Id. By 1886, Great Britain had entered into copyright conventions
with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Id. at 49.
53. Ricketson, supra note 51, at 15. "By 1886, there was an intricate
network of bilateral copyright conventions in force between the majority of
European states, as well as with several Latin American countries. Of these,
France was party to the most agreements (13), followed closely by Belgium
(9), Italy and Spain (8 each), the United Kingdom (5) and Germany (5)." Id.
54. Id. at 16.
55. See LADAS, supra note 44, at 66-67; Ricketson, supra note 51, at 15.
56. LADAS, supra note 44, at 66; see Ricketson, supra note 51, at 15-16.
57. Ricketson, supra note 51, at 16.
58. See Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International
Copyright-Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1052 (1968). "This
remained a part of French law until the principle of reciprocity was introduced
by Decree No. 67181 of Mar. 6, 1967." Id. at 1052 n.10.
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restraints such as nationality and political boundaries."
Second, France was concerned about its failure to negotiate
bilateral treaties with Belgium and the Netherlands--"the
two principal 'hotbeds' of French piracies"--and "therefore
hoped that the unilateral grant of protection to authors from
these countries in France would 'shame' them into
responding in like manner." Third, the French at that time
believed that "bargaining was not the best method of
securing international protection of authors' rights, and that
if France should begin declaring that piracy of a foreign
work in France was a crime punishable by the law, the other
governments would be more willing to take the same
step."9
59
Although it is hard to assess the impact and effectiveness of this
decree, the decree seems to have improved France's copyright
relations with other countries, in particular Belgium and the
Netherlands. 60 The decree also accelerated the movement toward a
multilateral copyright system.61
In 1858, authors and artists met at the Congress on Literary and
Artistic Property in Brussels to discuss the international protection of
authors' rights.62 Three years later, a new Congress was called in
Antwerp to induce countries to adopt uniform legislation that would
provide authors with "the greatest possible protection."63 Although
no international congresses were held for several years after the
Antwerp Congress, "important national meetings of authors and
artists were held in several countries, particularly France and
Germany, and the number of bilateral conventions that were made
59. Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDoZO L. REv. 331, 347
(2003) (footnotes omitted).
60. Id. "'During the decade from 1852 to 1862 France was able to
conclude twenty-three treaties for the reciprocal protection of authors'
rights.... In the previous decade she had been able to conclude but four
treaties. Two of the treaties concluded after 1852 were with Belgium (August
22, 1852) and Holland (March 29, 1855).... Id. at 347 n.120 (quoting
LADAS, supra note 44, at 29).
61. Ringer, supra note 58, at 1052 (noting that France's unilateral initiative
accelerated the movement toward a multilateral copyright system even though
it did not set a pattern).
62. See LADAS, supra note 44, at 72 (discussing the Congress of 1858).
63. Id. at 72-73 (discussing the Congress of 1861).
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during this period increased rapidly." 64 In 1877, artists met again in
Antwerp to celebrate the tercentenary of the birth of well-known
Flemish painter Peter Paul Rubens. 65 In that Congress, they adopted
a unanimous resolution to call upon the recently-established Institute
of International Law "to draft a project of world law on the
protection of artistic works."
66
At the Universal Exposition in Paris a year later, the Literary
Congress, presided over by French novelist Victor Hugo, met and
decided to create an international association of literary societies and
authors. 67 This association soon expanded their membership and
coverage to include artists and artistic property.68  In 1882, the
association met again in Rome, and Paul Schmidt of the German
Publishers Association proposed to establish a Union to protect
literary property.69  He called upon the association's Executive
Council to convene a conference that would include all of the
interested parties with the aim of creating a union.70 The association
unanimously approved the proposal, and the conference met in Berne
in September 1883.71 At the Berne conference, a draft convention of
ten articles was proposed,72 and the government of Switzerland
64. Ricketson, supra note 51, at 18.
65. LADAS, supra note 44, at 72.
66. Id. at 72-73 (discussing the Congress of 1877).
67. Id. at 73-74.
68. Id. at 74.
69. See Ricketson, supra note 51, at 19. Professor Sam Ricketson
considered Dr. Schmidt's motion "cannily conceived." Id. As he explained:
[The motion] began by saying that this was not the time or place to
begin discussion of a new international instrument on copyright.
Widespread discussions and consultations were needed before this
could be done, but, with a view to beginning this process, the motion
charged the office of ALAI with the task of undertaking:
the necessary measures for initiating, in the press of all countries,
as extensive and profound discussion as possible on the question
of the formation of a Union of literary property, and for arranging
at a date to be subsequently fixed, a conference composed of the
organs and representatives of interested groups, to meet to discuss
and settle a scheme for the creation of a Union of literary
property.
Id. at 19-20.
70. LADAS, supra note 44, at 75.
71. Id.
72. Ringer, supra note 58, at 1052.
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agreed to communicate the project to "all civilized countries. '" 73
For the next three years, intergovernmental conferences were
held in Beme. 74 Although the meetings were not well received in the
very beginning and countries disagreed on how they should protect
authors' rights, the participating countries eventually became
receptive to the idea of having a multilateral convention.75 When the
final conference met on September 6, 1886, twelve countries were in
76attendance. Except for Japan and the United States, which only
attended the conference as observers, 77 all of the other participating
countries-Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy,
Liberia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia-signed the final
instrument, which then was ratified and entered into force on
December 5, 1887.78 The United States did not join the Berne
73. Thorvald Solberg, The International Copyright Union, 36 YALE L.J. 68,
81 (1926). "The Swiss Government did not submit the project adopted by the
Congress of the International Association. It substituted a more complete draft
convention of eighteen articles, which, however, did not differ fundamentally
from that of 1883." LADAS, supra note 44, at 77.
74. For a discussion of these intergovernmental conferences, see LADAS,
supra note 44, at 76-83.
75. See Ricketson, supra note 51, at 22-29.
76. Id. at 29.
77. Japan joined the Berne Convention in 1899 and became the first Asian
country to do so. Although the United States did not sign the original Berne
Convention, its delegate, Boyd Winchester, "held out the promise of accession,
if the circumstances should become appropriate":
Whilst not prepared to join the proposed Convention as a full
Signatory, the United States does not thereby wish to be understood as
opposing the measure in any way, but on the contrary, desires to
reserve without prejudice the privilege of future accession to the
Convention, should it become expedient and practicable to do so....
The position and attitude of the United States is one of expectancy and
reserve.
Id. at 29-30. Little did the other signatory countries know at that time that the
United States would not join the Berne Convention until 1989, more than a
century later. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
78. LADAS, supra note 44, at 82-83 (discussing the Final Conference of
1886). Nine of the ten signatory countries ratified the Berne Convention.
Liberia did not ratify the original Berne Convention, but acceded to the
Convention in 1908. Id. at 83. The original Berne Convention is reprinted in
id. at 1123-34. For a comprehensive discussion of the Berne Convention, see
generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987); Symposium, Conference
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Convention until more than a century later. 
79
The original Berne Convention was, by modem standards, "a
modest beginning; nevertheless, it was the first truly multilateral
copyright treaty in history... [and] established some important basic
principles." 80  First, the Convention created a "Union for the
protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works," 81 which has an independent existence regardless of its
membership.82 The Union remains "open to all states without
restrictions, as long as they are prepared to comply with the
obligations embodied therein." 83 Second, in lieu of reciprocity, the
Convention adopted the principle of national treatment, which
requires member states to grant to foreigners the same rights they
grant to their own nationals. 84  Third, the Convention provided
merely minimum protection for translation and public performance
rights. 85 By doing so, the treaty provided member states the freedom
to augment protection through other bilateral or multilateral
arrangements while leaving room for further expansion of these
minimum rights in subsequent revisions.
86
Celebrating the Centenary of the Berne Convention, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 1 (1986).
79. The United States joined the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 77.
80. Ringer, supra note 58, at 1053; see LADAS, supra note 44, at 86 (noting
that the Berne Convention "was a great step ahead in securing to authors and
artists a more complete protection than they ever enjoyed up to that time in the
international field").
81. Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 1, 820 U.N.T.S. at 225.
82. STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS § 5.06, at 101 (2d ed. 1989).
83. Ricketson, supra note 51, at 9.
84. See Ringer, supra note 58, at 1053.
85. Ricketson, supra note 51, at 22. The original Berne Convention
required member states to protect translation rights for a minimum term of ten
years. Ringer, supra note 58, at 1053. The Convention also mandated that
national treatment be applied to the public representation of dramatic or
dramatico-musical works, to the public performance of an unpublished musical
work, and to the public performance of a published musical work provided the
author had expressly declared his intention to forbid public performance of the
work. See Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 9, 828 U.N.T.S. at 239.
86. Ricketson, supra note 51, at 22, 28. The Berne Convention underwent
revisions in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, and 1971. For a short discussion of the
various revisions of the Beme Convention, see H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 12-
13 (1988).
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Since its creation, the Berne Convention has been revised
substantially. For example, the 1908 Berlin Act prohibited the use of
formalities as a condition of the enjoyment and exercise of rights
under the Convention. 87 The 1928 Rome Act expressly recognized
the moral rights of authors, such as the rights of attribution and
integrity, as well as the right to authorize broadcasts. 88 The 1948
Brussels Act established a mandatory copyright term of life of the
author plus fifty years, which replaced the optional term adopted in
the Rome revision conference. 89
The most significant revision of the Convention came in the
1960s, when decolonization dramatically increased the size of the
international community. 90 At that time, both the Soviet Union and
the United States, the two post-War superpowers, were outside the
Convention. So were many African, Asian, and Latin American
countries, which had recently become members of the United
Nations. In light of this development, less developed country
participants were understandably concerned about their lack of
sufficient and affordable access to information and knowledge.
9 1
Led by India, these countries demanded "that unless some major
copyright concessions were made for developing countries, they
would have to make drastic changes in their international copyright
arrangements." 92 The 1967 Stockholm revision conference therefore
became the venue in which less developed countries sought "'to
adjust the system of protection under the Berne Convention to [their]
economic, social and cultural needs."'
93
Under the 1967 Stockholm Act,94 the Convention, for the first
time, expressly recognized the implicit reproduction right while
87. See H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 12 (discussing the 1908 Berlin Act).
88. See id. (discussing the 1928 Rome Act).
89. See id. at 12-13 (discussing the 1948 Brussels Act).
90. See Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role
in the Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 50 n.366 (1988).
91. See generally Ringer, supra note 58 (providing historical background
on the development of international copyright law and efforts by less
developed countries to influence the revision of the Berne Convention).
92. Id. at 1065.
93. Id. (quoting Judge Hesser, one of the architects of the revised
convention).
94. See Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828
U.N.T.S. 305.
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including exceptions to this newly recognized right.95 The new act
also reconciled different national rules of authorship and ownership
concerning cinematographic works.9 6 In addition, the Convention
extended protection to authors with habitual residence in a member
state, regardless of their citizenship. 97 Finally, in response to the
demands by less developed countries, the Stockholm Act established
a Protocol Regarding Developing Countries, which sought to enable
less developed countries to broadly limit rights of translation and
reproduction.
98
Although the demands by less developed countries at that time
were understandable, they were unacceptable to developed
countries. 99 Thus, the 1967 Act was never ratified. 00 Four years
later, the Stockholm Act was superseded by a less ambitious Paris
Act,' 0 ' which significantly revised the Protocol Regarding
Developing Countries while retaining virtually everything else in the
Stockholm Act.
102
Since the Paris revision conference, the Berne Convention has
not been revised, and the 1971 Paris Act remains the only Act open
to accession today. Although the Berne Convention has attracted
many less developed countries since the Second World War, the
United States retained formalities-such as the manufacturing
clause' 0 3 and the copyright notice °-and remained outside the
Convention until 1988. Indeed, as former Register of Copyrights
Barbara Ringer pointed out, "[u]ntil the Second World War the
United States had little reason to take pride in its international
copyright relations; in fact, it had a great deal to be ashamed of.
With few exceptions its role in international copyright was marked
by intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism, and narrow
95. See RICKETSON, supra note 78, at 120-21.
96. See id. at 121-22.
97. See id. at 120.
98. See id. at 122-23. For a comprehensive discussion of the Protocol
Regarding Developing Countries, see id. at 590-664.
99. See id. at 621-30 (discussing the events following the adoption of the
Stockholm Protocol).
100. See id. at 124.
101. Berne Convention, supra note 19.
102. See RICKETSON, supra note 78, at 631.
103. The manufacturing clause retired in 1986. See 17 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
104. See id. § 401 (a).
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economic self-interest."'
10 5
Since the Second World War, the United States' attitude toward
international intellectual property protection has changed
substantially. After the War, the United States became a major
exporter of copyrighted works in the world. 10 6 Countries therefore
were eager to induce the United States to join the international
copyright system 10 7 and were willing to establish under the auspices
of UNESCO an alternative copyright treaty called the Universal
Copyright Convention. 1° 8  As Ringer described, this treaty
"represented... a new 'common denominator' convention that was
intended to establish a minimum level of international copyright
relations throughout the world, without weakening or supplanting the
Berne Convention."
' 10 9
In 1988, the United States finally joined the Berne
Convention,"10 abolishing the application to foreign authors of all
formalities that interfere with the enjoyment and exercise of
copyrights. This adherence to the Berne Convention is particularly
important to the United States' role in shaping the current
international intellectual property regime, as it "serve[s] the United
States as an important talking point in its ongoing diplomatic efforts
to promote greater recognition of the rights of American intellectual
property owners abroad.""' Had the United States not become a
105. Ringer, supra note 58, at 1051.
106. Id. at 1060.
107. Id. at 1060-61.
108. See Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, revised at Paris
July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 178.
109. Ringer, supra note 58, at 1061; see also Peter Jaszi, A Garland of
Reflections on Three International Copyright Topics, 8 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 47, 53 (1989) (contending that the Universal Copyright Convention
"had been designed as a sort of junior Berne Convention, with the specific
objective of bringing the United States and other recalcitrant nations into the
fold").
110. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note 77; see
also Jaszi, supra note 109 (commenting on the short-tenn and long-term
international effects of the United States' adherence to the Berne Convention);
David Nimmer, The Impact of Berne on United States Copyright Law, 8
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 27 (1989) (expressing the disappointment of the
United States' minimalist approach to implementing the Berne Convention).
111. Jaszi, supra note 109, at 57. As Professor Jaszi explained:
Prior to 1989, American delegations representing the State
Department, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and
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member of the Berne Union, it might have great difficulty in pushing
for stronger protection in the TRIPS Agreement under the WTO,"
l2
which requires all member states to abide by the 1971 Paris Act of
the Berne Convention." 
3
While the United States was reluctant to participate in the
international copyright system-at least in the system's first century
of development-the country has actively embraced protection of
industrial property, which includes "patents, utility models, industrial
designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of
source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair
competition."" 4  In fact, the United States' reaction to the Paris
Convention was very different from its reaction to the Berne
Convention. While it considered the standards of the Berne
Convention "to be quite high," it found those of the Paris Convention
rather low. 
115
The origin of the Paris Convention was very similar to that of
the Berne Convention. In the eighteenth century, only local laws
protected patents, and international protection was virtually
nonexistent.1 6  Even worse, "blatant discrimination against non-
private industry argued in favor of greater protection for American
sound recordings, movies, and computer software. The governments
of Pacific Rim countries responded by challenging the moral
foundations of the American arguments. They pointed out repeatedly
that the United States has never seen fit to join the Berne Union. This
argument is no longer available.
Id.
112. As Professor Jaszi explained:
[T]here is a close relationship between United States adherence to the
Berne Convention and the potential for the development of an
intellectual property code in the General Agreements for Tariff and
Trade .... Because the copyright component of any set of intellectual
property provisions in GATT will be based largely on Berne
Convention principles, it would have been difficult or impossible for
the United States to function effectively as an advocate for the
inclusion of an intellectual property code in GATT without being a
member of the Berne Convention.
Id. at 57-58 (footnote omitted).
113. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
114. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 1(2), 21 U.S.T. at 1630.
115. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 16 (2001).
116. Even domestically, there were great variations between patent law of
different countries. As Stephen Ladas wrote:
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Spain and Bolivia did not grant patents for the invention of new
industrial products or results, unless by their working a new branch of
industry would be established in the country. Spain also refused
patents for the use of natural products. Germany did not grant a patent
for inventions regarding luxuries or for chemical products. Bolivia
excluded inventions which concerned only a modification of
dimensions, or purely ornamental objects. But the most important
differences concerned inventions, the subjects of which were articles
of food and medicines. With the exception of the United States,
England, Chile, and Brazil, all the countries excepted inventions
regarding medicines generally. Sweden, however, refused a grant for
the product itself, but not for the special process of its manufacture.
On the other hand, France, Spain, Turkey, and Argentina excepted
pharmaceutical compositions, besides medicines.
As to articles of food, they were excepted by Germany, Austria,
and Sweden; but again Sweden gave a patent for the process of
manufacture merely. Austria-Hungary also excepted beverages.
LADAS, supra note 23, at 22.
Thus, before the introduction of the Paris Convention, "foreign
inventors met with great and sometimes insurmountable obstacles to the
protection of their inventions." Id. at 26. As Stephen Ladas explained:
First of all, an invention patentable under the law of their country
might be nonpatentable in other countries. Then, it might not be new
any longer, if it received a certain publication in any country. Even
the filing of the application describing the invention, or the
advertisement of the invention by the administration, was considered
publication destroying the novelty of the invention in many countries.
And in cases where such official publication abroad was not a ground
of refusal of a patent or of its invalidation, there was always the
danger of a third person's obtaining knowledge of the invention
through such publication, and applying for a patent in advance of the
foreign inventor. Only a contemporaneous application in all the
countries where protection was desired could secure the rights of the
inventor. Next, there was the trouble of satisfying the extremely
minute rules of each country concerning the drafting of applications
and documents, and of discussing the patentability or novelty of the
invention with the administration and defending against objections to
the grant filed by third persons. This was a source of heavy expense
and charges. To these should be added the fees and annual taxes
payable in each country in which a patent was obtained.
When a foreign inventor was successful enough to obtain a patent
at great sacrifice, he still was not secure in his right. A failure to pay a
tax at the appointed time would cause the forfeiture of the patent. In a
few countries a period of grace was allowed, but in no country was
restoration of the patent, forfeited for nonpayment of a tax in due time,
possible. Lastly, the obligation to work the patent within a fixed, and
often short, period, and not to interrupt its working, rendered the
protection of foreigners very precarious, since it was almost
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nationals of the protecting country was usually the norm."' 117 Thus,
as trade in industrial products increased in volume, countries became
dissatisfied with the uncertain and inadequate industrial property
protection offered abroad." 8 Indeed, as Stephen Ladas noted in his
seminal treatise, with rapid economic growth and the advent of
speedy communication and transportation, "no country [at that time]
could expect to satisfy the claims and protect the interests of its own
people in the sphere of industrial property without securing
protection on an international level."' "19
Like copyright, early international protection of patents and
trademarks came in the form of bilateral treaties. 12 In 1883 alone,
there were at least sixty-nine bilateral treaties, including commercial
treaties, consular conventions, declarations, and special
arrangements. 12 Notwithstanding these treaties, international patent
protection remained inadequate. As Ladas recounted:
[A]ll of these international agreements dealt with the
protection of trademarks. One third of them protected also
industrial designs or models. But there were only two
conventions containing stipulations for the protection of
patents, two for trade names, and two for indications of
place of origin. The Treaty of Commerce of 1881 between
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the Customs
Convention of 1876 between Austria-Hungary and
Liechtenstein, were the only international agreements
providing for the reciprocal protection of patent rights. The
first was of a very late date; it was concluded after the
International Conference of 1880 had adopted the draft
impossible for a foreigner to take steps for the working of his
invention in all countries. In some countries, even granting a license
to other persons to work the invention was not held to be performance
of the obligation to work the patent unless the licensee started working
the invention within the fixed period. And in France and Turkey, even
the importation of a single article manufactured abroad with the
patented invention caused the loss of the patent.
Id. at 26-27.
117. Okediji, supra note 18, at 334.
118. See generally LADAS, supra note 23, at 43-55 (describing bilateral
conventions and the protection of foreign rights before 1883).
119. Id. at 12.
120. See id. at 43.
121. Id. at43 n.1.
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convention for the protection of industrial property. The
international importance of the second is minor, in view of
the very close political relation of those two countries. The
indications of place of origin were protected only by the
convention concerning the commercial and maritime
relations between France and Great Britain, of February 28,
1882, and by the Treaty of Commerce between Italy and
Montenegro, of March 16-28, 1883. Trade names were
protected by the above Convention between France and
Great Britain, and by the Convention for the Protection of
Trade Marks, Trade Names and Designs, between France
and Switzerland, of February 23, 1882.
So it may be said that the only rights of industrial
property which were protected before the Convention of
1883 were trademarks and designs or models. It is an open
question whether trade names, also, were protected together
with trademarks by the agreements dealing with the
latter. 
122
In light of this development, it was no surprise that foreign inventors
were reluctant to exhibit inventions at the international exposition in
Vienna in 1873, despite invitations by the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. 123 As Ladas explained:
Even if the inventors were to get a patent from the Austrian
government before exhibiting their inventions, it would not
help them very much. As it was said in an article in the
Scientific American dated December 23, 1871, "It was
almost equivalent to prohibition to require that the
locomotive engines of Great Britain, the telegraph
instruments of the United States, and the printed muslins of
France shall be manufactured on Austrian soil within a year
from securing the patent.... [T]he value of Austrian
patents issued to Americans and other foreigners can be
easily escheated to the benefit of the Austrian public."' 24
To strengthen protection for American inventors, John Jay, the
American minister in Vienna, at the request of the Foreign Minister,
122. Id. at 45-46.
123. See id. at 59.
124. Id. at 59-60.
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sent an informal note to the Austrian Foreign Office requesting a
special law to temporarily protect inventions, trademarks, and patents
or models against infringement until December 31, 1873. The
Austrian government responded by launching a congress of
specialists before the exposition. 126 In its invitation, it specifically
acknowledged the United States' proposal for patent law reforms.
127
This acknowledgement greatly elevated the prestige of the Congress.
As one commentator noted, "[t]he proposal for international patent
protection did not come from the semi-feudal country of Austria,
conspicuously lacking in industrial development; it came from the
United States, already at the forefront industrially and with the
strongest patent system in the world."' 128 Eventually, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire adopted a law "for the provisional protection of
articles introduced at the Vienna Exposition," which was based on
earlier ones enacted by Great Britain and France in connection with
the International Expositions in London in 1851 and 1862 and Paris
in 1855 and 1867.129
Although the discussions in the 1873 Congress were limited to
patents and did not address the diversity of laws governing such
protection, the Congress "was very keen [o]n... discussing the
nature of the rights of inventors, and [o]n laying down the rules
125. Id. at 60.
126. Id.
127. The invitation reads:
[F]ollowing a suggestion of the Government of the United States of
America, the General Direction of the Universal Exposition intends to
unite with the Exposition an International Congress, which shall
discuss the question of patent right; should this discussion, as may be
foreseen, induce a vote in favor of Patent protection, it will then be the
task of this Congress, on the basis of the experience of various
countries and the materials collected, to proceed to a declaration of
fundamental principles for an International Reform of Patent
Legislation.
Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Reevaluation of the International Patent
Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 766 (1947).
128. Id. at 767; cf. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: A TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY 55
(2003) (observing that "while [remedial] measures had first been proposed by
the US government, the lobbying efforts of a group of Austrian and German
patent attorneys and engineers helped to ensure that the congress took place").
129. Michael Blakeney, The Historical Origins of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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which would afford them complete protection."' 30  Thus, this
Congress provided "the first step" toward the formation of the Paris
Convention.13 1 To achieve uniform patent legislation in all
countries, the Congress voted on four resolutions. First, it "affirmed
[and provided justifications for] the natural right of the inventor,
which 'should be protected by the laws of all civilized nations."'
132
Second, it "laid down an equal number of 'principles on which an
effective and useful patent law should be based."" 3 Third, it noted
that "the necessity of reform is evident, and it is of pressing moment
that Governments should endeavor to bring about an international
understanding upon patent protection as soon as possible."'
134
Finally, it "converted the preparatory committee of the Congress into
a permanent executive committee, and it empowered them to
continue the work commenced, 'to use all their influence that the
principles adopted be made known as widely as possible and carried
into practice.., and to call from time to time meetings and
conferences. " 13
5
Five years later, the French Minister of Commerce organized the
International Congress on Industrial Property on the occasion of the
1878 International Exposition in Paris. 136  About five hundred
participants attended the meetings. 137 Unlike the Vienna Congress,
this Congress expanded beyond patents and "took up all matters
relating to patents, trademarks, designs and models, photographic
work, trade names, and industrial rewards."' 38 Although there was
an initial push for a multipartite union that would unify the various
industrial property laws, 139 participants disagreed on whether it
130. LADAS, supra note 23, at 60.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 61.
137. Id. These participants included official representatives from Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland,
and the United States.
138. Id.
139. For example, the French Minister of Commerce declared in his opening
speech at the 1878 Congress: "[T]he industrial property will not be truly
protected until it will find everywhere simple, uniform, precise rules, forming
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would be desirable, or even possible, to achieve such uniformity.
140
As prominent French lawyer Charles Lyon-Cadn noted forcefully at
the Congress:
We must not hope, in the present state of things, to have in
all countries industrial property laws which will be common
on all points; it is a utopia ... what makes impossible the
preparation of laws absolutely uniform, in all the countries,
on these matters, is that they are closely related to the civil
law, civil procedure, commercial law, penal law, and penal
procedure. It should have been necessary that all of these
branches of legislation should become uniform in order that
we may unify the laws related to industrial property, and
this is not possible.'
4 1
Countries also disagreed on how and what type of universal
rules the international community should adopt. While the French
delegates wished to derive the uniform rules from the French law, the
other delegates refused and stood by their own laws. 14 2 To make
things more complicated, some countries, like the Netherlands and
Switzerland, did not offer any patent protection at all, and Germany
remained heavily influenced by the anti-patent movement. 43 By the
middle of the Congress, it was apparent that "the only important
question upon which an agreement could be reached was the
principle of national treatment of foreigners."' 4 4 Countries therefore
could not reach a consensus on other questions, such as "previous
examination of the invention, conditions of patentability, [and]
effects of registration of trademarks."' 145 Eventually, the participants
managed to settle on some common ground of minimal unification.
For example,
the Congress affirmed that "the right of the inventor is a
right of property that the civil law does not create, but
among the States a sort of mutual assurance against plagiarism and
infringement." Id. at 62.
140. Id. at 61.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 62.
143. Kronstein & Till, supra note 127, at 767-70. Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck of Germany was reluctant to offer such protection, but he eventually
backed down to pressure from local engineers. Id. at 770.
144. LADAS, supra note 23, at 62.
145. Id.
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simply regulates." It enumerated the exceptions in which
no patent is granted. It declared itself against the system of
examination of the invention and for a system of previous
notification by the administration to the applicant of the
invalidity of the patent. It defined a design, and declared
that a trade name should be protected everywhere,
regardless of nationality or deposit. 1
46
At the end of the Congress, the participants adopted a resolution
to create a Permanent International Commission, which sought "to
obtain from one of the Governments the call for an official
international conference with the task of determining the bases of a
uniform legislation."' 147 Serving on the executive committee, the
French section of the Commission prepared a "very long and detailed
draft of a complete universal law" and presented it to the French
Minister of Commerce. 48  Upon advice that the draft was too
ambitious and that other countries were unlikely to adopt the treaty
because it encroached upon their laws in many respects, the
delegates redrafted the document, which eventually formed the basis
of the discussions of the International Conference of 1880 in Paris.
149
At that conference, eighteen states were represented. 5 °
Although the invitation only called for "the adoption of a number of
provisions suitable for incorporation in an international convention,"
the French Minister of Commerce and Minister of Foreign Affairs
broadened the scope of the conference to include the creation of a
union that would lay down the general principles for securing
protection of industrial property.151  As the chairman of the
conference put it, "it is the preface of a book which is to be opened,
and is not to be closed, perhaps, until after long years."'
52
146. Id.
147. Id. at 63.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. These states included Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil,
France, Great Britain and Ireland, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Russia, Salvador, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id.
151. Id. at 63-64.
152. Id. at 64. The original words in French are "la pr face d'un livre qui va
s'ouvrir et qui ne sera peut-6tre ferm que dans de longues ann~es."
Blakeney, supra note 129.
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Throughout the conference, there had been heated discussions about
national treatment, rights of priority, forfeiture of patents, and
validation of trademarks and industrial designs and models.'
53
Nevertheless, the delegates eventually adopted the draft
Convention. 1
54
In 1883, the French government called a follow-up conference
to obtain the final approval of the Convention. On March 20, eleven
countries-Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland-
signed the Convention.'55 These countries gathered again in Paris
the following year to exchange ratifications. At that meeting,
Ecuador, Great Britain and Ireland, and Tunis also acceded to the
Convention, although Ecuador subsequently denounced the
Convention in 1885.156 The Convention went into effect in July
1884, and the United States ratified it three years later-more than a
century before it ratified the Berne Convention. 1
57
Interestingly, despite joining the Convention, the Netherlands
and Switzerland did not offer any patent protection to inventions.
158
These countries, nevertheless, did not present any problem, as the
issue was anticipated and had been settled in the 1880
intergovernmental conference in Paris. During that conference, a
question arose whether the Netherlands and Switzerland would be
bound by the Convention to protect nationals of other contracting
states even though they did not offer any protection to their
nationals. 159 The author of the draft Convention, French delegate
Charles Jagerschmidt, answered in the negative, and the Conference
concurred "by striking out the word riciproquement, contained in
article 2 after the wordjouiront.',160 Thus, the Paris Convention did
not require reciprocity, and countries that did not offer patent
153. For an extensive discussion of the different arguments put forward by
delegates in the 1880 Conference, see id. at 64-66.
154. Id. at 66.
155. Id. at 67. The original Paris Convention is excerpted in EDITH TILTON
PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 56-57
(1951).
156. LADAS, supra note 23, at 73.
157. Id. at 68.
158. Id. at 64.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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protection could still become a member of the Convention.
Although the Convention did not unify the diverse patent and
trademark laws of the contracting states, it achieved several goals.
First, it created a "Union for the protection of industrial property,"'
16'
which has an independent existence regardless of its membership.
Like the Berne Union, the Paris Union remains open to all states
without restrictions, as long as they are prepared to comply with the
obligations embodied therein. 162 Indeed, this Union was so effective
that none of the contracting states denounced the Convention
expressly or impliedly during the First and Second World Wars.
163
Second, in lieu of reciprocity, the Convention adopted the
nondiscrimination principle of national treatment, which requires
member states to grant to foreigners the same rights they grant to
their own nationals. 164 Third, the Convention provided for the rights
of priority, 65 which enabled applicants to claim the earlier dates of
applications submitted in their home countries and avoid objections
made on those applications based on prior publication, application,
or use. Although the Convention participants initially did not
understand the significance and effect of this provision, such
protection "eliminate[d] the danger of invalidation of patents,
designs, or trademarks by reason of their publication or use, or of a
previous application by another before application by the true
owner." 166 Finally, the Convention sidestepped the difficult issues
concerning the forfeiture of patents upon importation or the right
holder's failure to "work," or exploit, the patent in a foreign country.
Instead, it affirmed the independence of patents doctrine, which
stated that a patent granted in one country is independent in time and
validity from patents granted in other countries. As Stephen Ladas
summarized,
[T]he [Paris Convention] is not merely a compact between
the individual countries party to it with reciprocal rights and
obligations; it is rather an instrument seeking to regulate
interests, claims, and demands pressing upon the national
161. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. at 1630.
162. See LADAS, supra note 23, at 68.
163. Id. at 80, 83.
164. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 2, 21 U.S.T. at 1631.
165. Id. art. 4, 21 U.S.T. at 1631-35.
166. LADAS, supra note 23, at 65.
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and international level. It has adopted, by its stipulations, a
legal ordering which seeks to satisfy the greatest number of
the scheme of interests involved with the least sacrifice to
any. 167
Since it entered into effect, the Paris Convention has been
periodically reviewed, clarified, revised, and expanded in subsequent
revision conferences. 168 The Convention also enabled contracting
parties to make special related arrangements that do not contravene
the Convention provisions. For example, the Madrid Agreement
Concerning the International Registration of Marks simplified the
trademark application process by allowing an applicant to
simultaneously pursue applications in all member states of the
Madrid Union. 169  The Nice Agreement on International
Classification of Trademarked Goods and Services facilitated
trademark registrations by establishing an international standard for
the classification of goods and services. 170 The Patent Cooperation
Treaty streamlined the early stages of the patent application process
in member states by allowing an applicant to file applications
simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions while benefiting from an
extended priority period. 17 1  The European Patent Convention
created the European Patent Office and authorized the office to
examine patents for all of the participating countries.' 
72
In sum, although the Berne and Paris Conventions cover
different sets of intellectual property rights, they have similar origins.
167. Id. at 12.
168. These conferences were held in Rome in 1886, in Madrid during 1890-
1891, in Brussels during 1897-1900, in Washington in 1911, in The Hague in
1925, in London in 1934, in Nice in 1957, in Lisbon in 1958, and finally in
Stockholm in 1967. For a discussion of these revision conferences, see id. at
68-94. The Paris Convention was revised in 1900, 1911, 1925, 1934, 1958,
and finally in 1967. Id.
169. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks,
of April 14, 1891, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.
170. Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods
and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, 23
U.S.T. 1336, 550 U.N.T.S. 45.
171. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160
U.N.T.S. 231.
172. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, as amended
by Decision of the Administration Council of the European Patent
Organization of Dec. 21, 1978, 13 I.L.M. 268 (1974).
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Taken together, the two conventions provided the foundations of the
current international intellectual property regime. Negotiating these
two conventions was not easy, and participating countries at times
resisted changes in their national intellectual property policies.
Nevertheless, the currents of multilateralism prevailed. Today, the
Berne and Paris Conventions remain in effect and have since been
incorporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement and the world
trading system.
III. FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO
SUPRANATIONAL CODES
Although the Berne and Paris Conventions provide very
important protection to authors and inventors, neither of them
contains an effective enforcement procedure. Instead, they include
only a provision laying out the optional dispute resolution
mechanism. Identical for both the Berne and Paris Conventions, this
provision reads:
Any dispute between two or more countries of the Union
concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention, not settled by negotiation, may, by any one of
the countries concerned, be brought before the International
Court of Justice by application in conformity with the
Statute of the Court, unless the countries concerned agree
on some other method of settlement. The country bringing
the dispute before the Court shall inform the International
Bureau; the International Bureau shall bring the matter to
the attention of the other countries of the Union.1
7 3
Notwithstanding this provision, countries are reluctant to use the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes, and the
optional forum offers very limited assistance. 174  As the late
Professor Oscar Schachter explained:
Litigation is uncertain, time consuming, troublesome.
Political officials do not want to lose control of a case that
they might resolve by negotiation or political pressures.
Diplomats naturally prefer diplomacy; political leaders
173. Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 33(1), 828 U.N.T.S. at 273; Paris
Convention, supra note 20, art. 28(1), 21 U.S.T. at 1665-66.
174. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 111 (2001).
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value persuasion, manoeuvre and flexibility. They often
prefer to "play it by ear[,]" making their rules to fit the
circumstances rather than submit to pre-existing rules.
Political forums, such as the United Nations, are often more
attractive, especially to those likely to get wide support for
political reasons. We need only compare the large number
of disputes brought to the United Nations with the few
submitted to adjudication. One could go on with other
reasons. States do not want to risk losing a case when the
stakes are high or be troubled with litigation in minor
matters. An international tribunal may not inspire
confidence, especially when some judges are seen as
"political" or as hostile. There is apprehension that the law
is too malleable or fragmentary to sustain "true" judicial
decisions. In some situations, the legal issues are viewed as
but one element in a complex political situation and
consequently it is considered unwise or futile to deal with
them separately. Finally we note the underlying perception
of many governments that law essentially supports the
status quo and that courts are [not] responsive to demands
for justice or change.1
75
So far, no member state of the Berne or Paris Unions has ever
pursued intellectual property litigation before the ICj.176 Worse still,
paragraph (2) of the dispute resolution provision of both Conventions
undercuts the optional dispute resolution mechanism by stating that
members of the Union may at the time of ratification of the
Convention "declare that it does not consider itself bound by"
that provision.' 77 Thus, in effect, the Berne and Paris Conventions
are virtually unenforceable except by coercion or diplomacy, and
none of them provides any effective dispute resolution
mechanism. 1
78
175. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 208 (1982).
176. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 174, at 111.
177. Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 33(2), 828 U.N.T.S. at 277; Paris
Convention, supra note 20, art. 28(2), 21 U.S.T. at 1666.
178. As Professor Daniel Gervais noted: "The two fundamental perceived
flaws of the Paris and Berne Conventions were (a) the absence of detailed rules
on the enforcement of rights before national judicial administrative authorities
and (b) the absence of a binding and effective dispute settlement mechanism
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After the Second World War, intellectual property became
important to many developed countries, particularly the United
States. Indeed, a substantial portion of the gross domestic products
of many of these countries can be attributable to the information and
entertainment industries, which use intellectual property rights to
protect their creative works. 79 To take advantage of this newly-
developed comparative advantage,' 80 developed countries actively
(for disputes between States)." DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 9-10 (2d ed. 2003).
179. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA 9 (Alan S.
Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997) (noting that the share of intellectual
property-based exports in the United States has doubled since the Second
World War); R. Michael Gadbaw & Rosemary E. Gwynn, Intellectual
Property Rights in the New GAIT Round, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 38, 45 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) ("The new reality is that the U.S.
economy is increasingly dependent for its competitiveness on its ability to
protect the value inherent in intellectual property. United States exports are
increasingly weighted toward goods with a high intellectual property
content."); Bruce A. Lehman, Speech Given at the Inaugural Engelberg
Conference on Culture and Economics of Participation in an International
Intellectual Property Regime, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 211, 211 (1997)
("Many Americans have begun to derive their livelihoods from products of
their minds, as opposed to products of manual labor, and much of [its] gross
domestic product is attributable to new information and entertainment-based
industries which have an interest in protecting their valuable products through
intellectual property laws."); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:
Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 131, 132 & n.2 (2000) (collecting sources that discussed how
information and high-technology goods have become a very important sector
of the American economy since the Second World War).
180. As Professor Ruth Okediji pointed out:
It is important to emphasize that the integration of intellectual property
and trade in that multilateral trade context was not solely or even
primarily to curtail piracy in global markets, although this was
certainly an important issue. The more vital role of the trade context
for intellectual property was the consolidation of a domestic
reconditioning of the basis of comparative advantage in order to
exploit both factor endowments and to adjust to the new division of
labour evident in the global economy. To secure these ends, a new
multilateral order was necessary to: provide coherence in the global
intellectual property framework; decrease the dependence of effective
protection on the vagaries of political relations; capture the static gains
of the multiple bilateral agreements already in place; and legitimize
the economic imperative of unilateralism.
Okediji, supra note 4, at 135.
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pushed for the introduction of an anti-counterfeiting code in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the end of the
Tokyo Round. Because only the European Community and the
United States supported this code, which sought to provide "border
measures for the interception and eventual destruction of
[intellectual] goods outside the channels of commerce," 181 no
agreement was reached by the time the Round ended in 1979.182
Three years later, in the GATT Ministerial meeting, countries were
only able to reach a limited agreement that allowed the Director-
General of the GATT to discuss the legal and institutional aspects of
the code with his counterpart in WIPO. 1
83
Meanwhile, less developed countries had actively pushed for
reforms in an opposite direction, seeking reduced obligations under
the Paris Convention.'8 4 Since the mid-1970s, these countries, which
had grown in number, had been demanding a revision of the
Convention to lower the minimum standards of intellectual property
protection as applied to them.' 85 The revision process eventually
broke down at the 1981 Diplomatic Conference in Nairobi, following
demands by less developed countries for exclusive compulsory
licensing of patents and the United States' strong objections to those
demands.
18 6
Commentators attributed this breakdown to two reasons. First,
the "one country one vote" forum disfavored developed countries by
rendering them ineffective in their negotiations. 187 Pressure from
intellectual property industries in the country therefore persuaded the
country to shift to the GATT forum, thereby enhancing the United
States' bargaining position. 188 Second, the WIPO forum focuses
primarily on intellectual property issues, thus preventing the United
States from providing cross-sector concessions that link intellectual
property to international trade items, such as agricultural subsidies
181. See WATAL, supra note 115, at 15.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 16.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. See MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL
COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12 (1998).
188. Id.
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and quotas in textiles.' 
89
Four years after the Nairobi debacle, the GATT member states
met in the ministerial meeting in Punta del Este. 190 At that meeting,
they set out their negotiating objectives for the Uruguay Round,
including a multilateral intellectual property agreement which
eventually became the TRIPS Agreement.' 9 1 As the Ministerial
Declaration stated in a section subtitled "Trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights, including trade in counterfeit goods":
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to
promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures
to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves
become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall
aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as
appropriate new rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral
framework of principles, rules and disciplines dealing with
international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account
work already undertaken in the GATT.
These negotiations shall be without prejudice to other
complementary initiatives that may be taken in the World
Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal
with these matters. 
192
This declaration delineated four major substantive negotiating issues:
(1) substantive standards for intellectual property protection; (2)
procedures under national law for the enforcement of such
protection; (3) dispute settlement procedures between parties to any
eventual agreement on TRIPS; (4) and the relationship between
GATT and other relevant international organizations, including
WIPO, concerning TRIPS and the relationship between an eventual
agreement in the Uruguay Round and existing intellectual property
189. Id.
190. WATAL, supra note 115, at 21.
191. Id.
192. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1626 (1986).
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conventions. 1
93
Initially, many less developed countries mistakenly believed that
they could use the text of this declaration to "limit the negotiations
primarily on trade in counterfeit goods and other such trade-related
aspects."' 194 According to these countries, the GATT mandate did
not allow for the discussion of substantive issues on intellectual
property rights. Led by Brazil and India, 195 these countries claimed
that only WIPO had the competence to discuss substantive
intellectual property issues, citing section B of the Declaration.
96
However, as Jayashree Watal, a negotiator for India, pointed out:
This was a misreading not only of the text but also of the
writing on the wall. Clearly, the negotiations were aimed
not only at clarifying GATT provisions but elaborating, 'as
appropriate', new rules and disciplines. Significantly, in the
very first paragraph, developing countries agreed to take
into account 'the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of IPRs', language that would ultimately lead to
the incorporation of minimum standards on a wide range of
IPRs in TRIPS. The language in the second paragraph on
trade in counterfeit goods was more specific 'to develop a
multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines'.
The third paragraph only stated that these negotiations were
without prejudice to complementary work in WIPO or
elsewhere. This language was a concession to the
insistence by developing countries that WIPO was the right
forum to discuss these issues. By this time, developing
countries had conceded that the subject of counterfeit goods
could be discussed in GATT.
197
To be fair, many less developed countries at that time had very
193. David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights:
The Issues in GAYT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 893, 902 (1989).
194. WATAL, supra note 115, at 21.
195. Other hardliner less developed countries included Argentina, Cuba,
Egypt, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. Id. at 19.
196. Id. at 21.
197. Id. Notwithstanding its scope and potential reach, the Punta del Este
Declaration "shows how difficult it was to get contracting parties to accept this
new subject matter. Indeed, most of the text states what the future agreement
should not do or recasts it in narrow GATT parlance." GERVAIS, supra note
178, at 11.
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limited understanding of intellectual property protection. "As the
United Nations Development Programme put it, the IP agreements
were signed 'before most governments and people understood the
social and economic implications of patents on life. They were also
negotiated with far too little participation from many developing
countries now feeling the impact of their conditions."' 98 Moreover,
most of the nongovernmental organizations that are active today did
not exist or have an intellectual property focus a decade ago. Indeed,
many of these organizations woke up only after the completion of the
TRIPS Agreement. 199 Recent examples of active participation by
nongovernmental organizations include the Doha Declaration, the
World Summit on the Information Society, and the Geneva
Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property
Organization.
200
Like less developed countries, European countries were initially
uncertain about whether they wanted to include minimum standards
for intellectual property rights in the GATT. To many of these
countries, counterfeiting seemed to be the only trade-related issue
that fit the GATT mandate, and the Uruguay Round already had a
complex agenda with many other pressing issues.20 1 However, the
European Community's position soon changed once it resolved some
of its major differences with the United States and obtained support
to include geographical indications in the new GATT treaty.202
Shortly afterwards, the Community introduced a comprehensive and
very ambitious proposal that provided "the spark [that] ignited the
198. SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 139-40 (2003) (quoting UNITED
NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999, at 66-76
(1999)); see also WATAL, supra note 115, at 44 (noting "the increasing
complexity of the subjects for negotiation [in the TRIPS Agreement] ... [and]
the lack of Geneva-based expertise").
199. See infra text accompanying notes 426-27.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
201. SELL, supra note 198, at 104-05 ("The Europeans and Japanese
anticipated an already complex agenda for the Round, including issues of great
salience, such as agriculture. They also were aware that developing countries
were opposed to incorporating intellectual property into the GATT.").
202. WATAL, supra note 115, at 23 (noting that the European Community
began to root for a GATT agreement "perhaps after a decision among
developed countries to include the subject of geographical indications").
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work towards the TRIPS Agreement."
20 3
Meanwhile, the United States actively deployed unilateral
actions to speed up the negotiating cycle. These actions successfully
isolated hardliner opposition countries while persuading other less
developed countries to change their positions. In 1988, Congress
introduced the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act204 to bolster
the leverage of U.S. trade negotiations. This statute amended section
301 of the 1974 Trade Act by including two new 
provisions:20 5
Super 301 required the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
to review U.S. trade expansion priorities and identify priority foreign• • 206
country practices that posed major barriers to 
U.S. exports.
Special 301 requires the USTR to identify foreign countries that
203. GERVAIS, supra note 178, at 16. As Professor Gervais described:
Boldly entitled "Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights", the proposal covered all aspects of
intellectual property rights as well as their acquisition, enforcement
and the application of basic principles such as national treatment and
most-favoured nation, all in treaty language.
The proposal's structure was closely followed by the United States,
which tabled its own proposal, under the same title and also in treaty
language. The similarity between the two texts suggested that
transatlantic consultations had preceded the tabling of both
documents. In any event, this "common" structure was eventually
adopted and, subject to a few changes, would serve as the basis for the
emerging Agreement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
204. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495 (2000).
205. "The new Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 is probably the most criticized piece of U.S. foreign trade legislation
since the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930." Robert E. Hudec, Thinking
About the New Section 301: Beyond Good and Evil, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 113, 113 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990)
[hereinafter AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM]. See AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM, supra, for an excellent collection of essays discussing Super
301 and Special 301.
206. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1)(A)-(B). Super 301 expired in 1990, and
President Clinton reinstated the provision by an executive order in March
1994. See Exec. Order No. 12,901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (Mar. 8, 1994).
Despite the reinstatement, then-USTR Mickey Kantor did not identify any
Super 301 targets. See A. Lynne Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules,
Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 681 (1996). Due to heavy criticism, the Clinton
Administration did not request the legislative renewal of this controversial
provision. Id.
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provide inadequate intellectual property protection or deny American
intellectual property goods fair or equitable market access. 20 7
Since the enactment of the new section 301 provisions, Brazil,
India, Japan, and Thailand have all been identified as either priority
foreign countries or on the priority watch list for trade sanction
purposes.208 (Before the United States introduced the new Special
301 and Super 301, it had also imposed, or threatened to impose,
trade sanctions on Argentina, Mexico, and South Korea.) These
sanctions ultimately divided the less developed countries and
induced them to agree to the United States' position.
By the early 1990s, GATTability-whether countries should
include intellectual property issues in the GATT-was no longer an
issue. In October 1990, Canada formally proposed the creation of a
new Multilateral Trade Organization, in which member states would
no longer pick and choose the trade rules they would join at the end
of the Uruguay Round.20 9 This organization eventually was renamed
the World Trade Organization and laid down the foundation of the
multilateral trading system. Because developed countries had
serious concerns about being excluded from this multilateral system,
"the World Trade Organization... effectively ended the debate on
the earlier developing country position of WIPO as the appropriate
forum for lodging the results of the TRIPS negotiations."'210
Notwithstanding this breakthrough, developed and less
developed countries reached an impasse in the early 1990s. 21 1 To
avoid a deadlock, the GATT Secretariat and Chairman Lars Anell of
the TRIPS Negotiating Group prepared what was commonly referred
to as the Dunkel Draft-a "take it or leave it" draft of the TRIPS
Agreement that constituted the Secretariat's best judgment of what
would be acceptable to all of the participants. 21  This no-option
strategy proved to be immensely successful, and the draft was
adopted with very minor changes at the Marrakesh ministerial
207. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A).
208. See WATAL, supra note 115, at 24-26.
209. Id. at 34.
210. Id.
211. See GERVAIS, supra note 178, at 23-24; WATAL, supra note 115, at 36-
37.
212. See GERVAIS, supra note 178, at 24-25 (discussing the Dunkel draft);
WATAL, supra note 115, at 37-40 (same).
CURRENTS AND CROSSCURRENTS
meeting in April 1994.213
In retrospect, developed countries fared much better than less
developed countries in the TRIPS negotiation process. Although the
initial positions and national laws of the European Community,
Japan, and the United States differ significantly, they managed to
present "fairly coordinated positions" during the negotiation
process.2 14 Meanwhile, despite leadership from hardliner opposition
countries like Brazil and India, less developed countries did not unite
in their opposition to the demands of developed countries.
Commentators attributed this lack of unity to a wide array of factors:
" the absence of any formal coordinating mechanism such as
G-77 in GATT;
" the effective use of Section 301 and other bilateral means by
the U.S. to obtain key concessions and win the silence of
major developing country participants in the TRIPS
negotiations;
" the differing expectations of gains in other areas of the
Uruguay Round, notably agriculture and textiles;
" the expectations of gains in attracting FDI through unilateral
liberalization of trade and investment policies, of which
strengthened protection of IP was considered an essential
part;
" the increasing complexity of the subjects for negotiation, the
lack of Geneva-based expertise and the inability of
developing countries to engage constructively and effectively
on a coordinated basis; ...
* the diversity in legal systems and specific intellectual
property laws[; and
" the fact that the United States has become the only global
superpower after such events as the collapse of the Berlin
wall, the breaking up of the former Soviet Union, and the
United States' easy victory in the Gulf war.]
2 15
213. See WATAL, supra note 115, at 40-41 (discussing the "finishing
touches" to the TRIPS Agreement).
214. See id. at 44. These positions were coordinated "through discussions
and negotiations amongst relevant segments of industry and government aided
by IPR specialists, at the preparatory stages as well as during the Uruguay
Round." Id.
215. Id. at 41, 43-44 (footnote omitted).
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By all accounts, the TRIPS Agreement was the biggest
innovation in the international intellectual property arena since the
creation of the Berne and Paris Conventions.216  By marrying
intellectual property to international trade, the TRIPS Agreement not
only revolutionized international protection of intellectual property
rights, but "play[ed] a new and important role in the international
economic system." 217  As Professor Keith Maskus noted, the
Agreement "is the first multilateral trade accord that aims at
achieving partial harmonization in an extensive area of business
216. As Professor Reichman noted:
The TRIPS Agreement is the most ambitious international intellectual
property convention ever attempted. The breadth of subject matters
comprising the "intellectual property" to which specified minimum
standards apply is unprecedented, as is the obligation of all WTO
member states to guarantee that detailed "enforcement procedures as
specified in this [Agreement] are available under their national laws."
In addition, each member state pledges its willingness to incur liability
in the form of cross-collateral trade sanctions for the nullification and
impairment of benefits owed other member states under the Uruguay
Round's package deal. For the first time in history,... these
provisions "make it likely that states will lodge actions against other
states before duly constituted international bodies, with a view to
vindicating the privately owned intellectual property rights of their
citizens against unauthorized uses that occur outside the domestic
territorial jurisdictions."
J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a
Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 366-67 (1996) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 41, 33 I.L.M. at 1213;
J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 385
(1995)); see also CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE
WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY
OPTIONS 101 (2000) (noting that the TRIPS Agreement "represents a radical
change, a 'conceptual leap' in the history of intellectual property" (quoting
Sam Ricketson, The Future of Traditional Intellectual Property Conventions in
the Brave New World of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 26 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 872, 883 (1995)); GERVAIS, supra note
178, at 3 (noting that the TRIPS Agreement, together with the 1968 Stockholm
revision conference, "is undoubtedly the most significant milestone in the
development of intellectual property in the twentieth century"); WATAL, supra
note 115, at 2 (noting that the TRIPS Agreement "is, by far, the most wide-
ranging and far reaching international treaty on the subject of intellectual
property to date and marks the most important milestone in the development of
international law in this area").
217. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global
Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL
INTEGRATION 39, 39-40 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997).
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regulation. 218
Part I of the Agreement laid down the basic conditions of the
Agreement, including national treatment, "most favored nation"
treatment, the noncoverage of exhaustion issues, and the objectives
and principles of the Agreement. This Part also includes such
development-friendly safeguard provisions as articles 7 and 8 of the
Agreement, which "were singled out as having a special importance
in para. 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. An argument
[therefore] could me [sic] made that these provisions now have
higher legal status not only for the negotiations but in interpreting the
Agreement in the context of, e.g., dispute-settlement procedures.
'" 219
Part II dramatically increased the level of international minimum
standards in eight different categories: copyrights and related rights,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents,
plant variety protection, layout designs of integrated circuits, and
undisclosed information.220 There is no doubt that these changes
were dramatic for less developed countries, as they went beyond just
intellectual property and affected such other areas as agriculture,
health, environment, education, and culture. For example, the
Agreement created new obligations in these countries to protect
"product patents for food, pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
microorganisms or copyright protection for software." 221 The TRIPS
Agreement also required changes from all WTO member states,
including both developed and less developed countries. As
Jayashree Watal pointed out, "at least one, undisclosed information,
has never been the subject of any multilateral agreement before, and
another, protection for integrated circuit designs, had no effective
international treaty, while others, like plant variety protection or
performers' rights, were geographically limited. '' 222 Furthermore,
the Agreement created new rights under existing categories, "such as
rental rights for computer programmes and sound recording (and for
films under certain circumstances) under copyright and related
218. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 2 (2000).
219. GERVAIS, supra note 178, at 120 (footnote omitted); see also WTO,
Doha Ministerial Declaration 19, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(0 1)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14,
2001) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration].
220. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 9-40, 33 I.L.M. at 1201-13.
221. WATAL, supra note 115, at 4.
222. Id. (footnote omitted).
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rights; higher level of protection for geographical indications for
wines and spirits; [and] reversal of burden of proof for process
patentees."
22
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement delineated international
standards for the enforcement of intellectual property rights for the
first time, including civil, administrative, and criminal procedures
and remedies and measures related to border control.224 It deals with
"one of the most difficult and, for rights holders, painful aspects of
intellectual property rights." 225 Part IV covers the acquisition and
maintenance of intellectual property rights, administrative
revocation, and inter-partes procedures, such as opposition,
revocation, and cancellation. 226 It subjects the final administrative
decisions in these procedures "to review by a judicial or quasi-
judicial authority."
227
Part V includes the mandatory dispute settlement procedures
that require all disputes arising under the Agreement to be settled by
the WTO dispute settlement process.228 Under this mandatory
process, a WTO member state can initiate consultations with another
member state that allegedly has breached its treaty obligations. 2 29 If
consultations fail, the parties may request that the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) establish a panel to hear the complaint.230 Following
hearings and deliberations, the panel issues a report, which the DSB
automatically adopts unless it decides by consensus against adoption
or unless a party appeals for review by the Appellate Body.231 The
Appellate Body will then issue a report, which the DSB will
automatically adopt unless it makes a consensus-based decision to
reject that report. 232 If the member is found to be in breach of its
treaty obligations and fails to implement the DSB's
223. Id.
224. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 41-61, 33 I.L.M. at 1213-20.
225. GERVAIS, supra note 178, at 3.
226. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 62, 33 I.L.M. at 1220.
227. Id. art. 62(5), 33 I.L.M. at 1220.
228. Id. arts. 63-64, 33 I.L.M. at 1221.
229. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. 112, 116 (1994).
230. Id. art. 4(7), 33 I.L.M. at 117.
231. Id. art. 16(4), 33 I.L.M. at 123.
232. Id. art. 17(14), 33 I.L.M. at 124.
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recommendations or rulings within a "reasonable period of time,
' 2 33
the complaining party may request negotiations for compensation or
request that the DSB authorize the suspension of concessions and
other obligations covered by the treaty.
2 3r
Part VI provides transitional provisions for less and least
developed countries and requires developed countries to transfer
technology to their least developed counterparts. 23  Part VII
provides a review mechanism, which requires the Council for TRIPS
to review the implementation of the Agreement at two-year intervals
after the expiration of the transitional periods, and in light of any
relevant new developments that might warrant modification or
amendment of the agreement.
2 36
Immediately after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement,
commentators wondered whether the negotiation of intellectual
property issues might stay in the WTO. After all, the TRIPS
Agreement was successfully concluded despite the initial deadlock
between developed and less developed countries. Nevertheless,
WIPO remains a very attractive forum. First, despite the shift of the
negotiating forum to the GATT/WTO, WIPO remains an important
part of the WTO regime and was heavily involved in the WTO
negotiation process. From the standpoint of the international
organizations, "the WTO did not supplant WIPO as the principal
intergovernmental organization devoted to intellectual property
lawmaking. TRIPS itself implicitly acknowledges the continuing
importance of WIPO as a forum for negotiating treaties, particularly
those embodying 'higher levels of protection of intellectual property
rights.' ' 238 Moreover, article 68 of the TRIPS Agreement stated
specifically that the Council for TRIPS "may consult with and seek
information from any source it deems appropriate" in carrying out its
233. Id. art. 21(3), 33 I.L.M. at 125.
234. Id. art. 22(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1224.
235. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 65-67, 33 I.L.M. at 1222-23.
236. Id. art. 71(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1224.
237. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading
System in the Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 661,
680-82 (1997) (discussing the possibilities for cooperation between WIPO and
WTO).
238. Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 24-25 (2004).
Fall 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol 38:323
functions and "shall seek to establish, within one year of its first
meeting, appropriate arrangements for cooperation with bodies of
[WIPO]. ' 239 The consultation required by this provision eventually
led to the Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property
Organization and the World Trade Organization, which called for
cooperation between the WTO and WIPO in the notification of,
provision of access to, and translation of national legislation; the
communication of national emblems and transmittal of objections
pursuant to article 6ter of the Paris Convention; and legal-technical
assistance and technical cooperation.
240
WIPO also provides a number of additional advantages for the
negotiation of intellectual property treaties. For example,
WIPO... has a mandate to strengthen IPR protection and
can thus start discussions on IP subjects more easily than
the WTO. It can also draw upon experts from both the
government and private sector for more broad-based
discussions. It also presents a neutral forum without
external influences like trade pressures impinging on
decisions.
241
Indeed, as Professor Graeme Dinwoodie noted, "the sudden
emergence of the WTO as part of the international intellectual
property lawmaking process seemed to energize WIPO, resulting in
the conclusion of several new treaties in copyright, patent and
trademark law, as well as the reorganization mentioned above that
was designed to make WIPO fit for the twenty-first century." 242 In
the past decade, the WIPO forum has been used to negotiate the
protection of audiovisual performers, broadcasters' rights, and
traditional knowledge. WIPO was also actively involved in the
Internet domain name process, in particular the development of the
model policy used in resolving disputes in generic top-level
239. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 68, 33 I.L.M. at 1223.
240. Agreement Between the World Intellectual Property Organization and
the World Trade Organization, Dec. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996).
241. WATAL, supra note 115, at 5; see also RYAN, supra note 187
(discussing WIPO's functional competence).
242. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International
Intellectual Property System, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 1005 (2002)
(footnotes omitted).
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domains.24 3  Moreover, "the highly politicized bargaining during
preparations for WTO ministerial conferences have led to some
hesitation in re-opening TRIPS in that forum."244 As indicated by
the discussions concerning the relationships between intellectual
property and biodiversity, countries prefer to use the TRIPS
Agreement as their reference point, but are reluctant to return to the
WTO to renegotiate the Agreement.
245
Shortly after the TRIPS Agreement entered into effect, countries
returned to WIPO to update the treatment of copyright issues and
legal protection for sound recordings and databases. In December
1996, WIPO hosted a diplomatic conference in Geneva to consider
proposals to update international intellectual property norms in light
of changes to the digital environment.246 The origins of this
Diplomatic Conference can be traced back to 1989, when the
governing body of the Berne Union called upon WIPO to convene a
Committee of Experts to explore the possibility of a supplementary
agreement to the Berne Convention "'to clarify the existing, or
establish new, international norms where, under the present text of
the Berne Convention, doubts may exist as to the extent to which that
Convention applies.' 247 This request was routine, as previously the
Berne Convention had been revised roughly every ten to twenty
years, and had not been updated since the Paris revision conference
243. See WIPO, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO
INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS (1999) [hereinafter WIPO INTERNET
DOMAIN NAME PROCESS FINAL REPORT], available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/processes/processl/report/pdf/report.pdf; WIPO, THE
RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET DOMAIN
NAME SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE SECOND WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME
PROCESS (2001), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/processes/process2/report/
pdf/report.pdf.
244. WATAL, supra note 115, at 5.
245. See id. at 5-8. Nevertheless, countries eventually might have to shift
back to the WTO forum to provide enforcement, as the WIPO forum lacks an
effective enforcement mechanism.
246. See generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
247. Id. at 376 (quoting Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the
Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference on Certain
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions 2, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4
(Aug. 30, 1996)).
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in 1971.
Initially, the United States was not actively involved in the
Diplomatic Conference. While the European Commission surveyed
many challenging questions concerning copyright law in the digital
context in its 1988 Green Paper, 248 the United States was primarily
interested in the use of copyright law to protect computer
programs. 249 As the Internet grew in size and scope, intellectual
property problems in the digital environment became a concern for
major businesses. In 1995, the Clinton administration released its
Information Infrastructure Task Force White Paper 250 ("White
Paper"). This White Paper turned out to be fairly controversial in the
United States, and many legislative proposals that sought to
implement the document failed to report out of congressional
committees. 25 1 Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration persisted in
promoting its digital agenda in both Geneva and Washington and
pressed aggressively for the adoption of its proposals in the 1996
WIPO Diplomatic Conference. As Professor Pamela Samuelson
recounted:
Clinton administration officials sought approval in Geneva
for international norms that would have (1) granted
copyright owners an exclusive right to control virtually all
temporary reproductions of protected works in the random
access memory of computers; (2) treated digital
transmissions of protected works as distributions of copies
to the public; (3) curtailed the power of states to adopt
exceptions and limitations on the exclusive rights of
copyright owners, including fair use and first sale
privileges; (4) enabled copyright owners to challenge the
manufacture and sale of technologies or services capable of
248. Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Copyright
and the Challenge of Technology--Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate
Action, COM (88) 172 final.
249. See Samuelson, supra note 246, at 377 (noting that "[i]nsofar as the
United States had a digital agenda at WIPO in the early period of Berne
protocol negotiations, it was to persuade the international community to use
copyright law to protect computer programs").
250. INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995).
251. See Samuelson, supra note 246, at 373.
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circumventing technological protection for copyrighted
works; (5) protected the integrity of rights management
information attached to protected works in digital form; and
(6) created a sui generis form of legal protection for the
contents of databases.
252
Except for the final item concerning database protection, the
Geneva agenda was identical to the one pushed in Washington by the
Clinton administration based on its controversial White Paper.25 3 As
252. Id. at 372-73 (footnotes omitted).
253. See id. at 373 (noting that "[t]he digital agenda that Clinton
administration officials pursued in Geneva was almost identical to the digital
agenda they had put before the U.S. Congress during roughly the same time
period"). As Professor Samuelson summarized in Wired:
The eight interrelated parts of the white paper's agenda intend to:
1. Give copyright owners control over every use of copyrighted works
in digital form by interpreting existing law as being violated whenever
users make even temporary reproductions of works in the random
access memory of their computers;
2. Give copyright owners control over every transmission of works in
digital form by amending the copyright statute so that digital
transmissions will be regarded as distributions of copies to the public;
3. Eliminate fair-use rights whenever a use might be licensed. (The
copyright maximalists assert that there is no piece of a copyrighted
work small enough that they are uninterested in charging for its use,
and no use private enough that they aren't willing to track it down and
charge for it. In this vision of the future, a user who has copied even a
paragraph from an electronic journal to share with a friend will be as
much a criminal as the person who tampers with an electrical meter at
a friend's house in order to siphon off free electricity. If a few users
have to go to jail for copyright offenses, well, that's a small price to
pay to ensure that the population learns new patterns of behavior in the
digital age.);
4. Deprive the public of the "first sale" rights it has long enjoyed in
the print world (the rights that permit you to redistribute your own
copy of a work after the publisher's first sale of it to you), because the
white paper treats electronic forwarding as a violation of both the
reproduction and distribution rights of copyright law;
5. Attach copyright management information to digital copies of a
work, ensuring that publishers can track every use made of digital
copies and trace where each copy resides on the network and what is
being done with it at any time;
6. Protect every digital copy of every work technologically (by
encryption, for example) and make illegal any attempt to circumvent
that protection;
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Professor Samuelson recalled, "[flor a time, it appeared that
administration officials might be able to get in Geneva what they
could not get from the U.S. Congress,... [and the Diplomatic
Conference provided] the potential for an end run around
Congress. ' 54 Had the Clinton administration officials succeeded in
Geneva, they "would almost certainly have then argued to Congress
that ratification of the treaties was necessary to confirm U.S.
leadership in the world intellectual property community and to
promote the interests of U.S. copyright industries in the world market
for information products and services." 255  Fortunately, the
disagreement among many WIPO member states, in particular less
developed countries, and the active participation of nongovernmental
organizations 256 made it difficult for the administration to pursue its
7. Force online service providers to become copyright police, charged
with implementing pay-per-use rules. (These providers will be
responsible not only for cutting off service to scofflaws but also for
reporting copyright crime to the criminal justice authorities);
8. Teach the new copyright rules of the road to children throughout
their years at school.
Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, 136.
254. Samuelson, supra note 246, at 373-74.
255. Id. at 374-75 (footnote omitted).
256. As Professor Samuelson recounted:
Realizing the potential for an end run around Congress, many of those
who had argued before Congress that the Clinton administration's
digital agenda was an unwise and unbalanced extension of rights to
information publishers redirected their efforts toward lobbying the
administration about the WIPO negotiations. They not only
successfully lobbied the Clinton administration, persuading it to
moderate or abandon parts of its digital agenda at WIPO, they also
attended WIPO-sponsored regional meetings to acquaint other states
with their concerns about the draft treaties, and went to Geneva in
large numbers to participate informally in the diplomatic conference
as observers and lobbyists. These expressions of concern found a
receptive audience among many national delegations to the diplomatic
conference.
Id. at 374.
Peter Choy, for example, went to regional bloc meetings about the
draft treaties and to Geneva as a nongovernmental observer (NGO) on
behalf of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and the American Committee for
Interoperable Systems. Adam Eisgrau, a lobbyist for the American
Library Association and for the Digital Future Coalition, went to
Geneva as an NGO to express the concerns of these organizations
about the draft treaties. Peter Harter, public policy counsel for
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proposals. "In the end, none of the original U.S.-sponsored digital
agenda proposals emerged unscathed from the negotiation process,
and at least one-the proposed database treaty--did not emerge at
all."257
Despite this setback, the United States managed to update the
international intellectual property regime in areas that are of major
interest to the American copyright industries. First, based on the
agreed statement the United States pushed forward in the eleventh
hour of the Diplomatic Conference, "[i]t is now clear that copyright
law applies in the digital environment, and that storage of protected
works is a reproduction that can be controlled by copyright
owners. ' 258 Second, the WIPO Copyright Treaty259 (WCT) and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 260 (WPPT) pro-
tect rights holders from digital transmissions that constitute
Netscape Communications Corp., went to Geneva as an NGO to
discuss Netscape's concerns about the treaty. Vanderbilt Law
Professor Jerome H. Reichman went to Geneva as an NGO on behalf
of the International Council of Scientific Unions.
Id. at 374 n.34. Through the Digital Future Coalition, Professor Samuelson
also actively participated in many events surrounding the WIPO Internet
Treaties in Geneva and Washington. Id. at 369 n.*.
257. Id. at 374-75 (footnote omitted). As Professor Samuelson recounted:
By comparison with the high-protectionist agenda reflected in the
White Paper and the U.S. submissions to WIPO, one would have to
say that the U.S. efforts were largely unsuccessful. The conference
rejected the temporary copying proposals that had initially had U.S.
support. It decided to treat digital transmissions as communications to
the public, rather than as distributions of copies (which may bring
with it a widened possibility for some private transmissions of works).
The treaty not only preserved existing user right privileges in national
laws; it recognized that new exceptions might appropriately be
created. The Chairman's variant on the U.S. White Paper's anti-
circumvention provision garnered almost no support. Even though the
treaty contains a rights management information provision, it is
watered down by comparison with what the U.S. delegation had
sought. Moreover, the U.S. model for a database treaty was so
objectionable that it was dropped virtually without discussion from the
agenda in Geneva.
Id. at 434-35.
258. Id. at 435 (footnote omitted). For a further discussion of the eleventh-
hour discussion, see id. at 390-92.
259. WCT, supra note 21.
260. WPPT, supra note 21.
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communications to the public.26' The treaties also reaffirmed the
three-step test enunciated in the TRIPS Agreement that limits
national authority to adopt exceptions or limitations in "certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder."262 Finally, the treaties require member states to
adopt adequate protection and effective remedies against
circumvention technologies and services 263 and to protect rights
management information from alteration and removal in an effort to
conceal or facilitate infringement.
264
In 2002, six years after the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva,
the WIPO Internet treaties finally entered into force when they
attained the thirty requisite accessions or ratifications from the WIPO
member states.265 Had the European Union been less ambitious in
incorporating these treaties in a new harmonization directive,266 the
treaties might have entered into force even earlier.267 Although the
261. See WCT, supra note 21, art. 8; WPPT, supra note 21, art. 15.
262. See WCT, supra note 21, art. 10(1); WPPT, supra note 21, art. 16(2);
see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 13, 33 I.L.M. at 1202
(delineating the three-step test).
263. See WCT, supra note 21, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 21, art. 18.
264. See WCT, supra note 21, art. 12; WPPT, supra note 21, art. 19.
265. The WCT entered into force on March 6, 2002. WIPO, WCT
Notification No. 32, WIPO Copyright Treaty, Entry into Force, at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/wct/treatywct_32.html (Dec. 6, 2001).
The WPPT took effect on May 20, 2002. WIPO, WPPT Notification No. 32,
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Entry into Force, at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/wppt/treatywppt_32.html (Feb. 20,
2002).
266. See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167)
10.
267. As Professor Bernt Hugenholtz wrote:
A less ambitious European legislature might have achieved this goal
in a matter of months, simply by copying the provisions of the WIPO
Treaties into a directive. It would have taken the Member States
another 18 months or so to adapt their national laws to the WIPO
standards, and presto, the E.C. and its Member States would have
been among the first, not the very last (as it now appears) to ratify the
Treaties-say, in Spring 1999. This, in turn, would have immediately
triggered the Treaties' entry into force (on 30 ratifications), by adding
16 ratifications (or even 29, including EEA countries and aspiring
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international community has yet to reach a consensus on many
issues-such as sui generis database protection, audiovisual
performance rights, the rights and liabilities of broadcasters,
protection of traditional knowledge, and patent harmonization-the
1996 WIPO Internet Treaties updated the international intellectual
property regime, extending the multilateral system to the Internet and
the new digital environment.
IV. THE CROSSCURRENTS OF RESISTANCE
Although the multilateral intellectual property regime has been
expanding since the creation of the TRIPS Agreement and the 1996
WIPO Internet Treaties, five major crosscurrents have emerged in
recent years, challenging-and at times slowing down, or even
disrupting-the international harmonization process. 268 These five
crosscurrents appear in the forms of reciprocity provisions in
national laws, demands for diversification by less developed
countries, bilateral and plurilateral agreements pushed by developed
countries, non-national systems created in response to Internet
domain name disputes, and regime abandonment caused by the
increasing use of mass market contracts, technological protection
measures, and open source licensing. This Part discusses each of
these crosscurrents in turn and explores their impact on the
international intellectual property regime.
A. Reciprocization
The nondiscrimination principle of national treatment is the
bedrock of the international intellectual property regime. Both
article 5(1) of the Berne Convention and article 2(1) of the Paris
Convention require member states to protect foreign nationals as if
they were nationals of the country.269 This requirement is important,
because countries should at least offer equal protection to the
E.U. members) to the list. Rightholders would have benefited from
the enhanced protection the Treaties provide ever since.
Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive Is Unimportant, and Possibly
Invalid, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 499, 499 (2000).
268. These crosscurrents sometimes might also promote multilateralism by
facilitating the development of common positions among participating
countries. See infra text accompanying notes 361-63.
269. See Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 5(1), 828 U.N.T.S. at 231;
Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 2(1), 21 U.S.T. at 1631.
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nationals of all member states of the international treaties, even if
they cannot agree on the specific scope of protection they grant to
intellectual property rights holders.
National treatment, however, has not always been the preferred
arrangement for establishing international intellectual property
norms. Indeed, at the first intergovernmental congress to form the
Berne Convention in 1883, the German delegation "asked whether it
might be better to abandon the national treatment principle in favor
of a treaty that would codify the international law of copyright and
establish a uniform law among all contracting states." 27° Although
most participating countries eventually rejected the German
proposition because such a proposal would require greater
modification of domestic laws than the changes for which they were
ready, the German request suggested that the international copyright
system could have been designed very differently had the
participating countries been more receptive to the German proposal
when the multilateral system was first created.
Indeed, countries had used reciprocity, rather than national
treatment, to coordinate their diverging national intellectual property
policies before the creation of the Berne and Paris Conventions.
2 7 1
Even after the creation of these Conventions, the United States,
which was only an observer in the intergovernmental meetings and
remained outside the international copyright system, incorporated
reciprocity into its national law. The International Copyright Act of
March 3, 1891, 2 72 which was commonly referred to as the Chace Act,
granted foreign authors copyright protection when the President
proclaimed that the foreign country provided American citizens with
"the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own
citizens" or was a party to an international agreement that provided
reciprocal protection to its members and to which "the United States
of America m[ight], at its pleasure, become a party."
273
270. Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright.- From a "Bundle" of
National Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 265, 268 (2000).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57 & 120-22.
272. Chace Act, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891).
273. Id. § 13, 26 Stat. at 1110. Section 13 of the Chace Act provides:
That this act shall only apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state
or nation when such foreign state or nation permits to citizens of the
United States of America the benefit of copyright on substantially the
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In the mid-1980s, the use of reciprocity provisions was
rejuvenated when the United States became dissatisfied with the
inadequate protection offered to semiconductor chips under the
international intellectual property regime. In 1984, the United States
enacted the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,274 offering sui
generis protection to the layout designs of integrated circuits, or the
so-called mask works.275 To induce other countries to offer similar
protection, the statute granted protection to foreign-manufactured
integrated circuits and chips only if the foreign country afforded
similar protection to chips made by U.S. manufacturers. 276  The
same basis as its own citizens; or when such foreign state or nation is
a party to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in
the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the United
States of America may, at its pleasure, become a party to such
agreement.
Id. "This system [of Presidential proclamations] has proved cumbersome and
ineffective in comparison with the simplicity, certainty, and other advantages
offered by multilateral arrangements." Ringer, supra note 58, at 1058
(footnote omitted); see also Roger C. Dixon, Universal Copyright Convention
and United States Bilateral Copyright Arrangements, in UNIVERSAL
COPYRIGHT CONVENTION ANALYZED 113, 118-23 (Theodore R. Kupferman &
Mathew Foner eds., 1955) (discussing the advantages of the Universal
Copyright Convention over the system of bilateral proclamation
arrangements).
274. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000). For a comprehensive discussion of the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and why other forms of
intellectual property failed to protect the layout design of integrated circuits or
mask works, see Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the Passage of the U.S.
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: Is International Protection Working?, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049 (2000).
275. The Copyright Act defines a mask work as:
a series of related images, however fixed or encoded-
(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimensional
pattern of metallic, insulating, or semiconductor material present
or removed from the layers of a semiconductor chip product; and
(B) in which series the relation of the images to one another is
that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of the
semiconductor chip product.
17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2).
276. The reciprocity provision provides:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), a mask work fixed in a
semiconductor chip product, by or under the authority of the owner of
the mask work, is eligible for protection under this chapter if-
(A) on the date on which the mask work is registered under
section 908, or is first commercially exploited anywhere in the
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statute further included a transitional provision that allowed the
United States Secretary of Commerce to extend protection to
countries that made a good-faith effort and reasonable progress
toward adopting laws that offered similar protection.
277
Although there was very limited litigation under the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, which was arguably obsolete by
the time it was enacted,278 the statute's reciprocity provision
successfully spurred the development of a worldwide system for the
protection of semiconductor chips and integrated circuit
topographies. In 1985, Japan became the first country to take
advantage of the transitional provision and obtained reciprocal
protection based on its enactment of the Semiconductor Layout
Act.2 79 In the same year, the European Community adopted the
Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the Legal
Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products,28° which
required all EC member states to adopt national legislation for the
protection of semiconductor topographies. Since then, the United
Kingdom amended its Copyright, Designs and Patents Act to include
sui generis protection for semiconductor topographies, while
Australia passed the Circuit Layouts Act of 1989 offering similar
protection.28'
At the international level, countries explored the possibility of
introducing worldwide protection of integrated circuit topography
through an international treaty.282 In 1989, WIPO circulated a draft
world, whichever occurs first, the owner of the mask work is (i) a
national or domiciliary of the United States, (ii) a national,
domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a foreign nation that is a
party to a treaty affording protection to mask works to which the
United States is also a party, or (iii) a stateless person, wherever
that person may be domiciled;
(B) the mask work is first commercially exploited in the United
States; or
(C) the mask work comes within the scope of a Presidential
proclamation issued under paragraph (2).
Id. § 902(a)(1).
277. Id. § 914.
278. See Radomsky, supra note 274, at 1052.
279. For a discussion of the Japanese statute, see id. at 1066-67.
280. Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the Legal
Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products, 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36.
281. See Radomsky, supra note 274, at 1069.
282. See id. at 1071.
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of the Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of
Integrated Circuits ("IPIC Treaty") at the Diplomatic Conference in
Washington. Although the Conference eventually failed, WIPO's
effort sowed the seed for the ultimate incorporation of the treaty into
the TRIPS Agreement.283 Under the Agreement, all WTO member
states are required to prohibit the unauthorized "importing, selling, or
otherwise distributing for commercial purposes a protected layout-
design, an integrated circuit in which a protected layout-design is
incorporated, or an article incorporating such an integrated circuit
only in so far as it continues to contain an unlawfully reproduced
layout-design."
284
Following the United States' lead using unilateral action to
protect its semiconductor industry, the European Union enacted the
European Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal Protection
of Databases,285 which requires all EU member states to implement
legislation that grants sui generis protection to databases created as a
286result of "substantial investment" by database producers. To
induce protection of EU database producers abroad, the Directive
includes a reciprocity provision that denies protection to databases
produced in non-EU countries that do not offer comparable
protection to databases. 287 Commentators and American businesses
have expressed major concern about this reciprocity provision,
which, coupled with the lack of database protection in the United
States, has made American database producers vulnerable to foreign
piracy and competition in Europe. 288  By requiring material
reciprocity, the provision also undermines the effectiveness of the
existing international intellectual property regime, which was built
upon the nondiscrimination principle of national treatment.
283. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 35, 33 I.L.M. at 1211.
284. Id. art. 36, 33 I.L.M. at 1211.
285. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
286. Id. art. 7(1). Under the Directive, databases are protected against
unauthorized extraction and reutilization for a renewable term of fifteen years
regardless of their eligibility for copyright protection. Id. art. 10.
287. Id. art. 11.
288. See Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CiN. L. REv. 569, 623
(2002).
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Furthermore, the reciprocity provision is likely to create tension
within the WTO, which requires all member states to grant to each
other "most favored nation" treatment. Article 4 of the TRIPS
Agreement specifically provides that "any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the nationals of all other Members."2 89  Although the provision
includes several exceptions,290 it remains unclear what would
constitute a violation of the "most favored nation" treatment
provision, as such treatment is rare in the intellectual property
context except for those bilateral commercial agreements adopted
before the Berne and Paris Conventions. It will therefore be very
interesting to see how broadly the WTO dispute settlement panel
interprets the enumerated exemptions under the provision.
Notwithstanding this tension concerning the increasing use of
reciprocity provisions, one could make a strong case that the
protection involved in the EU database directive falls outside the
scope of the TRIPS Agreement.291 Although article 10 of the TRIPS
289. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at 1200.
290. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the following exceptions:
Exempted from this obligation are any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity accorded by a Member:
(a) deriving from international agreements on judicial assistance
or law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly
confined to the protection of intellectual property;
(b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the Berne
Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the
treatment accorded be a function not of national treatment but of
the treatment accorded in another country;
(c) in respect of the rights of performers, producers of
phonograms and broadcasting organizations not provided under
this Agreement;
(d) deriving from international agreements related to the
protection of intellectual property which entered into force prior
to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, provided that such
agreements are notified to the Council for TRIPS and do not
constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against
nationals of other Members.
Id.
291. Paul Geller pointed out two possible interpretations for the WTO
dispute settlement panels to fill gaps in relevant law:
On the one hand, a minimalist would argue that TRIPS panels have no
powers to fill gaps in the law. This view finds support in the Dispute-
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Agreement protects "[c]ompilations of data or other material...
which by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents
constitute intellectual creations," that provision specifically excludes
"the data or material itself' and does not address compilations that
do not constitute intellectual creations in terms of the selection or the
arrangement of their contents. 292  Countries are therefore free to
provide additional protection as long as such protection does not
interfere with other extant protection granted under the regime.
After all, the TRIPS Agreement and the multilateral intellectual
property regime set only the floor, not the ceiling, of harmonized
protection.
293
B. Diversification
The United States and the members of the European Union were
not the only states that were dissatisfied with the recent development
in the international intellectual property regime. Many less
developed countries were similarly concerned. In particular, they
Settlement Understanding which, in article 3(2), states that such
panels "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements." This language would confirm the
minimalist interpretation limiting panels to rights that the TRIPS
Agreement specifically incorporates or enumerates, subject to minor
adjustments to the circumstances of each case. On the other hand, a
maximalist would argue that TRIPS panels are mandated to fill gaps
that leave present law uncertain, absent which these panels might fail
to bring, in the words of the provision I just cited, "security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system." This language might
prompt the maximalist to compare the prohibition of adding to or
diminishing TRIPS rights to the limitation which, in theory, has
confined the E.C. Court of Justice in Luxembourg to ruling on the
"exercise" but not the "existence" of intellectual property rights. This
Court, in practice, has not allowed this distinction to stop it from
effectively making new law when subjecting such rights to the
requirements of free European trade. By the same token, the TRIPS
panels might reconstrue rights in comparably flexible terms that
transcend the circumstances of any given case.
Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact
of TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAW. 99, 108 (1995) (footnotes
omitted).
292. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 10(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
293. Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: "Members may, but shall
not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene
the provisions of this Agreement." Id. art. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1198.
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felt threatened by the limited access to affordable drugs despite
severe public health crises in their countries; the lack of protection
for traditional knowledge and indigenous materials; and the growing
lack of access to information, knowledge, and technology transfer
due to increased global intellectual property protection.
Commentators have put forward at least four arguments to
support the harmonization of international intellectual property
norms notwithstanding the significant differences between developed
and less developed countries. First, harmonization enables the legal
system to internalize the positive externalities associated with the
creative process. Because of uniform laws, second-comer countries
will no longer be able to free ride on the investments of their first-
comer neighbors. 294 Second, harmonization facilitates economies of
scale in governance and administration. 295 For example, the Patent
Cooperation Treaty streamlined the early stages of patent prosecution
for nationals from all member states, while the European Patent
Convention enabled the European Patent Office to examine patents
for all of the participating countries. 296 Third, uniformity provides a
safeguard against destructive protectionism, thus promoting free
trade and stability in the international community.297 Indeed, the
GATT was created to combat the destructive protectionism and
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that led to the collapse of the world
294. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 693-700 (2002). As Professor Duffy explained:
Consider, for example, the situation in which one country maintains a
patent system but its neighbor does not. Because of the incentives of
the patent system in the first country, firms will invest resources in
developing patentable innovations. Consumers in the first country
will pay above-marginal-cost prices for those innovations and will
thus bear the cost of the information necessary to develop the
innovations. By contrast, consumers in the second country will, if
competitive conditions prevail, pay only the marginal cost of
reproducing the innovation; they will free-ride off the investments of
their neighbors. The legal regime in the first country thus has a
positive externality for the second country.
Id. at 694.
295. Id. at 699-701.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 171-72.
297. Duffy, supra note 294, at 702-03. But see Ruth Gana Okediji,
Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 117, 125-44 (1999) (exploring the tension between free trade and
intellectual property protection).
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trading system during the Great Depression era.298  Finally,
uniformity reduces the transaction costs of conducting business in
foreign countries. As experiences of the nineteenth century
demonstrate, changes in world politics are often rapid and
unpredictable, and foreign authors and inventors sometimes might
not receive the protection they were promised when they made the
investment. By setting up uniform or harmonized rules that are tied
to an international regime, countries therefore can have reasonable
expectations that their nationals will be protected from arbitrary
actions by foreign governments.
299
Notwithstanding these benefits, harmonization has its
drawbacks, and sometimes diversification may serve the countries
better. Professor John Duffy found three major benefits of
diversification. First, it allows countries to develop protections that
are commensurate with their particular needs and differences, instead
of applying "one size fits all" solutions that sit uneasily with the local
community.30 Second, diversification facilitates jurisdictional
competition that checks governmental inefficiency and abuse. 30 1 By
doing so, it makes the lawmaking process more accountable to local
populations who decide for their own what rules and systems they
want to adopt. Finally, diversification enables countries to develop
their legal systems by experimenting with new regulatory and
economic policies through interjurisdictional competition. 3 2 Indeed,legal experimentation was responsible "for creating the very subject
298. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 100 (1995) (stating that "[tihe central lessons the drafters [of
GATT] took from interwar history was that unilateral action on trade questions
and disputes led ultimately to the collapse of the international trading system").
299. See Yu, supra note 288, at 606-08.
300. See Duffy, supra note 294, at 703-06 (noting that jurisdictional legal
variation would permit jurisdictions to match laws to the unique tastes and
preferences of their populations); see also Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the New Millennium: Universal Templates
as Terms of Surrender for Non-Industrial Nations; Piracy as an Offshoot, 10
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47 (2002) (criticizing the application of
universal templates to non-industrial nations); Peter K. Yu, World Trade,
Intellectual Property, and the Global Elites: An Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002) (criticizing the application of universal templates to
non-industrial nations).
301. See Duffy, supra note 294, at 706-07.
302. See id. at 707-08.
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of patent law."
303
The TRIPS Agreement facilitates two different types
of diversification-individual diversification and group
diversification. 30 4 Individual diversification puts limits on the scope
of protection under the international treaty so that each country can
tailor protection to its own needs, interests, and goals. In the patent
context, the TRIPS Agreement makes the best mode requirement
optional, leaves open the possibility for administrative opposition
procedures, lets members decide whether they want to adopt a "first
to file" or "first to invent" system, and imposes no obligation that
countries grant "grace period[s]" for disclosing inventions without
failing the novelty requirement. 305 The Agreement also leaves room
for "the admissibility of reverse engineering for computer programs,
the recognition of moral rights under copyright, the determination of
exceptions to exclusive rights, the grounds and scope of compulsory
licenses for patents, and the type and extent of protection of plant
varieties."
30 6
Group diversification, by comparison, extends individual
diversification to a particular group and sets up a multi-tiered system
within a single treaty. The textbook example of group diversification
is the transitional provisions in the TRIPS Agreement. Article 65 of
the Agreement provides less developed and transitional countries
with a five-year transitional period.30 7 Article 66 provides least
308
developed countries with an eleven-year transitional period. To
help create "a sound and viable technological base" in these
countries, article 66 further requires developed countries to provide
incentives for their businesses and institutions to promote and
encourage transfer of technology to least developed countries.
30 9
By most accounts, the TRIPS Agreement was created as a
303. Id. at 709.
304. One can also argue that diversification reflects those issues on which
member states failed to come to agreement.
305. See Duffy, supra note 294, at 696.
306. CORREA, supra note 216, at 105.
307. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65(l)-(3), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
308. Id. art. 66(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
309. Id. art. 66(2), 33 I.L.M. at 1222.
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compromise between developed and less developed countries. 310
While developed countries received stronger protection for
intellectual property rights and a reduction in restrictions against
foreign direct investment, less developed countries obtained, in
return, lower tariffs on textiles and agriculture and protection against
unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States and other
developed countries via the mandatory settlement process. Although
commentators, including myself, have criticized the TRIPS
Agreement for its "coercive" and "imperialistic" nature, 31' it is
important not to focus so much on the Agreement that we ignore the
international trade background against which it was negotiated.
The problem with the TRIPS Agreement is not that it is one-
sided. It is expected to be one-sided, given the cross-sector
bargaining undertaken during the negotiation process. Rather, the
Agreement is problematic for three reasons. First, intellectual
property has become particularly important in today's knowledge-
based economy. The information industries, rather than the
agricultural or manufacturing industries, will drive the economy of
the twenty-first century. Gains by less developed countries in the
310. This compromise was complicated and reflected the unequal bargaining
power between developed and less developed countries. As Jayashree Watal
pointed out:
[W]hile developed countries agreed under the ATC [Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing] to phase out their quotas on the most sensitive
items of textiles and clothing on the last day of the 10-year transition
period, developing countries accepted the phasing-in of product
patents for pharmaceuticals, the most sensitive issue in TRIPS, on the
first day on [sic] the 10-year transition period. This result was
achieved despite the fact that the transition period for TRIPS, like that
on textiles, was negotiated at the same time, end of 1991. The
argument that pharmaceutical products would only be introduced in
the market after 10 years or so is not important as the domestic
industry in developing countries is effectively excluded from imitating
all pharmaceutical products for which patents are filed from 1995,
while the textile industry in developed countries can continue to be
protected by quotas until 1.1.2005.
WATAL, supra note 115, at 20. Cf Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of
Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 167 (1994) (arguing
that it is in the self-interest of less developed countries to agree to the TRIPS
Agreement). For background on the history of the TRIPS Agreement, see
GERVAIS, supra note 178; RYAN, supra note 187; WATAL, supra note 115;
Abbott, supra note 217.
311. See Yu, supra note 288, at 580.
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areas of agriculture and textiles under the WTO regime would
therefore not make up for losses in the intellectual property field.
Less developed countries would come out as losers under the
arrangement. Even worse for these countries, an inequitable system
that is biased in the intellectual property area forces them to utilize
an outdated competition model that frustrates their efforts to catch up
with their developed counterparts.
Second, the transitional periods provided under the TRIPS
Agreement were unrealistic for less developed countries. As some
commentators have pointed out, these _periods would be inadequate
even for many developed countries, 312 which arguably have more
economic resources and more sophisticated legal systems. More
problematically, the stronger protection for intellectual property
tends to focus on issues that are important to developed countries
while ignoring the need for equal participation by less developed
countries in the international intellectual property system.313 "For
example, the evolving language in TRIPS on geographical
indications remains largely.., confined to wines and spirits, while
many developing countries point to food products that could be
protected to their advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling
tea.' ' 314 The Agreement also failed to protect folklore, traditional
knowledge, and other indigenous creations, as they do not fit well
within the Western worldview and intellectual tradition, the capitalist
philosophy, and the contemporary notion of individual authorship.
315
Third, despite the compromise, developed countries failed to
312. WATAL, supra note 115, at 4 (noting that "[t]hese transitional
arrangements have proved inadequate for both developed and developing
countries").
313. MASKUS, supra note 218, at 239.
314. Id.
315. As the Bellagio Declaration stated:
Contemporary intellectual property law is constructed around the
notion of the author, the individual, solitary and original creator, and it
is for this figure that its protections are reserved. Those who do not fit
this model--custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge,
collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant
cultivators of valuable seed varieties, for example-are denied
intellectual property protection.
Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 192,
193 (1996).
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honor their bargains in reducing tariffs and subsidies in the
agricultural and textile areas. 316 This failure exacerbates the earlier
problems. Indeed, because of this failure, less developed countries
are now disillusioned with the WTO process, as was evident from the
breakdown of the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun.
Today, the geopolitical landscape has changed. When less
developed countries signed on to the WTO Agreements a decade
ago, they were divided and unclear as to what they wanted. Some of
the issues involved in the Agreements-such as intellectual property
protection-were relatively new, and arguably of low priority, to
these countries. These days, however, less developed countries have
become more vigilant, organized, and sophisticated. Led by such
heavyweights as Brazil and India and supported by a sleeping trading
giant, China, these countries now have a better sense of what they
want.317 It is therefore no surprise that less developed countries are
taking a more aggressive collective stance with respect to their
316. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 8 (2003) [hereinafter
IPR COMMISSION REPORT]; see SELL, supra note 198, at 173 (stating that
"there is... no evidence that developed countries are making good on their
commitments to open their markets more widely to developing countries'
agricultural and textile exports").
317. For discussions of the position taken by less developed countries and
the Group of 21, see, for example, Editorial, Lessons from the Cancun
Debacle, Bus. TIMES SING., Sept. 16, 2003; David Greising & Andrew Martin,
U.S. to Pursue Regional, Individual Trade Talks, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2003, at
C1; Hopes Dashed for Poor at WTO, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 18, 2003, at P2.
As Professor Sungjoon Cho pointed out:
One could not confidently predict that [the collective stance taken by
the Group of 21 ] will remain as solid in the future as it was in Cancrin.
Interests of G-21 members are not homogenous. For instance, while
India still wants to protect domestic agricultural industries, Brazil, a
member of the Cairns Group consisting of agricultural product
exporters, wants to further liberalize trade in this area. Moreover, we
witnessed other groups of developing countries, such as the G-33,
which advocated the inclusion of strategic products and a special
safeguard mechanism in the agriculture negotiation; the coalition of
the African Union, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, and
the LDCs (AU/ACP/LDCs) which collectively want the preservation
of current preferential treatment in addition to G-33 demands.
Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancan and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 219, 236 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
Fall 2004]
388 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol 38:323
demands for more group diversification in the international
intellectual property regime.
Among the many areas in which less developed countries have
demanded diversification, public health has captured the most public
media attention. In the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in
November 2001, the WTO member states adopted the Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,318 which responded to the
complaints by less developed countries that they were unable to
afford protection to patented pharmaceuticals in light of the massive
HIV/AIDS crises within their borders. In response to these
complaints, the Declaration granted to least developed countries an
additional ten years before they would be required to protect
pharmaceuticals. 319 The Declaration also clarified article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement by recognizing in each WTO member "the right
to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licences are granted. 320 In addition, the
Declaration stated explicitly that "[e]ach Member has the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public
health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency."321 The Declaration also
"recognize[d] that WTO Members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement" 322 and instructed the Council for TRIPS to
devise an "expeditious solution."
323
The second area is traditional knowledge. In recent years, the
misappropriation of folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous
practices has become an increasingly important issue in global
politics. Although folklore, traditional knowledge, and indigenous
practices "are not necessarily IP resources in the sense that they are
understood in developed countries,... they are certainly resources
318. See Doha Declaration, supra note 8.
319. Id. 7.
320. Id. 5(b).
321. Id. 5(c).
322. Id. 6.
323. Id.
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on the basis of which protected intellectual property can be, and has
been, created., 324 If instituted, protection of these materials would
have an impact on a wide variety of policy areas, including
agricultural productivity, biological diversity, cultural patrimony,
food security, environmental sustainability, business ethics, global
competition, human rights, international trade, public health,
scientific research, sustainable development, and wealth
distribution.325 The traditional knowledge debate to date has been
particularly intense. The international community has yet to reach a
consensus on how to protect indigenous materials, partly due to
limited understanding of the issue and partly due to the complexities
involved in defining and classifying the materials.
326
In the World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva in
December 2003, less developed countries pushed aggressively for a
multilateral document that declared the global importance of access
to information and knowledge. Paragraph 42 of the Declaration of
Principles, one of the two key documents emanating from the
summit, provides specifically:
Intellectual Property protection is important to encourage
innovation and creativity in the Information Society;
similarly, the wide dissemination, diffusion, and sharing of
knowledge is important to encourage innovation and
creativity. Facilitating meaningful participation by all in
intellectual property issues and knowledge sharing through
full awareness and capacity building is a fundamental part
of an inclusive Information Society.
327
Although I have criticized elsewhere the inadequacy of the
intellectual property-related portion of this document, 32 the summit
324. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 316, at 7.
325. See Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and
Indigenous Culture: An Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239,
240 (2003) (noting that negotiations on this issue are complicated by the
difficulty in classifying indigenous materials, the choice of negotiation forum,
cognitive barriers of policy makers, and the failure to include the indigenous
community in the process).
326. See generally Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual
Property, and Indigenous Culture, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239
(2003).
327. WSIS Declaration of Principles, supra note 9, 42.
328. See Peter K. Yu, The Trust and Distrust of Intellectual Property Rights,
16 REVUE QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2005).
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reinforced the need for diversification and demonstrated the
eagerness for less developed countries to push for more limited
protection under the international intellectual property regime.
To some extent, the recent demands for diversification and the
development of the WIPO development agenda by less developed
countries remind us of the developments in the 1967 Stockholm
revision conference, at which WIPO was created. At that
conference, countries were so eager to redesign the international
intellectual property regime that they introduced an ambitious
Protocol Regarding Developing Countries in the Bere
Convention.329 Ironically, the protocol was too ambitious, and the
Stockholm Act was never ratified and has now been superceded by
the Paris Act. Nevertheless, the Stockholm revision conference
demonstrated the need for diversification and the potential for radical
developments should developed countries continue to ignore the
needs and conditions of their less developed counterparts.
Less developed countries are understandably concerned about
the increased international protection of intellectual property rights.
After all, such protection tends to favor developed countries at the
expense of less developed countries. As many scholars have
demonstrated both empirically and theoretically, the presumption
that stronger protection will benefit less developed countries or that a
universal regime will maximize global welfare is questionable.
330
Equally doubtful is the assumption that the existing international
intellectual property regime strikes the appropriate "balance between
incentives to future production, the free flow of information, and the
preservation of the public domain in the interest of potential future
329. See supra text accompanying note 98.
330. See Carlos M. Correa, Harmonization of Intellectual Property Rights in
Latin America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 109, 126 (1997); see also Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus
Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 68, 103-05 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (urging
countries to develop their intellectual property rights regime according to their
own needs); Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 141, 152 (arguing that an
international regime may not yield overall welfare benefits and that actors
outside the regime may suffer).
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creators." 331 Indeed, when the United States Congress undertook a
critical examination of the American patent system, one of its
experts, Professor Fritz Machlup, remarked famously:
If one does not know whether a system... is good or bad,
the safest "policy conclusion" is to muddle through-either
with it, if one has long lived with it, or without it, if one has
lived without it. If we did not have a patent system, it
would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge of its economic consequences to recommend
instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our
present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
332
Moreover, as commentators have pointed out, the Western
intellectual property system became universal because it was backed
by great economic and military might,333 rather than because the
331. BOYLE, supra note 315, at 124; see J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders
to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 24 (1997) (arguing that policy makers in many
developed countries take the existing levels of innovative strength for granted
and mistakenly promote protectionism).
332. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC
REvIEw OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz
Machlup).
333. William P. Alford, How Theory Does--and Does Not-Matter:
American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 17 (1994); see ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY FOR NON-INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 93 (1996) ("[W]hether or
not [intellectual property] was consciously designed to serve economic policies
in any of the [industrialized countries], it has always evolved in response to
economic and political necessity."); see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 247 (1998) ("The range of Western beliefs that
define intellectual and cultural property laws.., are not universal values that
express the full range of human possibility, but particular, interested fictions
emergent from a history of colonialism that has disempowered many of the
world's peoples.").
Indeed, as Professor Samuel Huntington explained, Western culture and
ideology are sometimes attractive because they are linked to hard economic
and military power:
[Culture and ideology] becomes attractive when they are seen as
rooted in material success and influence.... Increases in hard
economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence,
arrogance, and belief in the superiority of one's own culture or soft
power compared to those of other peoples and greatly increase its
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system embodied universal values. A "one size fits all" international
intellectual property regime therefore may not be appropriate.
Indeed, an inappropriate system would hurt less developed countries
more than it would hurt their developed counterparts. While
developed countries may have the resources and regulatory
mechanisms to reduce the impact of an unbalanced system, the same
does not apply to less developed countries. 334  Many of these
countries lack the national economic strengths and established legal
mechanisms to overcome problems created by an unbalanced system.
Even if the system is beneficial in the long run, these countries might
not have the wealth, infrastructure, and technological base to take
advantage of the opportunities created by the system in the short
run.
3 35
C. Bilateralism
In response to the increased demands for diversification from
less developed countries, the European Union and the United States
have begun to use bilateral and plurilateral treaties to enhance their
bargaining positions and avoid stalemates in the international
intellectual property arena. The need for such a change of strategy
became apparent when the WTO Ministerial Conference ended
attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military
power lead to self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other
cultures the keys to economic, military, and political success.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 92 (1996).
334. As the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights stated in its final
report:
[W]e consider that, if anything, the costs of getting the IP system
"wrong" in a developing country are likely to be far higher than in
developed countries. Most developed countries have sophisticated
systems of competition regulation to ensure that abuses of any
monopoly rights cannot unduly affect the public interest. In the US
and the EU, for example, these regimes are particularly strong and
well-established. In most developing countries this is far from being
[the] case. This makes such countries particularly vulnerable to
inappropriate intellectual property systems.
IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 316, at 4; see MASKUS, supra note 218,
at 237 (noting that developed countries "have mature legal systems of
corrective interventions" where "the exercise of IPRs threatens to be
anticompetitive or excessively costly in social terms").
335. See MASKUS, supra note 218, at 237 (noting that "[1]ong-run gains
would come at the expense of costlier access in the medium term").
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prematurely in Cancun in September 2003. Since the Cancun
Ministerial, the United States has initiated a "divide and conquer"
policy that seeks to reward those who are willing to work with the
country while undermining the efforts by Brazil, India, and the
Group of 21 to establish a united negotiating front for less developed
countries. As then-United States Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick wrote in the Financial Times, the United States will separate
the "can do" countries from the "won't do," and it "will move
towards free trade with [only] can-do countries." '336 By October
2004, the United States had concluded free trade agreements with
Jordan, Chile, Singapore, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic,
and Bahrain337 (in addition to NAFTA,338 which the United States
signed with Canada and Mexico in 1992). The U.S. government had
also initiated trade talks with Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
Thailand, and with the Southern African Customs Union (including
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland).339
Commentators generally consider bilateral agreements more
effective in addressing the individual concerns and circumstances of
the contracting parties.340  These agreements "can take into
consideration the particular phases of development confronting each
336. Robert B. Zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won 't-do Countries,
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
337. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States
and Bahrain Sign Free Trade Agreement, at http://www.ustr.gov/
Document Library/PressReleases/2004/September/UnitedStatesBahrainSi
gnFreeTradeAgreement.html (Sept. 14, 2004) [hereinafter USTR Press
Release].
338. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605 (1993).
339. USTR Press Release, supra note 337.
340. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 174, at 139 (noting that the lengthy
enforcement action plan annexed to the 1995 China-U.S. Agreement
Regarding Intellectual Property Rights "imposed more detailed procedural
obligations than could be provided in a multilateral agreement such as
TRIPS"); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in
a Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 339 (1993)
("Bilateral agreements provide the most workable vehicle for addressing the
contentious issues surrounding intellectual property protection."). For
discussions of bilateral agreements, see Senator Max Baucus, A New Trade
Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1989);
Michael Aho, More Bilateral Agreements Would Be a Blunder: What the
President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25 (1989).
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country, and provide for the gradual inclusion of a developing
country into the global economy." 341  In addition, bilateral
agreements "can target practices of a particular country offensive to
U.S. interests and do so in an expeditious manner." 342 Empirical
evidence has also demonstrated that U.S. bilateral agreements "ha[d]
generally encouraged speedier and more substantial changes in
suspect nations" after the United States threatened to impose trade
sanctions on those countries.
343
Compared to bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes usually
result in compromises that contemplate less substantial change.
3 44
As these compromises may facilitate more gradual changes,
multilateral regimes are more likely to "establish[] a protection
standard binding on a greater number of countries than a bilateral
solution."345  Multilateralism also promotes efficiency, reduces
negotiation and political costs, and enhances international stability
341. Giunta & Shang, supra note 340, at 329; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 174, at 139 (noting that the lengthy enforcement action plan annexed to
the 1995 China-U.S. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
"specified particularized enforcement efforts for motion pictures, literary
works and software"). Professor Peter Drahos disagreed:
For the United States, there are very strong incentives for a
standardization of bilateral treaty standards. So, for example, the BIT
which the United States signed with Nicaragua in 1995 was based on
the prototype that the United States had developed for such treaties in
1994. Similarly, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that the United
States has negotiated with Jordan will serve as a model for the other
FTAs being negotiated with Chile and Singapore.
Drahos, supra note 4, at 794.
342. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property
Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273, 295 (1991).
343. Giunta & Shang, supra note 340, at 340; see also Ashoka Mody, New
International Environment for Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 203, 225 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole Ganz
Brown eds., 1990) ("In the short-run, bilateralism is proving more effective
than multilateral efforts in furthering U.S. interests. Bilateralism is quicker
and allows more focused and tailored responses.").
344. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (Anthony
D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997) (noting that "the need to achieve
concurrence among so many parties often leads to less stringent standards" and
that such standards "may be difficult (if not impossible) to raise through
bilateral efforts").
345. Id.
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by minimizing disruption to the international trading system.
346
Even when the interests of the signatory countries have changed,
multilateral solutions sometimes may be able to continue and persist
in their own right.347
The recent return to bilateral and plurilateral treaties is
particularly interesting. Although the need for countries to move
away from bilateralism to multilateralism was the main impetus
behind the creation of the Berne and Paris Conventions,
348
multilateralism has its limitation, especially when the disagreement
is likely to result in a deadlock in a multilateral forum. From the
United States' standpoint, the switch to bilateralism has at least two
benefits. By changing the forum and reducing the number of
negotiating parties, the United States can provide side payments that
it would not be able to offer in a multilateral forum, given the
diversity of interests the United States has vis-A-vis the contracting
states. By switching to bilateralism, the United States can also
prevent less developed countries from reopening the TRIPS
negotiations with a better bargaining position.
349
What is troubling, however, is that the new bilateral agreements
346. Leaffer, supra note 342, at 297 (arguing that bilateral agreements "may
run counter to U.S. long-term interests for a healthy, stable trade
environment... [and] fragment the world trading system... [by creating]
resentment, particularly among Third World countries who [sic] view imposed
bilateral agreements as a species of colonialism"); see also Cho, supra note
317, at 239 ("The inherent discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is
often blended with an internal power disparity and ultimately begets
unilateralism. Unilateralism, which is often clad with extraterritoriality, tends
to eclipse international trade law, thereby placing the global trading system at
the mercy of bare politics by a handful of powerful states."). But see William
Safire, Smoot-Hawley Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1983, at A23 (arguing that
protectionism may be the only solution to unfair competition from foreign
countries).
347. See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an
Anarchic World, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 1, at 115, 138
(noting that "[r]egimes may be maintained even after shifts in the interests that
gave rise to them"). Professor Stein provided four reasons for such
persistence: (1) the delays in recalculation or reassessment of interests; (2)
sunk costs involved in international institutions; (3) tradition, legitimacy, and
the reluctance to damage reputation by breaking with customary behavior; and
(4) the changing mindset from self-maximization to joint-maximization. See
id. at 138-39.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 44-86 & 120-67.
349. See WATAL, supra note 115, at 5.
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will allow the U.S. government to push foreign countries to adopt
intellectual property provisions that are considered controversial and
legally shaky on U.S. soil.350 For example, the United States pushed
Chile and Singapore to adopt the controversial provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 3 51  in their free trade
agreements. 352  Likewise, even though the American public has
heavily criticized the recent copyright term extension, the U.S.
government included provisions extending the duration of copyrights
in free trade agreements with Singapore and Australia.35 3 The free
trade agreement with Australia also bans the parallel importation of
cheap generic drugs. 354  Meanwhile, important public interest
safeguards, such as the fair use privilege in U.S. copyright law,355
were not included in the agreements.
While the positions of the U.S. government seemed hypocritical,
most countries-especially the smaller ones-willingly accepted
these agreements. Many of them do not have the bargaining power
to negotiate better agreements, and some of them consider these
agreements inconsequential to their key national interests. In fact,
the interests of the trade negotiators and government officials in
350. See Samuelson, supra note 246, at 372-74 (discussing how the 1996
WIPO diplomatic conference almost provided "an end run around Congress");
see also Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of
(International) Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 585 (2001).
351. Pub. L. No. 105-204, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
352. Capitol Hill, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 19, 2003.
353. Emma Caine et al., Copyright 'Harmony' Profits US Firms, AUSTL.
FIN. REV., Nov. 20, 2003, at 71; Eddie Lee, Taking the Mickey Out of
Innovation, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 20, 2004.
354. Karen Middleton, Trade Deal on Drugs Needs an Honesty Pill, W.
AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 6, 2004, at 22, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File.
355. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Commentators have advocated for the
inclusion of affirmative rights in obtaining public access to copyright-protected
materials. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 5 (arguing for the need to use the
next Round of GATT negotiations to add explicit user rights to the TRIPS
Agreement); Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 87 (2000) (arguing that "an international fair
use doctrine does not currently exist in the international law of copyright and
that such a doctrine is vital for effectuating traditional copyright policy in a
global market for copyrighted works as well as for capitalizing on the benefits
of protecting intellectual property under the free trade system"); Yu, supra
note 328, pt. III.D (criticizing the lack of affirmative rights in the international
intellectual property regime to enable public access to protected materials).
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some countries may coincide with those of the U.S. officials, as their
first priority is trade or development aid, not intellectual property.
Thus, many countries welcome these treaties, even if the intellectual
property systems required by the agreements might not benefit them.
As Professor Michael Geist explained in the context of the recent
free trade agreements between the United States and the Dominican
Republic and between the United States and Australia:
Developing countries such as the Dominican Republic view
the inclusion of stronger copyright protections as a costless
choice. For those countries, the harm that may result from
excessive copyright controls pales in comparison to more
fundamental development concerns and they are therefore
willing to surrender copyright policy decisions in return for
tangible benefits in other trade areas.
Developed countries such as Australia may recognize
the importance of a balanced copyright policy to both their
cultural and economic policies, but they are increasingly
willing to treat intellectual property as little more than a
bargaining chip as part of broader negotiation. Since most
trade deals are judged by an analysis of the bottom-line,
economic benefits that result from the agreement, and since
quantifying the negative impact of excessive copyright
controls is difficult, the policy implications of including
copyright within trade agreements is often dismissed as
inconsequential.356
From the standpoint of democratic governance, these bilateral
agreements are particularly problematic, because they seek to
circumvent the political process by using "negotiation backdoors"
through which government officials can achieve what these officials
otherwise could not achieve before Congress.3 57  By pushing
controversial legislation into international fora, these officials are
356. Michael Geist, Why We Must Stand on Guard Over Copyright,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20, 2003, at D3; see also Shira Perlmutter, Future
Directions in International Copyright, 16 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369,
378 (1998) (contending that, for many countries, "the trade-related benefits
that may be obtained from joining a club like the WTO can outweigh any
perceived drawbacks of adopting a new copyright law").
357. Samuelson, supra note 246, at 374 (discussing how the 1996 WIPO
diplomatic conference provided "the potential for an end run around
Congress").
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more likely to secure international agreements that, in turn, would
convince Congress to enact implementing legislation that would not
be adopted in the first place.
Indeed, the expediency of many of the proposals to expand
intellectual property rights is questionable. As Professors Keith
Maskus and Jerome Reichman pointed out,
the drive to further harmonize the international minimum
standards of patent protection at WIPO has occurred at the
very time when the domestic standards of the United States
and the operations of its patent system are under critical
assault .... How, under such circumstances, could it be
timely to harmonize and elevate international standards of
patent protection-even if that were demonstrably
beneficial-when there is so little agreement in the US
itself on how to rectify a dysfunctional apparatus that often
seems out of control? ... Further harmonization efforts in
this climate thus amount to a gamble from which bad
decisions and bad laws are far more likely to emerge than
good laws that appropriately balance public and private
interests."
358
Even more problematic, these agreements might threaten to
backfire on the American people by entering the country in the form
of customary international law when a sufficient number of countries
have adopted the controversial provisions in their bilateral or
plurilateral agreements and have expressly and consistently
recognized these provisions as legal norms governing their state
conduct. Such norms will also "form the context for" interpreting
treaties to which the United States is a signatory.
359
The large array of bilateral treaties might also create conflicting
obligations within many less developed countries. Just imagine the
obligations a small island country will have after signing bilateral
agreements with both the European Union and the United States.
Theoretically, the two agreements should be similar, given the fact
that both of these trading partners offer very strong intellectual
property protection. However, because the European Union and the
358. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 279, 300, 302 (2004) (footnote omitted).
359. See Okediji, supra note 350, at 602-04.
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United States strongly disagree on many intellectual property
issues, the two bilateral agreements are likely to diverge, resulting
in tension, or even conflict within the international trading system.
Thus, some less developed countries may exploit the differences
between the European Union and the United States as part of their
negotiation strategy while others may wait for the two trading
powers to battle out their differences before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body.
Bilateralism is not always destructive to the international
intellectual property regime. Sometimes it may help promote
multilateralism by facilitating the development of common positions
among participating countries. As one commentator pointed out,
"regionalism may contribute to multilateralism under certain
circumstances through a 'laboratory effect'. After experiencing trial
and error as well as learning-by-doing in the regional level, countries
may feel confident in ratcheting these regional initiatives up to the
multilateral forum."
361
360. In the copyright context, these differences "include the protection of
moral rights, fair use, the first sale doctrine, the work-made-for-hire
arrangement, and protection against private copying in the digital
environment." Yu, supra note 288, at 625-26 (footnotes omitted).
361. Cho, supra note 317, at 238 (footnote omitted); see also Okediji, supra
note 4, at 143 (noting that "[m]ultilateral efforts to harmonize intellectual
property norms should be anticipated by developing countries once the
network of bilateral agreements is sufficiently dense to warrant a mechanism to
consolidate and (perhaps improve) the gains from bilateralism"). Senator Max
Baucus contended that a bilateral agreement may "provide at least a partial
model for a future multilateral agreement." Baucus, supra note 340, at 21-22.
As he explained:
By opening markets on a bilateral basis, otherwise insoluble political
problems can be attacked incrementally; bilateral agreements might
break the political ice for multilateral agreements. Once the first steps
have been taken to eliminate a trade barrier or solve an economic
problem for one nation, political problems appear less formidable and
it is easier to reach similar agreements with other nations. For
example, opening the Japanese construction market to the entire world
might be extremely difficult politically for Japanese officials.
Opening it only to the United States might be somewhat easier. Once
the market is opened partially and the Japanese industry and
government become accustomed to the new situation, further
liberalization will be easier to achieve. Far from derailing the GATT,
bilateral agreements can blaze a trail that the GATT can follow.
Id. at 22.
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To be certain, some of these common positions might fail to take
into consideration the local conditions of participating countries,
especially when less developed countries are involved. For example,
commentators have heavily criticized the intellectual property
provisions of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. 362 Commentators
also suggested that the new bilateral treaties threatened to "roll back
both substantive and strategic gains of the TRIPS Agreement for
developing countries." 363 These concerns, however, are irrelevant to
the discussion of multilateralism, as many of these agreements might
eventually find their way into the international intellectual property
regime regardless of this lack of balance. Indeed, the TRIPS
Agreement was one of the most oft-criticized multilateral treaties in
the international trade and intellectual property arenas.
D. Non-nationalization
Traditionally, intellectual property lawmaking is a matter of
domestic affairs. Without external interference, governments make
value judgments as to what would best promote the creation and
dissemination of intellectual works in their own countries. With
increasing globalization and the establishment of the WTO, however,
the control of national governments over the adoption and
implementation of domestic intellectual property laws has been
greatly reduced. Indeed, international lawmaking has begun to
replace country-based assessments and domestic policy making as
the predominant mode of intellectual property lawmaking.
In recent years, however, a new form of lawmaking has
emerged. Non-national lawmaking is a new form of lawmaking
"that has developed contrary to the traditional premises of
deliberative construction and incrementalist decision making." 364 As
Paul Geller, the general editor of the leading international copyright
362. See, e.g., VIVAs-EUGUI, supra note 4; IP Justice, Why the Americas
Should Resist Pressure to Adopt the FTAA "s Intellectual Property Rights
Chapter, available at http://www.ipjustice.org/FTAA/santodomingo.shtml
(Jan. 28, 2004); Robin D. Gross, FTAA: A Threat to Freedom and Free Trade,
available at http://www.ipjustice.org/FTAA/IPJFTAAWhitePaper-r.l.pdf
(Oct. 20, 2003).
363. Okediji, supra note 4, at 129.
364. Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-national
Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
43 WM. & MARYL. REV. 141, 148 (2001).
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law treatise, described, the network model has now replaced the
patchwork model that countries traditionally used to structure
international intellectual property norms in the past 
century. 365
Likewise, Sir Robin Jacob, a noted English intellectual property
jurist, observed that, "as time goes on, ... the world will realize that
at least for intellectual property the days of the nation-state are
over."
366
The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy 367
365. As Paul Geller elaborated:
Until recently, national laws of intellectual property, along with
corresponding markets, fit within the patchwork model. Now, media
technologies are shifting the marketplace to the network model.
Laws of intellectual property have formed a patchwork country by
country. Treaties in the field set out minimum rights, but in flexible
terms so that each right may be implemented with more or less
discretion. Otherwise, these treaties, starting with the Berne and Paris
Conventions, provide for national treatment, requiring each member-
state to protect foreign treaty claimants like domestic claimants. Thus,
while differing from country to country, much the same legal rules
have governed most competitors in media and technology markets
within each set of borders. Industries have tended to group within
such borders: for example, publishers have gravitated to centers such
as Paris, London, and New York. Hard copies and products have been
marketed outward from such centers within national territories.
Now, however, markets are being globally networked. Computers
are releasing creation and production from the constraints of
geographical space. For example, they allow writers to ready text for
publishing, composers to synthesize music, and designers to shape
products, all at their desk tops. Telecommunication media, like the
fax and the Internet, enable teams of creators from the four comers of
the earth to collaborate instantaneously across cyberspace. The World
Wide Web opens up new interactive channels between creators and
producers, on the one hand, and mass and specialized markets, on the
other. More generally, the communication of media productions,
marketing symbols, and technologies is being decentralized and
enriched between points of input and end-use.
Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for International
Intellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 70-71 (1998)
(footnotes omitted).
366. Hon. Mr. Justice Jacob, International Intellectual Property Litigation in
the Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 507, 516 (2000), quoted in
Graeme W. Austin, The Role of National Courts: Valuing "Domestic Self-
Determination" in International Intellectual Property Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-
KENT. L. REv. 1155, 1157 (2002).
367. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Aug. 26, 1999)
[hereinafter UDRP], available at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm.
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(UDRP) provides an illustrative example. As Professors Graeme
Dinwoodie and Laurence Heifer wrote:
The UDRP is a new legal creature unlike any of its
international dispute settlement antecedents. It is a hybrid
system containing an amalgam of elements from three
decision-making models-judicial, arbitral, and
ministerial-and it draws inspiration from international and
national legal systems. However, neither the UDRP's
substantive content nor its prescriptive force necessarily
depend upon the laws, institutions, or enforcement
mechanisms of any single nation-state or treaty regime.
368
The origin of the UDRP can be traced back to the need by the
U.S. government to privatize the domain name system ("DNS") as
the Internet grew in size and scope in the mid-1990s. 369 In 1998, the
United States Department of Commerce issued the "DNS White
Paper, ' 370 which delineated four basic principles that were used to
develop the new domain name system--"stability, competition,
private bottom-up coordination, and representation." 371 The White
Paper also noted the need for the U.S. government to withdraw from
DNS administration.
372
In addition, the White Paper identified cybersquatting-the pre-
emptive registration of trademarks as domain names by third
parties-as a major problem in the domain name system. The
document called upon WIPO to "initiate a balanced and transparent
process" to provide the new entity with recommendations on how to
368. Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note 364, at 149.
369. For an excellent history of the U.S. government's efforts to privatize the
DNS and early development of ICANN, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong
Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the
Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000). See also Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah,
Fool Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us Twice Shame on Us: What We Can
Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89 (2001).
370. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741
(June 5, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
6 5 98dns.htm.
371. Id.
372. Id. (noting that "neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor
intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments
should participate in management of Internet names and addresses.").
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deal with cybersquatting.313  Pursuant to this invitation, WIPO
launched the First WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, a lengthy
and extensive global consultative process that involved consultation
meetings in fourteen countries on six continents and the participation
of a large number of government agencies, intergovernmental
organizations, professional associations, corporations, and
individuals.
374
Among the recommendations included in the report was the
UDRP, which set forth the terms and conditions related to a dispute
between the registrant and a third party over the registration and use
of a domain name. 375 Under the UDRP, each registrant agrees to
participate in a mandatory administrative proceeding when a third
party complains to a dispute resolution service provider. The person
bringing the case must then prove that the registrant's domain name
is identical, or confusingly similar, to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights. The complainant must also prove
that the person who registered the domain name has no rights to, or
legitimate interests in, the domain name and that the domain name
has been registered and is being used in bad faith.3
76 Although
commentators have criticized the UDRP for its procedural
weaknesses, 377 the policy has been widely acclaimed for its
simplicity and cost-effectiveness in resolving trademark disputes.
Since the UDRP entered into force in December 1999, thousands of
cases have been filed. The majority of these cases has been resolved
373. Id.
374. WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS FINAL REPORT, supra note
243, at 4.
375. See UDRP, supra note 367.
376. Id. 4a.
377. Among the criticisms are the selection and composition of the dispute
resolution panel, the failure to provide adequate time for a domain name
registrant to reply to a complaint, the failure to ensure that the registrant has
received actual notice of the complaint, and the registrant's limited access to
courts for review when the dispute resolution panel decides against a party.
For criticisms of the UDRP, see generally Michael Geist, Fair.Corn?: An
Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP,
27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy "-Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV.
605 (2002). See also Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note 364; Froomkin, supra
note 369; MILTON MUELLER, ROUGH JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF ICANN's
UNIFORM DISPUTE RESOLUTION POLICY (2003), http://www.acm.org/usacm/
IG/roughjustice.pdf.
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satisfactorily and efficiently.
What is interesting about the UDRP is that the policy is neither a
statute nor a treaty. Rather, it is "soft law," 37 8 a nonbonding norm
promoted through a recommendation by WIPO. Since the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) adopted the
UDRP to resolve domain name disputes involving the generic top-
level domains-such as .com, .net, or .org-the policy has been
extended to the domain name space in many foreign countries. For
example, the WIPO ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and
Resolution of Property Disputes advocates the adoption of the UDRP
by managers of country-code top-level domains (ccTLD)-such as
.cn (for China) or .fr (for France)-in the absence of any contrary
local privacy regulations. 379 Likewise, courts in other countries have
applied the UDRP by analogy or incorporated it into national law.
380
Although the development of the domain name dispute
resolution process is still evolving, the UDRP clearly demonstrates
the changing nature of lawmaking processes. Indeed, many
commentators have considered the domain name policy making
process controversial. Instead of a government or an
intergovernmental organization, a private not-for-profit corporation
in California called ICANN was charged with responsibilities for the
day-to-day management of the domain name systems, oversight of
378. See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-
BINDING NORMs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000).
379. The WIPO ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and Resolution of
Property Disputes is available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cctld/
bestpractices/index.html. The document is available in Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Spanish, and Russian.
380. A case in point is China. As Professor Justin Hughes described:
China has experienced a two-step process of moving toward the
UDRP standards. In August 2000, the Beijing Higher People's Court
promulgated guidelines to lower court judges stating that "bad faith
registration and preemption of other people's well-known trademarks
are acts ... to which the General Principles of the Civil Law apply and
which the Unfair Competition Law regulates." The Beijing Court
guidelines then, in effect, reproduced the UDRP examples of "bad
faith."
Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the
Formation of Legal Norms, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 173 (2003) (footnotes
omitted).
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the operation of the authoritative root server system, 3 8 and the
operation of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA),
which delegates to foreign ccTLD managers.
382
Because ICANN has contractual obligations with the United
States Department of Commerce and often ignores the interests of
other countries, the international community has become particularly
concerned. Since its establishment, ICANN has been heavily
criticized for its lack of legitimacy, openness, accountability, and
representation, as well as for its tendency to overstep the bounds of
its limited mission. This debate became even more intense in the
recent World Summit on the Information Society, as national
governments and intergovernmental organizations feared that
ICANN's dominant role in Internet governance would ultimately
encroach upon their normative functions. 383 Although the delegates
were not able to reach any consensus at the end of the summit, they
called on United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to create a
special working group on Internet governance to study the issue and
report back to them in the summit's second phase in Tunis in
381. While domain names are easy for humans to remember, computers do
not understand these catchy names. Instead, computers have to "translate"
these names back to numeric addresses before locating the information the
users requested. To maximize efficiency and minimize storage, the DNS was
designed as a hierarchy, like a pyramid. To "resolve" a domain name, the
computer issues a query to the name server at the bottom of the hierarchy. If
the computer fails to obtain an answer, it will move up the hierarchy. If the
computer still does not obtain an answer, it will continue to move up the
hierarchy until it finally succeeds. At the apex of this hierarchy is a set of
thirteen legacy root zone servers, which identify the name servers storing the
root zone files for all the top-level domains, including both the generic
domains-such as .com, .net, or .org-and ccTLDs. Each of these servers is
assigned a letter from A to M. For example, the Internet Systems Consortium
operates the "F Root Server," and the server in London is called the "K Root
Server." More than three-quarters of these servers are located in the United
States, and the rest are found in Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For
a comprehensive discussion of the authoritative root server system, see
MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 39-40 (2002).
382. For a collection of essays on country-code top-level domains, see
ADDRESSING THE WORLD: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNET COUNTRY
CODE DOMAINS (Erica Schlesinger Wass ed., 2003).
383. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Origins of ccTLD Policymaking, 13
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387 (2004).
Fall 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol 38:323
2005.384
E. Abandonment
Increasingly, intellectual property rights holders have resorted to
the use of protection outside of the international intellectual property
regime. For example, rights holders have used mass market
contracts, including shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses, to protect
their intellectual works. Other rights holders have also relied on
technological protection measures to protect their creative works. As
Shira Perlmutter, the former Associate Register of Copyrights, wrote
about the future of the copyright:
In an online world, the invocation of copyright rules
themselves seems likely to diminish. Copyright law may
become a smaller proportion of the fabric of everyday legal
business-less often the subject of litigation, less often
outcome-determinative. In courts and conference rooms,
384. Paragraph 50 of the WSIS Declaration of Principles states:
International Internet governance issues should be addressed in a
coordinated manner. We ask the Secretary-General of the United
Nations to set up a working group on Internet governance, in an open
and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active
participation of governments, the private sector and civil society from
both developing and developed countries, involving relevant
intergovernmental and international organizations and forums, to
investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the
governance of Internet by 2005.
WSIS Declaration of Principles, supra note 9, 50. The Plan of Action further
provides:
The group should, inter alia:
i) develop a working definition of Internet governance;
ii) identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet
governance;
iii) develop a common understanding of the respective roles and
responsibilities of governments, existing intergovernmental and
international organisations and other forums as well as the private
sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries;
iv) prepare a report on the results of this activity to be presented for
consideration and appropriate action for the second phase of WSIS in
Tunis in 2005.
World Summit on the Info. Soc'y, WSIS Plan of Action 13(b),
WSIS Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (Dec. 12, 2003), in PERSPECTIVES
ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, 97 (F. Scott Kieff, ed.,
2003).
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the battles will increasingly turn on contract law and the
functioning of technological tools. A parallel could be
drawn to the law of real property: few cases are brought
based on real property laws; rather, lawsuits seek to
vindicate contractual rights made possible by the
entitlements established by underlying law.
385
In recent years, the governments of many countries have become
interested in the large-scale deployment of free and open source
software-software whose source code has been made publicly and
freely available. Commentators have also extolled the benefits of
using nonproprietary software, which frees individual end users from
the stranglehold of major proprietary software manufacturers like
Microsoft. Interestingly, the push for stronger copyright protection
in the U.S.-Vietnam free trade agreement did not result in more
purchases of proprietary software from U.S. manufacturers. Instead,
the agreement led the Vietnam government to announce its plan to
require all state-owned companies and government ministries to use
open source software by 2005.386 Open source licensing is
particularly interesting because it is "outside the public domain in
theory, but seemingly inside in effect." 387  While the software
industry initially adopted this licensing model, commentators have
recently explored the application of the model to such other areas as
biomedical and genomic research.388
In sum, it remains unclear how the increasing use of mass
385. Shira Perlmutter, Convergence and the Future of Copyright, 24
CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 163 (2001); see also Samuelson, supra note 246, at
438 (contending that "other developments, such as widespread use of
shrinkwrap licenses or electronic equivalents that substantially limit user
rights, as well as emerging use of encryption and other technological
protections may make the balancing principles of copyright law something of
an historical anachronism" (footnotes omitted)).
386. Lee, supra note 353.
387. Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and
Opportunities, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (2003).
388. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model
for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER
INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECH (Robert Hahn ed., forthcoming),
http://ssm.com/abstractid=574863. See also James Boyle, Enclosing the
Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us, at
http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/low/genome.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2004).
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market contracts, technological protection measures, and open source
licensing will affect the development of the international intellectual
property regime. On the one hand, the increasing use of these
alternative protection measures will take protectible subject matter
out of the regime and may alter the protection traditionally granted
under it. On the other hand, the widespread use of such measures,
may, in turn, encourage the development of new multilateral
arrangements that facilitate such a use. For example, the 1996 WIPO
Internet Treaties were partly created as a response to the need to
prevent the circumvention of copy-protection technologies used to
protect copyrighted works in digital media.389 If the international
intellectual property regime can co-opt these new measures into the
regime by creating rules that facilitate their use and development,
these alternative protection measures will become heavily
intertwined with the regime and, therefore, will be more
appropriately considered "inside" rather than "outside" the regime.
V. OBSERVATIONS
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how countries have
moved from bilateral treaties to multilateral convention. It also
highlights the recent challenges confronting the international
intellectual property regime. Based on this discussion, this Part
offers some observations on the international intellectual property
regime in five different areas: bargaining frameworks, regime
development, global lawmaking, harmonization efforts, and judicial
trends.
A. Bargaining Frameworks
Throughout history, countries have made strategic shifts from
one international regime to another so that they could develop laws
closely aligned with their interests. 39  For example, developed
countries shifted from the intellectual property regime (WIPO) to the
international trade regime (GATT/WTO) to better negotiate
intellectual property issues. Likewise, less developed countries
389. See supra text accompanying notes 246-64.
390. See Helfer, supra note 238, at 6 (asserting that state and nonstate actors
engage in regime shifting for many reasons and, in the case of intellectual
property rights, developing countries are shifting to international regimes more
closely aligned with their interests).
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increasingly rely on the biodiversity and human rights regimes to
increase protection of their basic human economic and social
needs. 391  Indeed, long before the establishment of the WTO,
countries had benefited from regime shifts, such as the shift from the
intellectual property regime to the cultural rights regime. In the
1950s the United States sought to set up the Universal Copyright
Convention as an alternative copyright treaty under the auspices of
UNESCO. Two decades later, less developed countries used the
same forum to push for the establishment of the "New World
Information and Communications Order," which extended the New
International Economic Order to the communications area.
3 92
Several scholars have recently examined the regime shifting
phenomenon. 393 As Professor Laurence Helfer defined it, regime
shifting is "an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty
negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities
391. See id. at 28-34 (discussing the biodiversity regime); id. at 45-51
(discussing the human rights regime).
392. The New International Economic Order sought to bring about
fundamental changes in the international economic system by redistributing
power, wealth, and resources from the developed North to the less developed
South. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 527,
U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
393. For excellent discussions of the regime-shifting phenomenon, see, for
example, JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 564-71 (2000); Helfer, supra note 238. As Professors
Braithwaite and Drahos explained:
International forum-shifting was not an important strategy prior to the
Second World War, when the number of international fora was so
small as to afford little choice. It became an important strategy for the
first time during the era of US hegemony. The US state in fact
translated its 'national legal pastime' of forum-shifting into the realm
of international regulatory contests. When it is starting at defeat on a
given regulatory agenda in a given international forum it shifts that
agenda to another forum, or simply abandons that forum. Part of its
thinking behind abandonment is that the abandoned international
organization will be shocked into a more compliant mode of
behaviour, endeavouring to woo back the world's most powerful state
(and its financial contributions) with more favourable policies and
attitudes.... On other occasions forum-shifting is used to run a
parallel agenda in two international fora. Here the strategy is to cast
both fora in the role of warning suitors, making each strive to do better
than the other in terms of fulfilling the regulatory desires of the US.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra, at 564.
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from one international venue to another." 394 An "inter-regime shift"
reflects a country's move from one venue to another located in an
entirely different regime-for example, from the intellectual property
regime to the human rights regime.395 By contrast, an "intra-regime
shift" reflects a country's move from one venue to another situated
within the same regime-for example, from a bilateral agreement to
a multilateral convention, both under the intellectual property
regime.
396
These two phenomena are particularly important. A
combination of these phenomena demonstrates how countries shift
from one venue to another within a matrix of bargaining frameworks
covering different issue areas, rules, and players (see Figure 1).397
While some countries conduct vertical shifts in this chessboard-like
matrix to "shop" for a forum best aligned with their interests (and
that ensures their success in securing desirable treaty terms), others
counteract by shifting horizontally to an entirely different regime to
increase their bargaining power or create counter-regime norms that
challenge their rivals' positions in other regimes.
398
394. Heifer, supra note 238, at 14 (footnote omitted).
395. Id. at 16.
396. Id.
397. These frameworks "differ from one another according to features such
as membership and voting rules, scope of issues covered, resources allocated,
centralization of tasks, flexibility of applicable rules, control mechanisms, and
permeability to non-state actors." Id. at 11.
398. Professor Laurence Heifer defined counter-regime norms as "binding
treaty rules and non-binding soft law standards that seek to alter the prevailing
legal landscape." Id. at 14. As he explained: "Initially, these norms may
'circulate in the realm of rhetoric or lie dormant as long as those who dominate
the existing regime preserve their power.' But the move to a different
negotiating forum-whether or not the original forum is abandoned-provides
new opportunities for states and NGOs to contest established normative
orthodoxies." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Regime A Regime B Regime C Regime D
Multilateral T
Plurilateral --- -- FORUM -- *----* ---.--
Bilateral
Unilateral
Figure 1: The Matrix of Regime Shifts
As Dean Joseph Nye noted in his book, Soft Power, "the
distribution of power resources in the contemporary information age
varies greatly on different issues .... The agenda of world politics
has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can
win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally." 399  The
United States undoubtedly is "the only superpower with global
military reach"; it, nevertheless, has to collaborate with the European
Union, Japan, China, and other developed countries on international
economic issues.40 The United States also has to cooperate with the
399. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS (2004).
400. Id. at 4. As Dean Nye explained:
On the top board of classic interstate military issues, the United States
is indeed the only superpower with global military reach, and it makes
sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony.
However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the
distribution of power is multipolar. The United States cannot obtain
the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues
without the agreement of the European Union, Japan, China, and
others. It makes little sense to call this American hegemony. And on
the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, international
crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, power is
widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and nonstate
actors. It makes no sense at all to call this a unipolar world or an
American empire-despite the claims of propagandists on the right
and left.
Id. at 4-5.
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entire international community, including less developed countries
and nonstate actors, to deal with such transnational issues as
terrorism, drug trafficking, refugees, illegal immigration,
environmental degradation, illegal arms sales, nuclear proliferation,
bribery, and corruption. As a result, it is in a country's self-interest
to conduct inter-regime or intra-regime shifts to enhance its
negotiating power.
In the past, developed countries-in particular the United
States-made both inter-regime and intra-regime shifts to enhance
their bargaining positions. The textbook example of an inter-regime
shift is the shift from WIPO to GATT/WTO initiated by the
developed countries in the 1980s. At that time, WIPO was
dominated by less developed countries. The "one country one vote"
system therefore had made it difficult for developed countries to
push for stronger intellectual property protection. The forum also
failed to allow for cross-sector bargaining, preventing developed
countries from linking intellectual property rights to other trade-
related items, such as agricultural subsidies and quotas in textiles.
As a result, developed countries found it disadvantageous to
negotiate intellectual property issues in WIPO and pushed for a
different forum.
As the creation of the WTO demonstrates, however, inter-
regime shifts alone cannot achieve what developed countries desire.
Instead, developed countries also need intra-regime shifts to break
the stalemate created by less developed countries, which use
coalition building to offset the stronger bargaining power of
developed countries. For instance, in the 1980s, instead of focusing
on multilateral negotiations, the United States adopted a "divide and
conquer" strategy by making trade threats using section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act, when it sought to push other countries to adopt its
position on strong intellectual property protection. 4"' In the fall of
1985, for example, the United States initiated its test case against
401. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (2000) (granting the United States Trade
Representative power to investigate and identify foreign nations that do not
provide adequate intellectual property protection or that deny American
intellectual property goods fair or equitable market access); Kim Newby, The
Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for
U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 29, 39-46 (1995)
(discussing Special 301 actions in Taiwan, China, and Thailand).
412
CURRENTS AND CROSSCURRENTS
South Korea, successfully forcing the country to agree to stronger
protection for computer programs, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals
and in the copyright, patent, and trademark areas. As Jayashree
Watal pointed out:
[A]n important subsidiary objective... was to separate
Korea from joining developing country opposition to the
GATT initiative on IPRs. Korea was a soft target not only
because of its dependence on exports and more particularly
on the US, but because it had already reached a certain level
of development and could make the transition to
strengthened IPR protection more easily.
40 2
The United States also used section 301 sanctions to isolate such
opposition countries as Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico,
South Korea, and Thailand. Even for those countries outside the
WTO, like China, the United States successfully used section 301
actions to push for stronger intellectual property protection. 40 3 By
equating these other countries with Japan, which has one of the
largest trade imbalances with the United States, the United States
successfully sent a strong message about its determination to protect
intellectual property.
Operating in tandem, inter-regime and intra-regime shifts
successfully helped developed countries remake the international
intellectual property regime. While the ability to link concessions in
agriculture and textiles to intellectual property and foreign direct
investment was primarily the result of inter-regime shifts, intra-
regime shifts successfully convinced less developed countries that
the proposed mandatory dispute settlement process in the WTO
would protect them against unilateral trade sanctions. Indeed, as
some less developed countries pointed out, it would have been
pointless for them to join the WTO had the United States been able
to continue imposing unilateral sanctions despite their
membership.4 °4 It is therefore no surprise that a WTO dispute
402. WATAL, supra note 115, at 18 (footnote omitted).
403. See Yu, supra note 179, at 140-48 (discussing the United States'
success in using section 301 sanctions to pressure China to reform its
intellectual property regime).
404. See, e.g., GAIT Bill Brings Major Reforms to Domestic Intellectual
Property Law, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1966 (Dec. 21, 1994) (noting the
dissatisfaction of the less developed countries over the United States' ability to
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settlement panel held that a WTO member state could only pursue
unilateral sanctions after it had exhausted all actions permissible
under the international trading body.
40 5
Like developed countries, less developed countries have shifted
from one regime to another, though for different reasons. As
Professor Helfer pointed out, there are at least four reasons why less
developed countries found it expedient to do so. First, "[r]egime
shifting allows state and nonstate actors, particularly those that have
been ignored or marginalized in other international regimes, to
experiment with alternative ways to achieve desired policy
outcomes. 40 6 Second, regime shifting provides a safety valve which
states and interest groups can use to "consign[] an issue area to a
venue where consequential outcomes and meaningful rule
development are unlikely to occur.' 40 7 Third, regime shifting creates
"a 'safe space' in which [governments can] analyze and critique
those aspects of TRIPS that they find to be problematic." 408 Finally,
regime shifting "function[s] as an intermediate strategy that allows
developing countries to generate the political groundwork necessary
for new rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the WTO and
WIPO.
4 0 9
Increasingly, less developed countries have made inter-regime
shifts from the intellectual property regime to other regimes, such as
the biodiversity or human rights regime, to demand stronger
protection. While the ability to increase bargaining power by
shifting regimes remains limited for less developed countries, regime
shifting has been helpful in providing the groundwork for stronger
counterbalancing language in international treaties. Indeed, had it
not been for the increasing actions by less developed countries in
other regimes, these countries might not have been successful in
impose Special 301 sanctions despite their compliance with the TRIPS
Agreement); Hartridge & Subramanian, supra note 193, at 909 (suggesting that
states may not accept new multilateral commitments in the intellectual
property area if they are going to be vulnerable to unilateral actions).
405. See WTO, Report of the Panel on United States-Sections 301-310 of
the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
406. Helfer, supra note 238, at 55 (footnote omitted).
407. Id. at 56.
408. Id. at 58.
409. Id. at 59.
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pushing for favorable language in the Doha Declaration.
4 10
Compared to their developed counterparts, less developed
countries rarely perform intra-regime shifts to enhance their
bargaining positions, other than to move from unilateralism or
bilateralism to multilateralism. After all, less developed countries
are likely to be in a stronger bargaining position as a group than as
individual countries given the current geopolitical environment.
4 1'
As Professors Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite noted:
[D]eveloping countries should consider forming a veto
coalition against further ratcheting up of intellectual
property standards. The alliance between NGOs and
developing countries on the access to medicines issue and
the fact that this alliance managed to obtain the Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at the WTO
Ministerial Conference at Doha in November 2001 suggests
that this coalition is a realistic possibility. The position of
such a veto coalition could be converting the Council for
TRIPS from a body that secures a platform to one that
polices a ceiling. This bold new agenda for the Council for
TRIPS would be standstill and rollback of intellectual
property standards in the interests of reducing distortions
410. By laying down the principles, this language could be very important.
As Professors John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos explained:
The globalization of regulation is played out as a contest of principles.
Agreements would rarely be made if they started as enforceable bodies
of rules. Any precision in the rules would immediately create a veto
coalition disadvantaged by that way of framing the rules. The
uncertainty implicit in principles concerning a problem (that everyone
agrees is a problem) allows everyone to sign on. All hope the regime
will not become more specific over time in a way that will hurt their
future interests. But since they may not be sure of what those future
interests will be (e.g. whether they will more frequently end up as
complainants or defendants under the rules), they sign. Indeed, a
virtue of a thicker veil of uncertainty is that it 'increases incentives to
formulate provisions that are fair or equitable'. Sometimes this causes
parties to intentionally thicken the veil of uncertainty initially (e.g. by
lengthening the time or the range of issues to which a regime will
apply) to ensure that all parties can lock in to mutually acceptable and
just foundational principles for a new regime.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 393, at 619 (citation omitted).
411. Cf id. at 565 (stating that "forum-shifting is a strategy that only the
powerful and well-resourced can use").
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and increasing competition in the world economy. If
developing countries cannot forge a unified veto coalition
against further ratcheting up of intellectual property
standards, they can be assured that they will be picked off
one by one by the growing wave of US bilaterals on both
intellectual property and investment more broadly.
412
To maximize their ability to build coalitions, less developed
countries are much more likely to move upwards from unilateralism
or bilateralism to multilateralism, rather than downwards from
multilateralism to unilateralism or bilateralism. Nevertheless, as Part
IV described, less developed countries are sometimes indifferent to
the requests of their developed counterparts for an intra-regime shift.
They may agree because they have no choice but to move to a
regime under which the developed countries would be willing to
negotiate or because the bargaining issues are inconsequential to
their key national interests. Just imagine how little a small
Caribbean island country that focuses primarily on tourism cares
about the protection of semiconductor chips,414 although it might
have interests in protecting such other areas as copyrights,
trademarks, trade dresses, authenticity marks, and geographic
indications.
415
B. Regime Development
Commentators have used different regime theories to account
for the formation and development of international regimes. The
more dominant theories in political science and international
relations are based on the self-interests of individual states. Under
these interest-based theories, states act as self-interested, goal-
seeking players who try to maximize their individual utility.
416
There are at least three reasons why the creation of an international
regime furthers a country's self interests. First, international regimes
correct market failures and reduce the extreme costs and difficulty of
412. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 208 (2002) (footnote omitted).
413. See supra text accompanying note 356.
414. Thanks to Professor Daniel Gervais for this example.
415. Thanks to Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss for pointing this out.
416. For a discussion of interest-based theories, see HASENCLEVER ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 23-82.
416
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collecting information given world politics.417 Because countries are
autonomous, they are reluctant to reveal information unless other
states do the same, lest the lack of cooperation make them worse off.
Facilitating communication among countries helps international
regimes improve the quantity and quality of information available to
policy makers.
Second, international regimes reduce the transaction costs
associated with the negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of
agreements.418 At times, "ad hoc attempts to construct particular
agreements, without a regime framework, will yield inferior results
compared to negotiations within the framework of regimes.
4 1 9
There is no doubt that the international regime will incur transaction
costs. These costs, however, are generally lower, and at times much
lower, than the costs associated with bilateral and plurilateral
agreements. Where the regime costs exceed the costs of negotiating,
monitoring, and enforcing bilateral and plurilateral agreements, the
international regime is unlikely to be formed.
Third, an international regime makes the international system
more transparent. By laying down clear rules and procedures, it
420
becomes difficult for member states to evade their obligations.
When they cheat on these obligations, other member states can easily
point to the rules and procedures to indicate the deviation. The
regime therefore makes government policies more predictable and
induces cooperation by putting the reputation of member states at
stake or creating the threat of retaliation. The regime becomes even
more robust if it includes a rigorous enforcement and review
mechanism, although questions remain whether member states have
the defacto power to enforce the treaties in the regime.
In addition to interest-based theories, two other sets of theories
explain the development of the international intellectual property
regime: power-based theories and knowledge-based theories. Power-
based theories link the existence and effectiveness of an international
417. See Yu, supra note 288, at 605-07.
418. See HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 1, at 37; Yu, supra note 288, at
607.
419. ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND
DIscORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 88 (1984).
420. See Yu, supra note 288, at 607-08.
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regime to a certain configuration of power in an issue area.
When the Berme Convention was developed, Europe was deeply
divided, and no particular country could be considered a hegemon.
In fact, the Berne convention was convened by Switzerland, a
country that was considerably less powerful than many of its
European neighbors. Nevertheless, all of the strong continental
powers-including France, Germany, and Great Britain-were
present at the meeting, and they collectively pushed for the creation
of the Convention. Had they not participated, the Beme Convention
might never have been created.
The power-based theories can also be used to account for the
establishment of the Paris Convention, which involved all of the
major contemporary industrial powers from inception to ratification.
The first intergovernmental congress that led to the creation of the
Convention was organized by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a
declining continental power. The invitation noted specifically the
request of the United States, a strong industrial power at that time,
for patent reforms. The Convention was then concluded in Paris and
had France, Germany, and Great Britain among its signatory states.
The best explanations the power-based theories can provide
concern the development of the TRIPS Agreement and the 1996
WIPO Internet Treaties. The United States' participation in the
creation of the WTO was particularly important, as was the
participation of the European Community and Japan. Initially,
European countries were ambivalent about setting up a new
organization like the WTO. Eventually, however, they agreed with
the United States that protection under WIPO would be inadequate,
especially after they earned the support of other developed countries
to include geographical indications in GATT discussions.422 Once
they agreed that the WTO would be the negotiating forum for the
new intellectual property treaty, they set aside their differences and
collectively pushed for stronger protection.
Similarly, U.S. and EU participation was of the utmost
importance to the creation of the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties.
Unable to obtain stronger protection in the digital area through
Congress, the U.S. administration turned to the international forum.
421. For a comprehensive discussion of power-based theories, see generally
HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 1, at 83-135.
422. See WATAL, supra note 115, at 23.
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Using it as a "negotiation backdoor," the administration successfully
obtained two treaties that it subsequently presented to Congress for
implementation. As Professor Pamela Samuelson has pointed out,
the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties were heavily influenced by the
United States' digital agenda, as outlined in the white paper released
by the Clinton administration's Information Infrastructure Task
Force, and that the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference was almost
"an end run around Congress." 423
The United States' failure to establish the database treaty at the
Diplomatic Conference demonstrates the limits of a hegemon's
power. The United States' success there would have produced a
treaty that would have resulted in legislation that Congress could not
have passed. Although Congress has considered many database
legislation proposals since the mid-1990s, it has yet to adopt any of
them.
424
The last set of theories, knowledge-based theories, posits that
countries change their preferences and beliefs as they learn through
participation in an international regime and that these changes, in
turn, affect the development of the international regime. 42 5 Consider,
for example, the development of the TRIPS Agreement. Since its
creation, less developed countries have learned a great deal about
intellectual property law. Those with strong imitative capacity have
learned to utilize intellectual property laws to become more
competitive. Those lacking imitative capacity or technical expertise
have also learned about the deleterious impacts of the TRIPS
Agreement and its adverse spillover effects on agriculture, health,
environment, education, and culture.
As Professor Susan Sell noted in her book, Private Power,
Public Law, many countries and interest groups "woke up" after the
TRIPS Agreement.426 In the past, intellectual property issues were
considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly technical. They
were "reminiscent of the Catholic Church when the Bible was in
423. See Samuelson, supra note 246, at 372-74.
424. For a discussion of these proposals and the different treatment of
databases by the European Union and the United States, see Yu, supra note
288, at 621-25.
425. For a comprehensive discussion of knowledge-based theories, see
generally HASENCLEVER ET AL., supra note 1, at 136-210.
426. SELL, supra note 198, at 181.
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Latin. 427  This is no longer the case, and many less developed
countries now have well-trained negotiators who understand
intellectual property issues, and many of whom were educated in
developed countries. Although trade officials still conduct most
trade negotiations, many of these officials now have a better
understanding of the complex intellectual property issues involved in
the negotiation.
Many countries have also begun to find that intellectual property
rights are in their self-interest. As I have discussed elsewhere, this
change in attitude helps account for the significant improvement in
intellectual property protection in China in the mid 1990s, even after
the U.S. government backed away from its coercive tactics. In the
past, the Chinese leaders considered intellectual property rights
exploitative devices, which helped protect the West's dominant
position. 8 Now many of them have begun to see how these tools
can help promote national growth. It is small wonder that the
Chinese government has begun to provide assistance to set up special
intellectual property affairs departments, to create intellectual
property protection networks, and to build self-protection systems in
enterprises and institutes to which intellectual property rights are
particularly important.429
Indeed, by the late 1990s, many Chinese began to recognize the
increasing importance of a well-developed information economy.
"Knowledge economy" suddenly appeared as a frequent catchphrase
in major Chinese newspapers and in government officials'
presentations.430 Chinese businesses also quickly adopted words like
427. Id. at 99.
428. See Yu, supra note 179, at 189-90.
429. See, e.g., China: New Measure Will Be Taken to Protect IPR, CHINA
Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Apr. 4, 1997, 1997 WL 9842657; see also China
Introduces Anti-Piracy Technology, CHINA Bus. INFO. NETWORK, Mar. 15,
1999, 1999 WL 5618404 (reporting the efforts of the China Software
Association to introduce new anti-piracy technology to local software
producers).
430. XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA: A
COMPLETE GuIDE 7 (1999) (noting that the phrase "knowledge economy" has
suddenly appeared frequently in such major Chinese newspapers as the
Guangming Daily and The People's Daily); id. ("The Chinese government has
become enthusiastic about information-based economic development because
it has become aware that the value of the global information industry is more
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"e-commerce" and "e-business" to enhance public recognition and
the value of their stocks.43 ' When the National People's Congress
unveiled its new five-year plan in 2000, the plan included
information technology among the major goals of China's long-term
economic development strategy.
432
In sum, three different sets of regime theories-interest-based,
power-based, and knowledge-based theories-help explain the
development of the international intellectual property regime. These
theories are important because they provide us with a better
understanding of the strengths and limitations of the existing regime.
They shed light on how we can make it more effective and robust
and explain why countries act the way they do in the international
intellectual property arena.
C. Global Lawmaking
In the past, intellectual property lawmaking was either domestic
or international by nature. While most intellectual property disputes
were resolved through domestic laws, multilateral conventions-like
the Berne or Paris Conventions-were instituted to coordinate the
diverging national policies concerning the protection of creative
activities. Occasionally, these conventions also harmonized the
diverse protections offered by the laws of different contracting states.
For example, the Berne Convention sets the international minimum
standards for copyright duration, the scope of protection, and the
extent of limitation of that bundle of rights.433 The Paris Convention
provides for the international minimum standards for protection
against unfair competition, delineates priority rights, and reduces the
possibility that patents would be forfeited upon importation or for
nonexploitation.434 The European Patent Convention, the Madrid
Agreement and Protocol, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty all
provide means for industrial property applicants to simultaneously
submit applications in many countries via simplified application
than US$1,000 billion, and that this will be the 'first industry' in the next
century.").
431. XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY, at xl (2002).
432. XUE & ZHENG, supra note 430, at 7.
433. See Berne Convention, supra note 19.
434. See Paris Convention, supra note 20.
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procedures.
435
Today, however, the international intellectual property
lawmaking process is more complex than ever before. First, the
international intellectual property regime is no longer focused on
maintaining international relations and coordinating national
policies. Rather, the regime has become more legalistic.43 Thanks
435. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
436. As Professors Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld described:
[One of the major breakthroughs in the Uruguay Round] was
agreement on a strict and binding system of dispute settlement and
enforcement. Under the earlier GATT dispute settlement mechanisms,
parties to disputes could frustrate the system both at the beginning and
at the end. In contrast, the new Understanding on Dispute Settlement,
to which all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are
required to belong, precludes objection by a potential defendant to
initiation of a case beyond a short delay, and precludes veto of a
decision made by a panel, or, if that decision is appealed, by the
Appellate Body. There is also a complex system of enforcement,
complete with fairly short deadlines and provision for retaliation, in
case a member state does not comply with a decision.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 275, 276-77 (1997); see also William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in
GAIT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 76-78 (discussing how an adjudicative
system "would better promote compliance with GATT rules than would a
negotiation/consensus system"). Professor John Jackson argued that the rule-
based system is particularly important for the governance of international
economic affairs:
Economic affairs tend (at least in peace time) to affect more
citizens directly than may political and military affairs. Particularly as
the world becomes more economically interdependent, more and more
private citizens find their jobs, their businesses, and their quality of
life affected if not controlled by forces from outside their country's
boundaries. Thus they are more affected by the economic policy
pursued by their own country on their behalf. In addition, the
relationships become increasingly complex-to the point of being
incomprehensible to even the brilliant human mind. As a result,
citizens assert themselves, at least within a democracy, and require
their representatives and government officials to respond to their
needs and their perceived complaints. The result of this is increasing
citizen participation, and more parliamentary or congressional
participation in the processes of international economic policy, thus
restricting the degree of power and discretion which the executive
possesses.
This makes international negotiations and bargaining increasingly
difficult. However, if citizens are going to make their demands heard
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to the WTO dispute settlement process, the regime now includes
hard laws that state whether a country's behavior is acceptable.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, all disputes in the intellectual property
area are subjected to the mandatory dispute settlement process under
the WTO.437 As a result of these changes, the international
intellectual property regime is now enforceable.
Notwithstanding this improvement, it remains unclear whether
the system affects developed and less developed countries to the
same extent. A case in point is the recent dispute between the
European Union and the United States over the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act of 1998 ("FIMLA").438 Following the loss before the
WTO dispute settlement panel, the United States entered into an
agreement with the European Union to submit to binding
arbitration,439 instead of amending the section of its copyright statute
and influential, a "power-oriented" negotiating process (often
requiring secrecy, and executive discretion so as to be able to
formulate and implement the necessary compromises) becomes more
difficult, if not impossible. Consequently, the only appropriate way to
turn seems to be toward a rule-oriented system, whereby the various
citizens, parliaments, executives and international organizations will
all have their inputs, arriving tortuously to a rule-which, however,
when established will enable business and other decentralized decision
makers to rely upon the stability and predictability of governmental
activity in relation to the rule.
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 111 (2d ed. 1997).
437. See supra text accompanying notes 228-34.
438. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2000). The Fairness in Music Licensing Act of
1998 amended section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act by exempting
from royalties those restaurants, bars, and retail stores that use "homestyle"
audio and video equipment to play broadcast music. Id. § 110(5)(A). For
excellent discussions of the dispute, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R. Helfer, World Music
on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in
Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REv. 93 (2000).
439. See WTO, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act:
Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU 5.1, WTO Doc.
WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001) (determining the award at 1,219,900
Euros per year), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
160arb 25_1 e.pdf; see also Phil Hardy, WTO Arbitrators Rule That US
Should Pay $1.4m a Year to EU Copyright Owners, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT,
Nov. 7, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File (discussing the arbitration
decision); Richard Owens, TRIPS and the Fairness in Music Arbitration: The
Repercussions, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 49 (2003).
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that is incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement. As one
commentator noted, the United States' approach "raises worrying
concerns that future WTO dispute settlement proceedings might
undercut the minimum standards for intellectual property protection
included in the TRIPS Agreement." 440  This substitute of
compensation for compliance would encourage WTO member states
"to replace effective enforcement of intellectual property rights with
a cynical 'exemptions plus compensation' approach to TRIPS."44'
"[T]he opportunity for strategic gaming predicated on the
requirement for agreement between disputing states [also] poses a
threat to the notion of equality that a rule-based system was intended
to secure.
' 442
Second, the players in the international intellectual property
regime are no longer limited to national governments and
intergovernmental organizations. For example, private corporations
have been very aggressive in lobbying in Brussels, Geneva, and
Washington. As Professor Sell showed in her recent book, private
corporations were the main proponents behind the push for stronger
international intellectual property protection in the TRIPS
Agreement. 443 As she stated, "State-centric accounts of the Uruguay
Round are at best incomplete, and at worst misleading, as they
440. Owens, supra note 439, at 52.
441. Id. at 53.
442. Okediji, supra note 350, at 629. As Professor Ruth Okediji explained:
The opportunity to opt-out and pursue alternative means of settlement
will depend on the political and economic status of a given country in
relation to the complaining Member. Developing and least-developed
countries who do not have the influence to leverage buy-outs from the
DSU process, nor the resources to pay compensation, will
undoubtedly be disadvantaged under this new regime. While having
fewer states with the ability to opt out may in fact benefit the dispute
settlement system, the fact that certain states will be more vulnerable
within the DSU process imposes a systemic cost, namely, the loss of
equal bargaining positions between disputing parties, one of which
may lack the resources, power or opportunity to utilize the alternative
possibilities. The unfortunate result is that... TRIPS compliance as
measured by Members changing their domestic laws will be a matter
for those too poor or too principled. I would add to this list also, those
too powerless in the context of their specific relations with other
countries.
Id. (footnote omitted).
443. See SELL, supra note 198.
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obscure the driving forces behind the TRIPS Agreement."
444
In addition, nongovernmental organizations have increasingly
demanded voices and roles in international organizations and
processes-for example, by submitting amici curiae briefs to the
WTO dispute settlement panels as third parties.4 5  Although
nongovernmental organizations do not have any right to submit these
briefs and the dispute settlement panels do not have any obligation to
consider them, the Appellate Body of the DSB stated clearly that a
dispute settlement panel "has the discretionary authority either to
accept and consider or to reject information and advice submitted to
it, whether requested by a panel or 
not."446
444. Id. at 8. As Professor Sell elaborated:
The TRIPS process was far more complex than a state-centric account
would lead us to believe. In the TRIPS case, private actors pursued
their interests through multiple channels and struck bargains with
multiple actors: domestic interindustry counterparts, domestic
governments, foreign governments, foreign private sector
counterparts, domestic and foreign industry associations, and
international organizations. They vigorously pursued their IP
objectives at all possible levels and in multiple venues, successfully
redefining intellectual property as a trade issue. However, it was not
merely their relative economic power that led to their ultimate success,
but their command of IP expertise, their ideas, their information, and
their framing skills (translating complex issues into political
discourse).
Id.
445. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental
Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 173 (2000) (examining the role that
nongovernmental organizations do and should play in the WTO dispute
resolution process, including the submission of amici curiae briefs); Jacqueline
Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment:
Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European
Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 47 (2001) (discussing the opportunity that the WTO dispute
resolution process provides to nongovernmental organizations for participating
in environmental cases); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Unfriendly Actions: The
Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87 (2001) (exploring
the arguments supporting and criticizing the increased judicialization of WTO
dispute resolution, with particular emphasis on the battle over amicus briefs).
446. WTO, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products: Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R 108
(Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu-e/
58abr.doc. Paragraph 108 reads:
In the present context, authority to seek information is not properly
equated with a prohibition on accepting information which has been
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Many of these organizations, especially powerful ones, have
also actively observed WIPO and WTO meetings to influence
outcomes. 7 Indeed, the participation of civil society organizations
has been a major issue for the World Summit on the Information
Society, as the emergence of the information society has enabled
individual end users to communicate with others in a borderless
world, thus transforming virtually everybody into a stakeholder in
the global information society. That participation, however, is
troublesome, as it does not fit well with the state-centric international
system we have today. Indeed, the needs of individual end users
often are not fully represented-and, worse, ignored-in
intergovernmental fora. As the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights explained:
Too often the interests of the "producer" dominate in the
evolution of IP policy, and that of the ultimate consumer is
neither heard nor heeded. So policy tends to be determined
more by the interests of the commercial users of the system,
than by an impartial conception of the greater public good.
In IPR discussions between developed and developing
countries, a similar imbalance exists. The trade ministries
of developed nations are mainly influenced by producer
interests who see the benefit to them of stronger IP
protection in their export markets, while the consumer
nations, mainly the developing countries, are less able to
submitted without having been requested by a panel. A panel has the
discretionary authority either to accept and consider or to reject
information and advice submitted to it, whether requested by a panel
or not. The fact that a panel may motu proprio have initiated the
request for information does not, by itself, bind the panel to accept and
consider the information which is actually submitted. The amplitude
of the authority vested in panels to shape the processes of fact-finding
and legal interpretation makes clear that a panel will not be deluged,
as it were, with non-requested material, unless that panel allows itself
to be so deluged.
Id. For an interesting chronology of the use of amici curiae briefs in WTO
litigation, see Schneider, supra note 445, at 96-98.
447. See Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding
International Intellectual Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2004) (discussing observer status in the Council for
TRIPS and WIPO), available at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/pubs/helfer-
mediatinginteractions.pdf.
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identify and represent their own interests against those of
the developed nations.
448
Third, as Part IV.D described, a new form of non-national
lawmaking has emerged with the creation of ICANN and the
privatization of the domain name system. Commentators have
discussed at length the limited mission and the structural problems of
ICANN,449 the discussion of which is outside the scope of this
Article. However, it is important to note that ICANN is a private
not-for-profit organization, unlike a national government or an
intergovernmental organization. In the case of country-code top-
level domains, one also cannot ignore the growing influence of
ccTLD managers, associations of national domain registries, and the
private sector, including intellectual property rights holders, Internet
service providers, and major telecommunications and information
technology companies.
450
Fourth, the dynamism between soft law and hard law has
changed, especially where transnational intellectual property issues
are involved. As the UDRP has demonstrated, development of new
technologies necessitates new development in the lawmaking
process, and soft law has taken on a new meaning in the information451
age. Although soft law is not new in the intellectual property area,
448. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 316, at 7.
449. For discussions and criticisms of ICANN, see James Boyle, A
Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50 DUKE L.J. 5 (2000); Tamar
Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker in Cyberspace: A Power Model, 27 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 859 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net:
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003); A.
Michael Froomkin, supra note 369; A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley,
ICANN and Antitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and
Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J.
587 (1999); John Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN's Foray
into Global Internet Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 409 (2004);
Symposium, ICANN Governance: ICANN 2.0, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087
(2003); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE
L.J. 187, 194-95 (2000); Jonathan Zittrain, ICAN: Between the Public and
the Private-Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1071-93
(1999).
450. See Yu, supra note 383.
451. See, e.g., Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc. A/34/13, at 3 (adopted Sept. 20
to 29, 1999), http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/development-iplaw/pdf/
pub833.pdf; Joint Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Marks, and
Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet (adopted Sept. 24 to
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the recent development of international intellectual property issues
and the growing mistrust of less developed countries have made soft
law sometimes more attractive than hard law in inducing less
developed countries to adopt the standards implemented in the
domestic laws of developed countries.
Finally, through incorporation by reference, the laws made in
one forum increasingly influence the laws made in another forum.
For example, panelists from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
increasingly look to treaties in the WIPO or other fora to resolve
ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement. In the EU-U.S. dispute over
the FIMLA, the WTO Panel looked to the WCT to determine
whether subsequent development in international copyright law has
reflected the minor exceptions doctrine of the Berne Convention as
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. 452  Although the panel
ultimately found that the WCT did not constitute "a subsequent
treaty" within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, the Panel
noted the need "to seek contextual guidance... when developing
interpretations that avoid conflicts within this overall framework,
except where these treaties explicitly contain different
obligations."
453
What is striking about this decision is that the Panel sought to
incorporate the WCT into the TRIPS Agreement even before the
agreement entered into force. While sometimes it is advantageous to
look to treaties in other fora for clarification and for harmonization
purposes, it is important that the parties who signed on to the treaty
receive the bargain they struck in the negotiation process. Given the
fact that WTO panelists will now look to WIPO treaties to resolve
ambiguities and promote harmonization, policy makers need to be
particularly cautious when they negotiate treaties in the WIPO
forum, even though the treaties "promise" no enforcement
mechanism, or in a "safety valve" or "safe space" regime in which
states and interest groups expect that consequential outcomes and
Oct. 3, 2001), http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/developmentiplaw/pdf/
pub845.pdf.
452. WTO, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act: Report
of the Panel, WTO Doc. WTiDS 160/R 6.67-.70 (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter
Panel Report on § 110(5)], available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/dispue/1234da.pdf.
453. Id. 6.70.
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meaningful rule development are unlikely to occur. After all,
provisions negotiated in the WIPO or other fora might ultimately
find their way into the WTO regime, which can then be enforced
through the mandatory dispute settlement process.
D. Harmonization Efforts
Since the creation of the Berne and Paris Conventions, there has
been a strong push for international harmonization. In the 1980s,
there was a further push with the creation of the WTO and the TRIPS
Agreement. Notwithstanding these efforts, harmonization is not
always beneficial. As Part IV.B pointed out, diversification may
serve a country better. This benefit was indeed the reason why less
developed countries have been pushing aggressively for more group
diversification in the international intellectual property regime. To
have a better understanding of the international harmonization
process, one must understand the entire spectrum of options available
to a country.
Legal Transplant Approximation/Partial Diversification
Harmonization
Figure 2: The Spectrum of Harmonization
On the one end of the spectrum is a legal transplant,4 5 5 which
454. Heifer, supra note 238, at 56 (discussing the use of an international
regime as a safety valve which states and interest groups can use to "consign[]
an issue area to a venue where consequential outcomes and meaningful rule
development are unlikely to occur"); id. at 58 (discussing the use of an
international regime as "a 'safe space' in which [governments can] analyze and
critique those aspects of TRIPS that they find to be problematic").
455. See Geller, supra note 43. See also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21-30 (2d ed. 1993)
(discussing how laws of one society are borrowed from another); Jacques
deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179 (1999) (discussing American legal assistance to the
post-Communist societies); Julie Mertus, Mapping Civil Society Transplants:
A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe and Latin America, 53 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 921 (1999) (arguing that foreign legal experts bring with them
their own cultural, social, and political misconceptions); John V. Orth,
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Paul Geller defined as a process by which "any legal notion or rule
which, after being developed in a 'source' body of law, is...
introduced into another, 'host' body of law." 456 A case in point is the
transplant of Western intellectual property laws into China, which
occurred twice in China's modem history.457 The first transplant
occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, when the United States
used its military and economic strengths to induce China to sign a
commercial treaty in 1903.458 This treaty granted copyright, patent,
and trademark protection to Americans in return for reciprocal
protection for the Chinese. Despite this treaty and other similar
commercial treaties with Great Britain and Japan, China offered very
limited intellectual property protection to foreign authors and
inventors.
459
The second transplant occurred in the early 1990s when China
signed the Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC)
and the United States on the Protection of Intellectual Property,
460
which established a new intellectual property regime in China.
Pursuant to this memorandum of understanding, China amended its
copyright, patent, and trademark laws; promulgated new
implementing regulations; and adopted a new unfair competition law
Exporting the Rule of Law, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71 (1998)
(explaining the challenge of exporting legal culture).
456. Geller, supra note 43, at 199.
457. For discussions of legal transplants in China, see Herbert H.P. Ma, The
Chinese Concept of the Individual and the Reception of Foreign Law, 9 J.
CHINESE L. 207 (1995) (discussing the cultural barrier to the reception of
Western laws in China); Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Drafting
Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project, 44 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (1996) (discussing the difficulties encountered while assisting
China in drafting legislation).
458. Treaty for Extension of the Commercial Relations Between [China and
the United States], Oct. 8, 1903, reprinted in TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA 1894-1919, at 423 (John V.A. MacMurray ed.,
1921).
459. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 37-38 (1995); Peter
K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1,
6 (2001).
460. Memorandum of Understanding Between China (PRC) and the United
States on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34
I.L.M. 677 (1995).
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protecting trade secrets.46' China also acceded to the Berne
Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty and ratified the
Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms. 462
On the other end of the spectrum is diversification.
Diversification signifies not only disagreement, but also agreement-
countries sometimes agree to disagree. An oft-cited example in the
TRIPS Agreement is the exhaustion provision,464 which provides that
"nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights." 465  This provision
preserves the need for diversification while recognizing the
negotiation impasse among contracting states.
4 66
Somewhere in the middle of the spectrum is a full range
of harmonization processes. Sometimes, countries or regional
communities may approximate the law of different countries. Such a
process is common in the European Community, when the EC
directives harmonize the laws of different EC member states.
Countries may also adopt the legal standards of other countries, thus
engaging in a hybrid process of legal transplantation and
diversification. For example, the TRIPS Agreement extends patent
protection to all "field[s] of technology," but leaves open the details
of how countries frame their patent systems.467 Moreover, countries
may also come up with compromises. A case in point is the 1928
Rome Act of the Berne Convention, which established an optional
copyright term of life of the author plus fifty years when some
461. For a brief discussion of the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding, see
Yu, supra note 179, at 142-43.
462. Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25
U.S.T. 309, 866 U.N.T.S. 67.
463. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
464. See generally Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to
Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other
Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333 (2000) (discussing the disagreement over the
exhaustion issue during TRIPS negotiations).
465. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6, 33 I.L.M. at 1200.
466. As Professor Vincent Chiappetta noted, this provision "reflects the
developing countries' 'last stand' resistance in a losing cause." Chiappetta,
supra note 464, at 337.
467. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 27-34, 33 I.L.M. at 1208-11.
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contracting parties were not ready for a change.468
To make things more complicated, the outcome of the
harmonization process may be affected, and sometimes interrupted,
by other agreements in the same regime, such as bilateral
agreements, plurilateral treaties, or regional conventions.4 69 Through
inter-regime shifts, the process may be influenced by norms or
counter-regime norms countries developed outside of the intellectual
property regime. 470  The process may also "spawn[] new
relationships among different actors and institutions, redefine[] issue
area boundaries, and wear[] away at the distinctions among
regimes." 47 1 To some extent, the existing regime is closer to what
Professors Kal Raustiala and David Victor have described as a
regime complex--"an array of partially overlapping institutions
governing a particular issue-area." 472 As Professor Helfer noted in
relation to the international intellectual property regime, "What
began as a regime with a single intergovernmental organization-
WIPO-then became a bimodal regime with two predominant
organizations-the WTO and WIPO-and has now morphed into a
multi-modal or conglomerate regime populated by numerous
intergovernmental bodies and networks of regional and bilateral
agreements."
473
The outcome of the harmonization process may be further
affected by the demands of different stakeholders in the international
intellectual property regime. Consider the intellectual property
system in India, for example. While policy makers might push for
stronger protection of computer software and audiovisual works in
light of India's booming computer software and movie industries,474
468. This optional term did not become mandatory until twenty years later
when the convention was revised again at Brussels in 1948. See discussion
supra Part II.
469. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
470. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
471. Heifer, supra note 238, at 17.
472. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant
Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 279 (2004), quoted in Heifer, supra
note 238, at 16.
473. Heifer, supra note 447, at 12.
474. See, e.g., IPR CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 316, at 97 (discussing
the India software industry); Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of
Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New,
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they might prefer weaker protection, or even special exceptions, for
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food, and agricultural 
products.475
Similar dilemmas confront many other less developed countries, as
their indigenous industries emerge at different times and grow at
different paces.
Indeed, the international intellectual property regime has been
increasingly sectorized. For example, the wine and spirits industry
successfully lobbied for article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement, which
offers special protection to geographical indications for wines and
476 Tepatbednspirits. The plant breeding industry successfully obtained special
protection in article 27 of the Agreement, which requires member
states to "provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof. 477  In addition, the semiconductor industry gained
protection through the adoption of IPIC Treaty in article 35 of the
Agreement.478  There have also been serious talks about
implementing sui generis protection of databases and traditional
knowledge at the international level.479
In sum, harmonization is not a single process, but one that exists
within a continuum that is continuously influenced by norms and
counter-regime norms set by inter-regime and intra-regime
agreements, specific protection lobbied for by particular sectors of
the creative industries, and other factors that arose as a result of the
12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 940 n.22 (2002)
(discussing Bollywood, the India movie industry).
475. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 316, at 20 (discussing the
weaker patent protection offered to pharmaceutical products in India).
476. Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to
prevent use of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines
not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in
question or identifying spirits for spirits not originating in the place
indicated by the geographical indication in question, even where the
true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is
used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as "kind","type", "style", "imitation" or the like.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 23, 33 I.L.M. at 1205.
477. Id. art. 27(3)(b), 33 I.L.M. at 1208.
478. Id. art. 35, 33 I.L.M. at 1211.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 285-93 (discussing sui generis
database protection) and notes 324-26 (discussing sui generis protection of
traditional knowledge).
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increasing use of mass market contracts, technological protection
measures, and open source licensing. The process is often slow and
complicated, 48 0 as it has to reconcile "the conflicting demands of the
need for stability and the need for change. ' ' 4s1 The outcome of the
process and the reception of the new laws are also heavily influenced
by the socio-economic and cultural backgrounds of the participating
482countries. As Stephen Ladas wrote in the 1970s, long before the
intensification of our current harmonization debate:
Discussion on unification or harmonization of law has
suffered from an initial false assumption that law is a simple
single conception. When we think of law, as we must, as an
apparatus by which judicial and administrative agencies
determine the acquisition, maintenance, and enforcement of
rights in industrial property, we find four distinct elements
in law, as Dean Pound has taught: first, legislative texts and
regulations containing rules of law and procedures for their
application; second, judicial and administrative decisions
construing and applying these texts; third, traditional
techniques and modes of handling legal materials; and
fourth, philosophical, political and ethical ideas and ideals,
as to the end of law, by which the texts, decisions, or
techniques are continuously shaped.
When speaking of uniformity of law in the
international field, many are apt to think only of the first
element in law. While this in itself is not a simple
institution and may be of different types, the other three
480. LADAS, supra note 23, at 15 (noting that harmonization is "a seeking
for approximation of law where uniformity of legal solutions is brought about
through a slow and gradual process and in a spontaneous way on the basis of
recommendations and directives internationally agreed upon").
481. Id. at 14. As Stephen Ladas cautioned us:
It may be that the world is changing faster than we can change
ourselves and our institutions. But lawyers cannot ignore the need for
stability even in periods of rapid growth. For we must always strive to
retain in a continuously evolving environment those things which are
achievements of value, for it is these that give endurance and our
civilization depends on endurance.
Id.
482. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball
Can Teach About Intellectual Property and International Trade, 26 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 218 (2003).
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elements are of decisive importance. When they have
reached a certain fixity in the judicial and professional
tradition, these elements give to law its living content; they
constitute the law "as is" rather than the illusion of 
law.483
It will be very interesting to see whether these additional
developments will strengthen or weaken the existing international
intellectual property regime. It will also be interesting to see whether
such traditional intellectual property rights as copyrights, patents,
and trademarks will be further diluted due to the need for more
tailoring to specific industries and whether the traditional safeguards
in the international intellectual property conventions will be
applicable to this type of sector-specific protection. After all, one
can easily make an argument that the newly created protection falls
outside the scope of the existing conventions.
E. Judicial Trends
Intellectual property laws are territorial by nature. The creation
of a work or an invention does not lead to an international
intellectual property right, but rather a bundle of intellectual property
rights in many different countries. One will not have an international
copyright, but rather copyrights in China, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Even when international conventions are
involved, the nondiscrimination principle of national treatment has
made intellectual property laws more domestic than international.
Oftentimes, a court will use justiciability as a device to avoid cases
involving infringements that arise under foreign laws. 484  Thus,
intellectual property rights holders, whose works have been infringed485
abroad, are often forced to sue in many different jurisdictions. As
a result, enforcement is costly, difficult, and time consuming.
In recent years, however, increased globalization and the
emergence of digital communication technologies have led to three
483. LADAS, supra note 23, at 14.
484. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A
Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 440
(2001).
485. Compare Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d
1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (maintaining that the U.S. Copyright Act confers rights no
further than the national border), with L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int'l,
149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the U.S. Copyright Act exterritorially
based on a domestic predicate act of infringement).
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new judicial trends. First, intellectual property laws--or, to be
more precise, technology laws-have become increasingly
constitutionalized. As Professor Mark Lemley wrote a few years
ago, "Technology lawyers, and especially intellectual property
lawyers, have discovered the Constitution. They are filing suits to
invalidate statutes and interposing constitutional defenses to
intellectual property claims at an unprecedented rate." 486 Since the
advent of the Internet, litigants have brought constitutional
challenges to the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 487 and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,48 8 as well as other technology
489statutes. 48  Scholars and commentators have also begun to focus
"more attention on the complex interaction between intellectual
property, Internet regulation and the Constitution. '49° Indeed, some
486. Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 529 (2000). As Professor Lemley explained:
If you are a loser in th[e legislative] process because you aren't well-
organized or well-funded-say, because you are a member of the
public-you will naturally look for an end-run around what Congress
has done. The Constitution is the perfect avoidance mechanism,
because it allows you to resort to the judgment of the courts, and
courts are more resistant to the sorts of public choice concerns
described above. If you can persuade a court that what Congress has
done is unconstitutional, all the campaign contributions in the world
are unlikely to help your opponents.
Id. at 533 (footnote omitted).
487. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
488. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 457-58
(2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting the constitutional challenge of the anti-circumvention
provision of the DMCA); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding on statutory grounds
the constitutional challenge of the subpoena provision of the DMCA).
489. For example, constitutional challenges have been made to the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (striking down a provision of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 that prohibited the transmission of obscene or indecent communications
by means of telecommunications devices to persons under eighteen), the Child
Online Protection Act, see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)
(remanding to the lower court for a determination of the constitutionality of
Child Online Protection Act); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (same),
and the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, see Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996).
490. Lemley, supra note 486, at 529; see also Thomas B. Nachbar,
Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 272
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commentators have argued that the international intellectual property
regime and the world trading system have become increasingly
constitutionalized as a result of the legalistic trading rules under the
WTO.
4 9 1
Second, as courts begin to use more "choice of law" analyses to
explore possible legal options in the borderless environment of
cyberspace, the adjudication of intellectual property laws requires a
better understanding of foreign laws. As Professor Graeme
Dinwoodie pointed out, "the mere fact that national courts are now
engaging in serious copyright choice of law analysis and that they
are contemplating the application of foreign law requires us to know
foreign law more intimately and thus enhances the need for
comparative work. 4 92  While harmonization has facilitated the
creation of uniform laws and international minimum standards,
policy makers still need to have a better understanding, and a more
generalized appreciation, of foreign legal systems, cultures, and
traditions in order to successfully navigate through the existing web
of national laws, international conventions, and non-national
systems.
What commentators sometimes ignore is the final trend: the
increased importance of public international law. Intellectual
property laws are generally considered private law. However,
intellectual property disputes-in particular the use of multilateral
treaties to resolve disputes between nation-states--concern public
law. Indeed, Paul Geller considered this shift from private to public
(2004) (discussing the limits of the Intellectual Property Clause on Congress's
powers).
491. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511 (2000); GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING
UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITuTION: A STUDY IN LEGISLATING BY THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000).
492. Dinwoodie, supra note 484, at 441. As Professor Dinwoodie explained,
"choice of law" analysis requires more information than just the foreign law:
[T]ranslating information into knowledge, and thence into
understanding, such that the information is properly understood and
applied, is facilitated by exposure to comparative scholarship.
Understanding foreign substantive law often requires a more
generalized appreciation of foreign systems and methods that does not
neatly correlate to the specialized division of substantive law.
Id. at 441-42.
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international law to be one of the more important recent trends.
4 93
As he explained:
The Berne Convention is above all an instrument of private
international law, assuring private parties of rights in
literary and artistic works. To have effect, these rights must
be vindicated in national courts, to which private parties
may have recourse in copyright disputes with other private
parties. The GATT, by contrast, is essentially an instrument
of public international law: it governs disputes between
public entities, notably nation-states, and has procedures to
adjudicate such disputes and to sanction states for violating
its rules.
494
Despite this recent trend and the changing nature of the law,
very limited scholarship has been devoted to the 4public law aspects
of international intellectual property disputes.4 5  As countries
increasingly use international treaties to protect intellectual property
rights, a more thorough understanding of public international law is
now in order. For example, in the EU-U.S. WTO dispute over the
FIMLA, the dispute settlement panel used the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties to determine whether the WIPO Copyright
Treaty constituted subsequent development in international copyright
law. 4 96 The Doha Ministerial Declaration also mentioned explicitly
the need for "the Council for TRIPS ... to examine.., the
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity," which was created outside of the WTO
regime.497 With the creation of increasing overlapping obligations
through inter-regime shifts and the need to deal with interactions
493. Paul Edward Geller, New Dynamics in International Copyright, 16
CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 461, 469 (1992).
494. Id.; see also Ruth L. Okediji, The Institutions of Intellectual Property:
New Trends in an Old Debate, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 219 (2004)
(noting that "[b]y inserting private rights into a public institutional framework
with enforcement authority, TRIPS has caused scholars, policy makers, users,
and owners alike to confront the inherently public function of intellectual
property rights").
495. Most of this scholarship focuses on the WTO dispute settlement
process. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 436; Neil W. Netanel,
The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute
Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441 (1997).
496. Panel Report on § 110(5), supra note 452.
497. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 219, 19.
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among the different international regimes, intellectual property
policy makers and commentators have an increasing need to
understand public international law better. Unfortunately, except for
those who are trained in public international law, many concepts in
the field remain foreign to these policy makers and commentators.
In addition, it is very important for policy makers, in particular
those from less developed countries, to understand the many
different ways they can interpret treaties. Although commentators
have criticized the weakness and one-sidedness of the TRIPS
Agreement, these problems can be significantly reduced if the treaty
is interpreted properly and strategically. Indeed, the treaty contains a
lot of "constructive ambiguit[ies], ' 498 and these ambiguities provide
sufficient "wiggle room" for less developed countries to interpret the
treaty in its favor.499 For example, Professor Carlos Correa pointed
out that developed countries are likely to interpret the word "review"
to mean "review of implementation" while less developed countries
could arguably interpret the same word in a way that opens up the
possibility for "reviewing," or revising, the text of the Agreement.
50 0
Thus, it is very important for less developed countries to "self-
consciously adopt a defensive, pro-competitive strategy with regard
to those standards whose application to specific cases remain open to
interpretation. '501 By doing so, these countries may be able to
"'claw[]' back much of what was lost in the negotiating battles in
TRIPS."502
Commentators have already noted the importance of articles 7
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and how these development-friendly
safeguard provisions can be interpreted to strengthen the position of
less developed countries. 503  For example, the preamble of the
498. WATAL, supra note 115, at 7.
499. See Reichman, supra note 331, at 28 (contending that "the TRIPS
Agreement leaves developing countries ample 'wiggle room' in which to
implement national policies favoring the public interest in free competition").
500. See CORREA, supra note 216, at 211.
501. Reichman, supra note 331, at 91.
502. WATAL, supra note 115, at 7.
503. As Professor Reichman explained:
These countries could attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in
Articles 7 and 8 in one of two ways. The least destructive approach
would be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to recommend
narrowly described waivers to meet specified circumstances for a
limited period of time. This approach would strengthen the mediatory
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Agreement states that "the underlying public policy objectives of
national systems for the protection of intellectual property...
include[e] developmental and technological objectives. ' '5°4 The
preamble also recognizes "the special needs of the least-developed
country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to
create a sound and viable technological base., 505  Article 7 states
explicitly that "[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations." 50 6 Article 8(1) notes the needs for
member states to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health
and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
50 7
Thus, by interpreting these articles to their advantage, less
developed countries may be able to push for stronger language in the
international intellectual property regime that protects less developed
powers of the Council for TRIPS and help to offset the problems
arising from the inability of that body to quash or stay requests for
consultations and dispute-settlement panels launched by trigger-happy
governments.
Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to
complaints of nullification and impairment under Article 64 might
invoke the application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet unforeseen
conditions of hardship. This defense, if properly grounded and
supported by factual evidence, could persuade the Appellate Body
either to admit the existence of a tacit doctrine of frustration built into
the aforementioned articles or to buttress those articles by reaching out
to the general doctrine of frustration recognized in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Either way, overly aggressive
complainants could wind up with what would amount to a judicially
imposed waiver.
J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation
with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 461-62
(2000) (footnotes omitted).
504. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. at 1198.
505. Id.
506. Id. art. 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1200.
507. Id. art. 8(1), 33 I.L.M. at 1201.
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countries against the continuous expansion of intellectual property
rights as demanded by developed countries. They may also be able
to use the treaty to preserve their ability to exercise national
discretion that were appropriately reserved to them during the TRIPS
negotiations, and therefore regain the balance of the international
intellectual property regime.
Moreover, the successful use by less developed countries of the
WTO process might create spillover effects that ensure more
beneficial outcomes in their political negotiations with developed
countries, as well as "policy space in which they implement domestic
intellectual property and public health regimes." 508 As Professor
Gregory Shaffer explained:
[P]articipation in WTO political and judicial processes are
complementary. The shadow of WTO judicial processes
shape bilateral negotiations, just as political processes and
contexts inform judicial decisions. If developing countries
can clarify their public goods priorities and coordinate their
strategies, then they will more effectively advance their
interests in bargaining conducted in WTO law's shadow,
and in WTO legal complaints heard in the shadow of
bargaining. They, in turn, will be better prepared to exploit
the 'flexibilities' of the TRIPS Agreement, tailoring their
intellectual property laws accordingly, and will gain
confidence in their ability to ward off US and EC threats
against their policy choices. In other words, developing
countries' international legal strategies have implications
for their leverage in international political negotiations and
for the policy space in which they implement domestic
intellectual property and public health regimes.
50 9
To enable less developed countries to take advantage of the dispute
settlement process, he proposed three strategies. First, less
developed countries "could pool their resources through national,
regional, and international centers specializing in trade-related
intellectual property issues."510  Second, they "need to work
508. Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute
Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 477
(2004).
509. Id. at 476-77 (footnote omitted).
510. Id. at 477.
Fall 2004]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol 38:323
consistently with US and European political allies to alter the US and
European domestic political contexts." 511 Third, "developing
country governments and their legal advocates should work with the
generic pharmaceutical sector, including companies from third
countries, if they are to develop an effective strategy."
512
VI. CONCLUSION
Since countries began using bilateral treaties to coordinate
national intellectual property policies in the nineteenth century, the
international intellectual property regime has changed substantially.
In its first century of development, the regime consisted of primarily
national laws that were patched together by a framework of
multilateral conventions. While the Berne Convention protects
literary and artistic property, the Paris Convention covers industrial
property.
Although these two conventions formed the foundations of the
international intellectual property regime, they were soon considered
inadequate due to the lack of an effective enforcement and dispute
resolution mechanism. By the mid-i 990s, this patchwork of national
laws and multilateral conventions had given way to a supranational
code called the TRIPS Agreement. This supranational code was later
supplemented by other multilateral treaties like the 1996 WIPO
Internet Treaties. As Professor Jane Ginsburg pointed out
insightfully:
"International copyright" can no longer accurately be
described as a "bundle" consisting of many separate sticks,
each representing a distinct national law, tied together by a
thin ribbon of Berne Convention supranational norms.
Today's international copyright more closely resembles a
giant squid, whose many national law tentacles emanate
from but depend on a large common body of international
norms. 
513
In recent years, the international intellectual property regime has
been transformed once again, as it confronts the new crosscurrents of
reciprocization, diversification, bilateralism, non-nationalization, and
511. Id. at 479.
512. Id. at481.
513. Ginsburg, supra note 270, at 289.
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abandonment. Although the supranational code remains in effect,
the network model has challenged to replace the outdated patchwork
model. As a result, the proverbial giant squid has now taken the
shape of a planet system in which outlying moons revolve around the
planet, clashing with it at times, and drifting away at others.
Today, the international intellectual property regime represents
an amalgam of national laws, multilateral conventions, supranational
codes, and non-national systems. This amalgam is further subjected
to influences and interferences by norms and counter-regime norms
set by other related regimes, while simultaneously affected by
such alternative protection measures as mass market contracts,
technological protection measures, and open source licensing. Like a
planet, the international intellectual property regime will travel in a
large universe, and at some point it may cut into the paths of other
planets. How these planets will react remains a complete mystery-
a mystery apt for the new millennium.
Two things are certain, however. First, the regime will continue
to expand. The recent developments in the international intellectual
property regime reflect neither the end of a multilateral process nor
the beginning of a new era of resistance. Rather, they reflect the
interaction between an evolving set of currents and crosscurrents. As
with all evolutionary processes, it is impossible to predict the end
results or the shape the final product will take. Second, as the
international intellectual property regime continues to develop, it will
become more sectorized and diverse. While history provides helpful
insights into our understanding of current developments in this
regime, the nature and scope of the rights have changed substantially.
Thus, it is very important not to overlook recent developments when
one applies "lessons" of the past.
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